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ABSTRACT
The Thesis investigates issues of growth and development economics from both a 
theoretical and empirical perspective. The basic stylised fact which motivate the 
analysis are the existence, documented in the work, of poverty traps and the obser­
vation that there is a critical stage in which growth becomes the normal condition of 
a society. The main objective of the work is to identify economic determinants which 
explain the growth-stagnation dichotomy, or why countries find more difficulties in 
activating growth rather than in keeping growth going.
In the first chapter, I construct a model which combines self-sustained growth and 
‘underdevelopment traps’ into a common analytical framework. The model exhibits 
aggregate non-convexities and thresholds which separate a region in which the equi­
librium growth path converges to a stationary steady-state from a region in which 
growth is self-sustained. The core of the chapter is a set of original formal propo­
sitions about non-linear economic dynamics of which I make use in both this and 
the following chapter. The outcome of some simulations are also discussed. The 
findings are used to interpret some historical episodes like the take-off experience of 
different countries during the Industrial Revolution.
The second chapter presents a model built on a similar analytical framework, based 
on the parable of an economy of many island which grow different fruits from spe­
cific trees, whose fertility increases when fertilisers taken from different islands are 
employed. The parable aims at explaining how the cost of ‘market activity’ and 
intermediation affect growth and, possibly, cause underdevelopment traps. The fol­
lowing chapter tests some implications of the model.
The fourth chapter introduces into the analysis foreign direct investments as a po­
tential source of growth, stressing how enforcement problems may limit their flow 
towards poor countries. Overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents choose the 
level of individual investment in human capital, whose effects are transmitted be­
tween dynasties, and elect the government. The political equilibrium is determined 
by the distribution of income across generations. Simulations show that it is possible 
for structurally identical countries to select alternative equilibria at some period and 
converge to either a constant positive growth rate or a low income stationary state. 
The last chapter is an empirical investigation of the sources of macroeconomic fluctu­
ations using the methodology of structural vector autoregression analysis. It extends 
to a multicountry framework the decomposition analysis of the GNP into perma­
nent and temporary components and present the results of an application to the 
United States and United Kingdom using a sample of about one century lenghth. 
The results confirm other authors’ findings about the large relative importance of 
temporary disturbances in explaining business cycle fluctuations.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent survey article, Lucas (1993) addresses the question of what ex­
planations growth theory can provide to those episodes of very rapid income 
growth, that he calls ‘economic miracles’. He notes that in 1960 the Philippines 
and South Korea had about the same per capita GDP, and the main struc­
tural economic indicators were rather similar (apart from a difference in the 
higher education schooling rates that was clearly in favour of the Philippines). 
These preconditions notwithstanding, from 1960 to 1988, GDP per-capita in 
the Philippines grew at about 1.8 per cent per year, without any evidence of 
‘convergence’ to the GDP levels of the rich countries. Korea, on the other 
hand, ‘grew at 6.2 per cent per year, a rate consistent with the doubling of 
living standards every 11 years’ (p. 251).
Traditional growth literature fails to provide satisfactory explanations to 
these contrasting performances. On the one hand, neoclassical models follow­
ing the Solow-Cass-Koopmans tradition predict that backwardness itself is one 
main reason for rapid growth. When we control for technological and taste 
parameters, convex growth models predict that countries with a lower initial 
capital stock will grow faster than rich countries towards the steady-state long- 
run equilibrium. This may help explain the Korean miracle, but does not say 
why the Philippines did not do the same, and is even more sharply contra­
dicted by the Sub-Saharan Africa experience of stagnation throughout the last 
decades. On the other hand, generations of trade and development theorists of 
more or less radical inclination (Baran, 1957; Frank, 1967; Lewis, 1977; Krug- 
man, 1981) argue, to the opposite, that due to the nature of the North-South 
relations growth and development are impossible for poor country. According 
to these authors, relative backwardness, far from being a source of growth, is 
a cause of stagnation. This claim, consistent with diverse example of poverty 
traps, seems contradicted by the Korean miracle.
Lucas’ viewpoint is different from either school. His requirements for a
satisfactory theory of growth and ‘miracles’ are that:
• ‘since it is a fact that the poor are either not gaining on the rich, or 
are gaining only very slowly, one wants a theory that does not predicts 
otherwise’ (p. 269);
• ‘a successful theory of economic miracles should, ..., offer the possibility 
of rapid growth episodes, but should not imply their occurrence as a 
simple consequence of relative backwardness. It should be as consistent 
with the Philippine experience as with the Korean’ (p.269).
The main objective of this thesis is to develop a theory of economic devel­
opment which is consistent with these guidelines and with a number of other 
stylised facts which will be presented throughout the work. Our initial objec­
tive is an analytical foundation for the existence of underdevelopment traps. 
We observe that both historical and cross-country evidence (discussed in the 
beginning of chapter 1) suggest that it is more difficult for countries to acti­
vate a development process than to keep growth going. This leads to a natural 
emphasis on non-convexities and increasing returns to scale. On the other 
hand, motivated by the stylised facts identified by Prof. Rostow’s monumen­
tal work, we aim at explaining why single once-over episodes may activate a 
self-sustained growth process, with the take-off periods being characterised by 
particularly high growth rates.
This does not fulfil completely Lucas’ guidelines yet. The other point raised 
by Lucas (that we also document with further examples in the final section 
of chapter 1) is that countries that seem to be structurally identical do some­
times react differently when hit by the same innovation: some of them activate 
the engine of growth, whereas others remain locked into stagnation. To ad­
dress this point, we think it useful to develop models containing economically 
meaningful multiple equilibria, of the type recently emphasised by Krugman 
(1991), related to the presence of externalities. Krugman observes that ‘in the 
presence of some kind of externality,..., future returns depend on the factor al­
location decisions of other people - which also depend on their expectations of 
future earnings. Thus, there is at least potentially a possibility of self-fulfilling 
prophecies’ (p.654). This idea stretches back to the traditional ‘Big Push’ doc­
trine of Rosenstein Rodan (1943), recently revisited and formalised by Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989). More precisely, Pareto-rankable multiple equilib­
ria can be obtained in macroeconomic models when both externalities and 
strategic complementarity (Cooper and John, 1988) are present1.
In the first, second and fourth chapter, we develop a number of analytical 
models which try to explain why structurally identical country at some stage 
of their history may take some divergent routes. Our approach abstracts from 
im portant idiosyncratic factors (like cultural, anthropological or social differ­
ences) and, following Lucas (1988), tries to identify ‘a mechanics of economic 
development - the construction of a mechanical, artificial world, populated by 
the interacting robots that economics typically studies, that is capable of ex­
hibiting behaviour the gross features of which resemble the actual world ...’ 
(p. 5).
The first chapter of the thesis constructs an endogenous growth model 
whose most original feature is a particular type of multiplicity of equilibrium 
solution trajectories. These trajectories all but one converges to a stationary 
steady-state, whereas one exhibits perpetual growth. This is, in our opinion, 
the most sensible representation of the growth-stagnation dichotomy. Related 
literature on underdevelopment trap issues has identified a number of economic 
mechanisms which generate multiple equilibrium trajectories converging to al­
ternative steady-states. Other papers have shown the possibility of zero-growth 
corner solutions in endogenous growth models. In the former group of papers, 
we might mention models of sectoral allocation (Krugman, 1991; Matsuyama,
1The former refer to the interactions between agents’ decisions at the level of their pay­
offs, the latter to the interactions at the level of optimal strategy. For example, there are 
strategic complementarities in investment decisions if not only the representative agent’s 
payoff but also the optimal individual investments is increasing with the aggregate level of 
investments.
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1991, Rodriguez, 1993), models with pecuniary externalities coming from tech­
nological complementarities (Young, 1993; Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1992), 
models with search and trade externalities (Diamond and Fudenberg, 1989), 
or other types of external effects (Benhabib and Farmer, 1991; Boldrin, 1993). 
In the second group we find mainly some models which assume non-convexities 
in the technology of human capital accumulation (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; 
Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990), but also models with stochastic endoge­
nous innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992). To our knowledge, however, our 
model is the first to demonstrate the possibility of saddle-path (interior) equi­
librium solutions a la Cass (1965) co-existing with self-sustained growth equi­
libria a la Romer (1986). The analytical intuition is that such dynamics emerge 
whenever both decreasing and increasing returns occurs, such that the produc­
tivity of reproducible assets is larger than the social discount rate in the ‘large’ 
economy, but falls below it for some range of interior values of the state vari­
able. We rationalise this in a model with externalities of the learning-by-doing 
type. The main analytical issue is that standard arguments of existence and 
determinacy2 of the solutions do not apply to this framework. The core of 
the contribution is contained in a technical section which provides analytical 
conditions for such properties to be satisfied. We interpret the model as a 
formalisation of the Rostovian idea of economic take-off. Multiple equilibria 
are a possible feature of this model.
Results obtained by manipulating the aggregate production function such 
as assuming various types of externalities can always be criticised on the 
grounds of the ad hoc nature of the assumptions. In the second chapter, we 
develop a two-sector model which exhibits the same dynamics as those dis­
cussed in the first chapter without any special assumption about technology. 
The model has the nature of a parable about an economy of islands in which
2 By determinacy of the solutions we mean the existence of a finite number of equilibrium 
values of the choice variable(s) for each state of the system. Our equilibria may be non­
unique but are always determinate (cfr. Benhabib and Farmer, 1991, for a model with 
opposite results).
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there are transaction costs and specialised operators whose activity consists 
of trading heterogeneous productive resources owned by agents who live in 
different island. The main intuition is that if there are imperfections in the 
‘intermediation sector’, and the degree of imperfection is decreasing with the 
size of the market, it is possible to obtain the alternance of increasing and de­
creasing returns which makes this model observationally equivalent with that 
characterised by technological externalities discussed in the first chapter.
Some problems of economic interpretation are worth mentioning. In both 
the models of the first and second chapter, due to the presence of non-convexities, 
a critical issue may seem to be the size of the economy. A natural objection 
(particularly to the second model) is that in an open economy environment 
all the intermediate inputs that it is expensive to produce locally due to the 
limited size of the market could be imported. This appears to destroy the 
argument for the existence of traps. However, one should notice that a large 
part of intermediate goods and services has a non-traded nature; the addition 
to the model of (totally or partially) traded goods which can be purchased in 
the international market would not alter the qualitative results. This seems 
to be a weak condition. Consider for instance financial services, whose nature 
of local goods may appear particularly controversial. In many underdeveloped 
countries the access to international credit markets is highly limited; further­
more, im portant sector of activities (e.g. credit to small rural enterprises) 
are characterised by serious information asymmetries which make the credit- 
customer relation essential for the existence of credit activity. In these cases, 
financial intermediation turns out to be a quasi-local good. A further issue 
is that in both models the size of the market or of the externality network 
seems to be the crucial variable, but there is no evidence that ‘large’ countries 
perform better than small countries. We should stress, however, that when we 
refer to the market or the capital stock size, this does not need to be deter­
mined by the political borders of independent states. Many countries lack even 
significant markets of nationwide scale, whereas other countries are perfectly
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integrated in international market networks which make their political borders 
of low importance. The theoretical predictions of the model should be taken 
as conditional on these dimensions.
Chapter 3 tests some implications of the model of section 2. The model 
predicts that intermediation costs3 should be negatively correlated with growth 
rates. We assume for sitnplicity that the market power of the banking sector 
is representative of that of the whole intermediation sector. Then, we take 
the wedge between the borrowing and lending interest rate as a measure of 
such markup, which, according to our theory, should be negatively correlated 
with, tfie growth rates across countries. The results are clearly supportive of 
the hypothesis, after controlling for several typical explanatory variables in 
cross-country growth regressions4. Though we take this empirical analysis as 
just preliminary, the results look encouraging. The main limitation, which we 
plan to cope with in future investigation, is that the test does not consider 
explicitly the trap issue, which plays a main role in the theoretical analysis.
In the models of the first two chapters, we do not take any explicit view on 
the nature of the resources whose accumulation determines growth. Traditional 
growth theorists would call it ‘physical capital’; Romer (1986), on the other 
hand, referred to it as ‘knowledge’; in the first chapter we simply define it 
as the vector of ‘reproducible resources’. There exists a class of endogenous 
growth models, however, which entails a clear characterisation of the driving 
force of the growth process as the accumulation of human capital (Lucas, 1988; 
Santos and Caballe, 1993; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1993). From an analytical 
viewpoint, there is a clear distinction between these models and the those 
discussed earlier. Models with human capital accumulation do not need any
3By intermediation we mean here all economic activities which, without being directly 
productive, allow economic agents to perform exchanges activity which improve the alloca­
tion of productive resources. Financial intermediation is the main economic activity of this 
type; other examples are mentioned in the introduction to chapter 2.
4Here, we are not faithful to our previous discussion, and maintain the country as the 
unit of analysis. We leave to future research to check the robustness of results when control 
is made for the degree of openness of countries.
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force which sustains the productivity of physical capital (or analogue concepts) 
to keep growth going as the stock of capital increases. Since the productivity 
of labour is continuously augmented by the investments in education, these 
models do not have any genuinely fixed factor which enters the production 
function. The stock of capital can increase for ever without losing productivity 
at the margin, because the complementary factor - labour in efficiency units 
- also grows over time and constant returns to scale are sufficient to generate 
endogenous growth. If the critical assumption of non-decreasing returns to the 
accumulation of human capital is satisfied, there is an engine of growth. This 
is the framework of our model of chapter 4.
A theory of underdevelopment traps within this framework needs to explain 
why agents in poor countries find it lowly profitable to devote time to increase 
their future labour productivity and wage. The key issue is to identify an eco­
nomic mechanism such that people in very poor countries expect to receive too 
low a benefit from augmenting their productivity to justify the effort and the 
opportunity cost of learning and not invest in education. Earlier models simply 
assume that there are increasing social returns to human capital accumulation 
(Azariadis and Drazen, 1990). In our model, low investment in education is 
caused by the lack of some complementary inputs to labour in the economy. 
An isolated electronic engineer cannot expect to take great advantage from his 
qualification in a primitive rural economy. The model identifies a vicious circle 
tha t two-way links low human capital accumulation to the absence of devel­
opment of a modern industrial sector of activity. Recent experience suggests 
that foreign investments are an important vehicle of industrialization and de­
velopment, particularly in those activities (manufacturing sector) that entail a 
significant technological transfer towards poor countries. This suggests a rela­
tion of complementarity between the capability of a country to attract foreign 
investors, and that of inducing the accumulation of local human resources.
The question to be answered becomes then why many poor countries fail 
to attract foreign investment. The explanation proposed by our model is that
15
investors feel unsafe about property rights. Political changes, revolutions or 
changes in the attitude of the local governments can undermine the control of 
the investor over the resources invested. The issue of property right enforce­
ment has been recently discussed within endogenous growth models, but usu­
ally without explicit reference to foreign investment. Benhabib and Rustichini 
(1991) assume an heterogeneous two-group population and show that the poor 
definition of property rights (each group may lobby to redistribute the existing 
resources in favour of the consumption of its members) may negatively affect 
the investment and growth rate of the economy. Persson and Tabellini (1991a) 
relate this issue to that of income distribution. They assume that heteroge­
neous agents vote about a linear tax schedule on capital to finance lump-sum 
redistribution. The higher the degree of inequality, the higher the petition for 
redistribution and the equilibrium tax rate, and the lower the growth rate. 
Saint-Paul and Verdier (1991) argue, on the other hand, that high inequality 
leads to higher growth, since it causes more pressure for redistribution in the 
form of public education. Other papers include Perotti (1990), Alesina and 
Rodrik (1991) and Bertola (1991). In all these papers, the conflict is about 
redistributing a stock of resources owned by members of the social community 
in a way that could be either favourable or unfavourable to growth.
The issue becomes even more serious when part of the resources which 
are used in production are owned by foreigners, whose interests are not repre­
sented, in principle, by local governments. There is always an incentive for the 
government to prevent these agents from appropriating the reward perceived 
from their participation to the productive process. When both local agents 
and governments are finitely lived and non-altruistic, there is a problem of 
time-consistency inherent to foreign investment decisions. We show that the 
issue can be solved by allowing the host country to pre-commit itself to prop­
erty right enforcement by electing a government consisting of a ‘committee 
of foreign capitalists’. However, the condition for this political solution to be 
viable through the support of the majority of voters is that the benefit from
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seizing foreign resources be not too large. This implies that in equilibrium 
the amount of foreign investments is rationed below the first-best level by the 
investor themselves. By the previous argument, this feeds back to reducing 
the rate of human capital accumulation and the growth rate of the economy.
The model allows for heterogeneous agents, with different human capital 
endowments and income, and contains predictions about the effects of distri­
bution on growth. In particular, it is consistent with the Kuznets curve and 
predicts a relation between growth and distribution similar to that found by 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Piketty (1993) assuming information issues in 
capital markets.
The model of chapter 4 shares some features with those presented in the 
previous chapters. Multiple equilibria are possible due to the nature of the 
interactions between political equilibrium and individual choices of human 
capital investments. The selection between alternative outcomes only depends 
on the expectations prevailing within the members of a particular generation. 
In one type of equilibrium there is higher investment in education in the host 
country and higher foreign investment, whereas the other type of equilibrium 
is characterised by a lower level of both variables. We show by simulation that 
a single episode, namely the choice of one or another equilibrium may have 
dramatic long-run consequences. The succeeding generations may no longer 
face the multiplicity of equilibria, and we can construct cases in which given 
two initially identical countries, that which selected the good equilibrium takes 
off into sustained growth, whereas the other declines irreversibly.
The last chapter of the thesis is somewhat self-contained It presents an 
empirical contribution to the debate about the nature and sources of macroe­
conomic fluctuations. Some elements of this debate are discussed at the begin­
ning of the chapter. Nelson and Plosser (1982) suggested a new way of looking 
at the relationship between growth and business cycle in macroeconomics, 
stressing the unit root properties of the GNP stochastic process. According to 
these authors, the presence of a stochastic rather than deterministic trend in
17
GNP is per se sufficient to diminish the role attributed by traditional models 
to temporary (e.g. monetary) disturbances in explaining output fluctuations. 
This view was later challenged by work in a multivariate framework (Blanchard 
and Quah, 1989; King et al., 1991) which rescued the Keynesian argument ac­
cording to which demand shocks play a main role as a source of business cycle. 
Recent work using cointegration analysis (Bernard and Durlauf, 1991) estab­
lished that the data reject both the view that growth is driven by a common 
trend worldwide and the view that growth has an entirely idiosyncratic na­
ture. This means that output in each country is affected by more than one 
independent disturbance with a permanent nature and that the share of out­
put variability explained by temporary disturbances might be smaller than 
that found by Blanchard and Quah assuming that output growth is driven by 
one stochastic trend only.
To disentangle the effects of multiple trends and measure the importance of 
short-run interactions between idiosyncratic disturbances in explaining business- 
cycle fluctuations, we extend to a multicountry framework the analysis of 
Blanchard and Quah. We then present the result of a simple two-country 
VAR system. The results show that the qualitative findings of Blanchard and 
Quah concerning the importance of purely temporary disturbances seem to 
be confirmed, though quantitatively somewhat diminished. Furthermore, we 
present results obtained from a sample of data over ninety years which allow 
us to assess the performance of the model in the face of large scale episodes 
like the World Wars and the Great Depression. However, some results are 
puzzling and suggest that more work need to be done before drawing definite 
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 1
A Rostovian Model of Endogenous Growth and 
Underdevelopment Traps
Sustained growth of per-capita income is a recent event in world economic 
history. Reynolds (1983) documents a prolonged period in which, though 
output grows driven by labour force growth (‘extensive growth’), no significant 
trend in per-capita output is observed. He produces historical evidence of 
this for China from 1368 (the establishment of the Ming dynasty) to 1949, 
several pre-colonial African countries and India. Europe’s similar experience 
between 1500 and 1800 is documented by Maddison (1982). A large part of 
the contemporary world has in fact not yet achieved a path of continuing per 
capita income growth. Recent experience suggests that many poor countries 
not only fail to exhibit evidence of convergence to the income level of developed 
countries, but find themselves trapped in stable ‘underdevelopment equilibria’ 
with zero growth. The tables of the World Bank Report (1991) for the period 
1965-1989, clearly reveal that situations of persistent insignificant per capita 
income growth are associated with low GNP per head. Forty-one countries 
out of a hundred have experienced a yearly average growth rate in GNP per 
head of less than 1%. Among these, twenty-seven had a per capita GNP of 
less than $800 (average OECD =  $10,500, figures in 1989 U.S.Dollars) in 1965, 
eleven had a per capita GNP between $800 and $3,500 and only three had a 
per capita GNP of more than $3,500. Table 1 reports a list of countries which 
presents evidence of underdevelopment traps.
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Table 1: Evidence o f Underdevelopment Traps.
COUNTRY P.C.GDP 1965 P.C. GDP 1989 AV.GROWTH RATE
Mozambique 80
Ethiopia 123 120 -0.1
Tanzania 133 130 -0.1
Somalia 158 170 0.3
Bangladesh 164 180 0.4
LaoPDR 180
Malawi 142 180 1.0
Nepal 156 180 0.6
Chad 253 190 -1.2
Sierra Leone 210 220 0.2
Madagascar 365 230 -1.9
Nigeria 238 250 0.2
Uganda 494 250 -2.8
Zaire 422 260 -2
Niger 519 290 -2.4
Haiti 335 360 0.3
Benin 389 380 -0.1
Central Afr.R. 440 390 -0.5
Ghana 560 390 -1.5
Togo 310 310 0
Zambia 633 390 -2
Mauritania 564 500 -0.5
Bolivia 752 620 -0.8
Senegal 769 650 -0.7
Ivory Coast 652 790 0.8
Papua New G. 848 890 0.2
Honduras 780 900 0.6
Guatemala 734 910 0.9
Peru 1,060 1,010 -0.2
El Salvador 1,178 1,070 -0.2
QECP average 10,554 19,090 2.5
Source: World Bank Report 1991.1
xNote: according to Summer and Heston (1991) data with adjusted purchasing power parities, we should 
add Angola, Liberia and Sudan (whose data are not reported by the World Bank), whereas we should not 
include Tanzania and Guatemala.
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In a classic contribution to the economics of development, Rostow (1990) 
claims that there is a ‘decisive interval in the history of a society when growth 
become its normal condition... The beginning of take-off can usually be traced 
to a particular sharp stimulus. The stimulus may take the form of a political 
revolution ..., a technological innovation ..., a newly favourable international 
environment .... W hat is essential is ... the fact that the prior development of 
the society and its economy result in a positive, sustained and self-reinforcing 
response to it: the result is not a once-over change in the production function 
..., but a higher proportion of potential innovations accepted in a more or less 
regular flow, and a higher rate of investment’ (pp.36-37).
The idea that underdeveloped economies may be trapped in stable, or 
‘quasi-stable’ equilibria with low per capita income, investment and technical 
progress has a long tradition in the development literature (Rosenstein-Rodan 
1943 and 1957; Nelson, 1956; Leibenstein, 1957; Basu, 1984), stretching back 
to the Malthusian theory of endogenous population growth. In a recent revival 
of interest, the poverty traps issue has been analysed in the framework of the 
coordination failure literature (Cooper and John, 1988). Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) develop a model with increasing returns to scale and imper­
fect competition. Other papers include Krugman (1991), Matsuyama (1991); 
Zilibotti (1993a). The main limitation of this literature is that it only proves 
the existence of multiple Pareto-rankable steady-state equilibria, rationalising 
the existence of differences in the long-run income levels between structurally 
identical countries, but does not explain the stagnation-growth dichotomy de­
scribed by Rostow.
New growth theories characterise the economy as endowed with a self- 
sustaining engine of growth. Standard endogenous growth models (Romer, 
1986; Lucas, 1988), however, do not answer the question of why starting the 
engine of growth should be more difficult than keeping it going.
Some papers which focus on the effects of human capital accumulation 
seem to be closer in spirit to Rostow’s point. Azariadis and Drazen (1990) use
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an overlapping generations model to show that if the private yield on human 
capital is increasing in the stock of human capital, then there may be bifurca­
tions and multiple equilibria with different growth rates associated with each 
of them (including a zero-growth solution). A similar result is found by Becker, 
Murphy and Tamura (1990) in a model where fertility rates are endogenized. 
A problem with these models is that they characterise stationary traps as 
zero-income corner solutions. On the other hand, Reynolds (1983) argues con­
vincingly that both contemporary poor countries and pre-industrial European 
economies actually look quite dynamic and not unresponsive to innovation, 
though unable to produce sustained per capita income growth (p.948). Also 
Rostow (1990, ch.3) stresses the importance of those cultural and economic 
changes taking place during the stages of development at which a society is 
still unable to produce continuing growth, which represent, in his words, the 
‘preconditions’ for take-off. Models in which the equilibrium dynamics drive 
any ‘trapped’ economy to a zero-income solution, however, fail to capture any 
difference between societies which are in a pre-take-off stage and rule out that 
any structural change may have permanent effects before the ‘big push’ occurs. 
We find it somewhat counterintuitive to think of some centuries of history 
which preceded the Industrial Revolution in terms of a completely immobile 
equilibrium.
Our model aims at capturing more closely Rostow’s stylised fact. The 
‘extensive growth’ or pre-take-off stage turns out to be characterised by the 
absence of self-sustained growth, but episodes of short run growth, technical 
change and permanent increase in per capita income are possible. The Solow- 
Cass model, with its implication of long-run stationarity, provides the natural 
framework to describe economies that do not grow at a sustained rate in per 
capita terms. Once the take-off has occurred, however, the same economies 
exhibit a Romer-type behaviour with sustained growth. Furthermore, we have 
a role for both development thresholds and multiple self-fulfilling prophecies.
A secondary objective of the chapter is to capture a stylised fact which
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emerges from the observation of cross-sectional data, namely the existence of 
a hump in the pattern of growth. Though very poor countries grow on aver­
age less than advanced countries, with many of them exhibiting zero growth, 
middle-income countries grow on average faster than rich countries. Average 
per capita growth rates obtained from the Summers and Heston (1988 and 
1991) postwar data turn out to be below 1% for low-income countries, 3.2% 
for middle-income, 2.2% for rich countries. Some Asian newly industrializing 
countries exhibit growth rates well above 5% per year for prolonged periods. 
Both traditional and recent growth models, by focusing on balanced growth 
solutions, are at odd with explaining this evidence.
Section 1 relates our analytical framework to the existing growth literature. 
Section 2 discusses the assumptions of the model. Section 3 characterizes the 
dynamic solution of the model through a series of formal propositions. Section 
4 presents the results of some numerical simulations based on a specification 
of the model. Section 5 discusses the economic implications and concludes.
1 T he analytical framework. G eneral issues.
The main feature which distinguishes endogenous growth from traditional neo­
classical models is the existence of an autonomous engine of growth. In the 
Solow-Cass framework, long-run growth is not sustainable in the presence of 
a fixed supply of some non-reproducible factors which enter the production 
function, because the marginal productivity of the reproducible factor would 
fall to zero as the accumulation proceeds. The convexity of technology is not 
sufficient to generate the traditional result of a long-run stationary equilib­
rium trajectory. A ‘convex’ economy may still have an autonomous engine of 
growth if the productivity of the reproducible factor is bounded from below by 
a sufficiently large positive bound (greater than the social discount rate), as 
it has been shown by Jones and Manuelli (1990). Traditional growth models 
rule out this possibility by imposing the Inada conditions (often in the form
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of a Cobb-Douglas specification), implying that the marginal productivity to 
capital alone tends to zero in the ‘large’ economy. Under these circumstances, 
long-run growth is only possible if an exogenous factor-augmenting technolog­
ical trend is imposed to the production function. However, a point that seems 
to have been ignored by the literature is that the analytical solution found 
by Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) carries over to a model in which the 
productivity of capital falls below the social discount rate only ‘locally’, rather 
than globally as in standard neoclassical models. In other words, it is possible 
to obtain the standard long-run stationary saddle-path as just one of a number 
of equilibrium solutions of the model, rather than the unique one, when some 
types of aggregate non-convexities are allowed.
Modern growth theory has examined a number of economic mechanisms 
which might sustain the marginal productivity of capital, as accumulation 
proceeds. Among the factors which have been identified are learning-by-doing 
externalities (Romer, 1986 and 1989), accumulation of human capital (Lucas, 
1986), ‘intentional’ innovation (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and 
financial development (Greenwood and Smith, 1993; Saint-Paul, 1992; Zili- 
botti, 1993b). In most cases, reasons of analytical convenience have induced 
the researchers to focus on models which generate balanced-growth solution 
trajectories. In other words, the existing literature has accorded a generalised 
preference for reduced-form solutions which are linear in the reproducible fac­
tor (sometimes known as the A A-type).
This chapter seeks to challenge this view, by proposing a model which is 
asymptotically of the A/f-type, but which allows for richer dynamics at lower 
levels of accumulation. In principle, our basic idea could be built on any of the 
many engines of growth proposed in the endogenous growth literature. An­
alytical simplicity, however, leads us to use the simplest mechanism, namely 
a Jones and Manuelli-type technology which does not require externalities 
to sustain growth in the long-run. By adding to this model the assumption 
that technical progress only augments the reproducible factors, we obtain an
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analytical framework which fits well Rostow’s description of take-off and de­
velopment.
The formal results of this chapter apply to a reduced-form solution which 
can be generated by a potentially vast set of structural models. The critical 
feature of these models is that the social productivity of the reproducible fac­
tors of production, given the stock of factors in exogenous supply, be decreasing 
at lower levels of accumulation and increasing at higher level of accumulation. 
Can we think of economic circumstances which make this picture realistic? 
In the abstract, reduced-form solutions exhibiting this type of non-linearity 
are neither more nor less plausible than those displaying the exact linearity 
of the social productivity of capital in its stock, as in mainstream endogenous 
growth models. To be concrete, however, we will base the formal discussion on 
a stylised economic model, close in spirit to Rostow’s analysis, which generates 
the required reduced form.
This is not the unique relevant interpretation for our reduced form, though. 
Recent models of intermediation and growth (Greenwood and Smith, 1993; 
Zilibotti, 1993b) also potentially exhibit this type of property. The basic idea 
is that the productivity of capital is higher when there is (real or financial) 
intermediation, but there is a cost to opening and operating a market for in­
termediation. Small economies do not have intermediation markets and are 
characterised by decreasing returns since the technology of the final sector is 
assumed to be convex. However, when the intermediation market opens up 
there is a ‘thick m arket’ externality associated with the accumulation process: 
as the size of the market grows the cost of intermediation falls, and this in­
creases the productivity of capital. If these externalities are strong enough, 
growth is characterised by increasing returns at higher stages of development.
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2 The m odel.
In this section we discuss the benchmark model. Imagine a world in which 
two types of innovation take place. The first type, which we will call ‘scientific 
advancements’ has the character of large-size episodic events, like changes in 
the dominant scientific paradigm or development of new machines based on 
previously unknown principles (e.g. the wheel, the steam engine and so on). 
The second type is a continuous flow of technical progress resulting from the 
daily effort to translate the potential warranted by the current state of scien­
tific knowledge into actual improvements to the technology used to produce 
goods. In other words, we draw a distinction between technical revolution and 
technical evolution.
We make the simplifying assumption that the former are entirely exoge­
nous; in particular the productive activity does not affect the occurrence of 
revolutionary changes. One can imagine that these innovations come from 
the research activity carried on in academic and other institutions, whose ac­
cumulated knowledge moves the frontier of possible technical improvements, 
without being directly applicable to productive activity.1.
The second type of innovation continuously augments the factor productiv­
ity. This technical change is assumed to be the by-product of the investment 
activity as in standard learning-by-doing models (Arrow, 1962, Romer, 1986)2. 
In other words, technical progress driven by the process of accumulation is the 
channel through which the state of technical efficiency catches up with the 
frontier productivity level warranted by the state of knowledge. The central
1This assumption is criticizable, since much of the research activity conducted in modern 
societies receives a determinant impulse from the needs of the productive sector. However, 
this linkage has not always been so strong as today (for instance, the Copernican revolution 
was not the result of any stimulus from the productive sector). Furthermore, even in the 
contemporary world, many countries do not participate in a significant way in the produc­
tion of great scientific changes, but simply endeavour to catch-up with the technological 
capabilities of the leading countries, taking as given the frontier of knowledge.
2Schmookler, 1967, reports microeconomic evidence about a causal relation going from 
the rate of investment to the rate of invention.
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idea of the model is that when the conditions for sustained investment are not 
fulfilled, the process of technical change is also arrested and the economy gets 
locked into an underdevelopment trap. Stagnation and low levels of income 
and productivity are two sides of the same coin.
We now introduce two strong simplifying assumptions. First, though it 
would be appealing to use a vintage structure in which innovation is embodied 
only in newly installed plants, we avoid the formal complications which this 
would bring about by assuming that the flow of technical progress affects the 
whole existing capital stock. Second, as in the first generation of endogenous 
growth models, we treat the learning-by-doing effect as a pure externality, so 
that any agent cannot exclude others from benefitting from the productivity 
improvements coming from his investment activity.
Consider a one-sector competitive economy, k (called capital for simplicity) 
is a composite good consisting of the private component of any reproducible 
private factor of production like human and physical capital. The technology 
depends on this composite variable, a non-reproducible factor in fixed sup­
ply, n, and a variable, A t representing the state of technical efficiency. To fix 
ideas, the non-reproducible factor could be thought of as labour. The produc­
tion function yt =  y(kt, n ,A t) is assumed to be continuous, twice differentiable 
and to exhibit constant returns to scale in capital and labour and increasing 
returns to scale in all the three arguments. A t is a pure public good and does 
not receive explicit compensation. With reference to the previous discussion, 
A t is not just worldwide available knowledge, but is rather that part of it which 
is applicable to production activity at time t in a certain country.
We characterise the ‘learning equation’ as a function of two variables:
- the distance between the current state of technical knowledge and the 
frontier of technical knowledge, determined by past scientific discoveries;
- the current level of aggregate investments.
We define a as the frontier of technical knowledge, which will be kept constant
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throughout the analysis3. We implicitly assume that scientific knowledge is 
publicly available worldwide at zero cost. The learning function is assumed 
always to satisfy the following properties:
A t = h ( [ a - A t\ ,K t) , h(Q ,kt ) = h { [ a - A t] ,Q )= 0 ,  hx > 0, h2 > 0, (1)
with subscripts denoting partial derivatives and dots denoting time derivatives. 
Notice that K% denotes aggregate capital, whereas kt is used to indicate capital 
at the level of the production unit. A convenient specification, originally used 
for diffusion of techniques among firms in a given market (Mansfield, 1968), 
but also used in growth models (Ricottilli, 1990) that fits well in our framework 
is a function of the type:
i i  = q (a ~ A l ) k t (2)
A t a
where At <  a and q is a positive parameter. The rate of technical change is 
positive only in the presence of a positive rate of accumulation. Furthermore, 
given the level of investment, it is higher the further a country is from the 
frontier of technical knowledge. When integrated, this formulation gives a 
logistic solution of the form:
A t = ------7---- ——r  (3)
1 + (t - 9 e ~ , K t
where the term inside bracket reflects the initial state of the system. This 
formulation implies increasing learning effects in the first stage of the accu­
mulation process and decreasing effects at later stages. The core argument of 
this chapter, summarised by a number of formal propositions in the following 
section, does not rest, however, on a specific parametrisation. For this rea­
son, when not specified we will only assume some weaker restrictions on the
3As we said, we regard here scientific revolutions as secular episodes like changes in the 
scientific paradigm, rather than continuous advancements on the margin. The model studies 
the dynamics of the system within each period, emphasising that in each period dominated 
by a certain scientific paradigm only a subset of countries succeed in activating a sustained 
growth process. In the last chapter, we will informally consider the effects of revolutions 
which affects the frontier of knowledge.
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function A (K t), which are satisfied by (3), but could in principle come from 
an alternative structural model (see the previous section). These restrictions 
are that A(Kt)  be positive, strictly increasing and bounded from above and 
below. Summarising:
A t =  A (K t) >  0, A '(K t) > 0, lim A(I<t) =  a, lim A(I<t) = A0, 0 <  A 0 <  a.
K t —►oo K t —*-0
(4)
The important assumption here is boundedness, the other restrictions be­
ing familiar from other growth models with technological externalities (Romer, 
1986 and 1989). If A (K t) were unbounded above, we could not use an asymp­
totically linear production function to sustain growth in the long-run, since the 
technology would become globally unbounded. This restriction notwithstand­
ing, our specification is more robust than those usually employed in AAr-type 
endogenous growth models with an externality, which rests on non-generic pa­
rameter configurations such that the aggregate productivity is exactly linear 
in capital4.
The following assumptions characterise the technology, specifying the na­
ture of technical progress and the asymptotic behaviour of the production 
function.
yt = y (A (K t)kt, n ), (5)
y i(A (K t)kt,n) > 0 , yu (A (K t)kt ,n)  < 0, (6)
lim y\(A(K t)k t ,n)  =  oo , lim y i(A (K t)ku n) =  fl >  0. (7)
k t—*0 kt-*oo
Assumption (5) requires that technical progress only affects the productivity of 
the reproducible factor. In the conventional terminology, technical progress is 
of the pure ‘capital augmenting’ type. Notice that if n is interpreted as labour
and k as capital, in a literal and statistical sense, this assumption generates
some counterfactual implications. Empirical evidence suggests that in most 
countries the capital-output ratio tends to be constant in the long-run, whereas
4A typical example is the technology Yt =  K*K^‘N 1~Q, used for instance by Romer 
(1989), which generates sustained growth only if u =  1 — a
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labour productivity shows a tendency to grow over time. This is consistent with 
labour-augmenting rather than capital-augmenting technical progress. In our 
model, however, the choice of the labels ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ as the relevant 
factors is merely conventional; land or natural resources might also play the 
role of fixed factor, instead of labour5. Assumption (5) means in fact that 
growth is driven by a vector of reproducible factors, whose productivity is 
enhanced by endogenous technical progress, and is limited by the presence 
of a vector of fixed factors whose productivity is not affected by technical 
progress. Assumption (6) means that the technology is concave when A (K t) 
is taken as parametric, as we will assume it to be the case for firms. It is 
essential to maintain the competitive nature of the model. Assumption (7) 
requires that the marginal productivity of the reproducible factor be bounded 
from below by the positive constant fI, as in Jones and Manuelli (1990).
Throughout the rest of the chapter, we normalize the size of the fixed factor 
n to unity and ignore it, simply rewriting the production function (with licence 
of notation) as j/t =  y (A (K t)kt), where y' > 0 and y" <  0.
The set of technological assumptions (5)-(6) and (7) encompasses standard 
parametrizations like a C.E.S. function with two factors of production (the 
fixed factor and capital in efficiency units), constant returns to scale and elas­
ticity of substitution between factors strictly greater than one. Since it will be 
useful at some stage to refer to a fully parametrised version of the model, we 
specify here the following convenient production function:
y, =  DA(K,)k,  +  Z [A (K t)kt]° , 0 <  0 < 1, (8)
5Still, it is perfectly coherent to interpret n as the non-accumulable component of human 
activity (purely physical labour) and think, as a matter of simplification, that the produc­
tivity of manual activity is not subject to technical progress as opposed to both physical 
and human capital. Also, notice that assumption (7), when n is taken to be labour, implies 
that the competitive labour share would tend to zero in the large economy, whereas empir­
ical evidence suggests that the income shares of capital and labour remain approximately 
constant in the long-run. However, the unconventional definition of kt and n renders the 
usual measure of income shares irrelevant. A more correct test of this assumption would 
involve seeing whether the share of unqualified labour has been declining through time in 
industrialized countries.
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which is a conventional constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function (the 
term  n, here omitted because normalised to one, should appear in the second 
term  at the power of 1 — 0), augmented by a term which increase linearly with 
the capital stock in efficiency units (D and Z  are parameters).
We assume a continuum of atomistic identical profit-maximising firms on 
the real interval [0,1]. Firms act competitively, taking prices as parametric, 
and atomistically, neglecting the effects of their investment decisions on the 
aggregate stock of public good A t6. Assumption (6) ensures that the problem of 
profit maximization facing each firm is concave and well-defined. Under these 
conditions, the existence of a competitive equilibrium may be proved, using a 
fixed-point argument (Romer, 1989). In equilibrium, firms’ expectations are 
self-fulfilling.
Finally, we specify the consumers’ preferences as parametrised by a stan­
dard intertemporally separable isoelastic utility function with a constant time- 
discount factor S €]0,1[. Infinitely-lived identical consumers maximize the 
utility function:
roo f J ~ a
u(ct) =  I  7^ e~Stdt (9)Jo 1 — <T
The competitive solution for this economy is equivalent to the solution of 
a second-best welfare maximization problem, where the planner is constrained 
to ignore the externalities when he solves the problem (see Romer, 1989, for a 
proof of the equivalence). This corresponds to treating A t as parametric. The 
equilibrium conditions are then substituted into the First Order Condition, 
obtaining the competitive analogue. The problem is then:
fo°max{ct;jfct} J^
s.t. kt =  y (A (K t)kt ) -  ct (11)
with kt >  0; ct > 0; K t =  K t\ k0 =  k0.
6Since the total measure of firms is unity, it is clear that kt =  K t . However, it is important 
to maintain the notational distinction, since firms treat kt as a choice variable and K t as 
parametric, the learning effects having the nature of an externality.
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We have assumed for simplicity that capital does not depreciate. The 
necessary conditions for an optimum can be found from the solution of the 
current-value Hamiltonian equation:
H(ct ,k t, K t ,fj,t) =  -p—  + nt[y(A(Kt)kt) -  ct\ (12)
I — <7
By the standard procedure, we find the First Order conditions (treating c* 
as the control variable, kt as the state variable, fit as the costate variable and 
K t as exogenous), then substitute in the equilibrium conditions kt =  Kt and 
d  = Ct, and finally rearrange the expressions to eliminate fit. The necessary 
conditions for optimality are summarized by a planar autonomous system of 
differential equations in Ct and K t (Euler equations).
C, = [A(Kt)y '(A(Kt)Kt) -  Z}—  (13)
(7
K t = y(A{Kt)K t) -  Ct (14)
An additional condition that the plan has to satisfy is the transversality 
condition, which guarantees that the non-negativity constraint on K t is binding 
at infinity:
lim e - ftC r"K , = 0 (15)
t—►OO
A plan that satisfies (13), (14) and (15) plus the non-negativity constraints 
is a dynamic competitive equilibrium for some set of consistent expectations 
on the path of K t.
In order to rule out trivial cases, we will focus on economies whose prefer­
ences and technological structure make sustained growth attainable for some 
set of initial conditions. The problem which we will be interested in is to find
conditions that prevent some economies from achieving this outcome. To this
aim, we need to assume that the productivity of capital is higher than the 
social discount rate, when the frontier of technical knowledge is reached and 
the size of the capital stock is arbitrarily large:
lim A (K t)y '(A(Kt)K t) = att = $  > 6 (16)
K t —* oo
where a and Cl have been defined in (1) and (7), respectively.
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3 D ynam ics.
This section is more technical than the rest of the chapter. We summarize 
here the main ideas before going through formal propositions.
We are interested in two types of solutions: saddlepaths converging to 
a stationary state and trajectories characterised by perpetual growth. The 
assumptions of the model, particularly (7) and (16) guarantee that orbits with 
sustained growth exist, which satisfy (13) and (14). However, they are not 
sufficient to ensure that the boundary and the transversality conditions are also 
satisfied. We provide conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium 
with sustained growth satisfying (13), (14) and (15). We show that such a 
trajectory asymptotically approaches a ‘balanced growth’ path where capital, 
consumption and income grow at a common constant rate.
Stagnation is also a possible outcome when there are trajectories that sat­
isfy the Euler equations and converge to a stationary steady-state. These 
orbits always satisfy the transversality condition. In fact, they closely resem­
ble the unique solution of the Cass-Koopmans model and are interpreted here 
as ‘extensive growth’ trajectories converging to zero long-run growth. Small 
exogenous shocks may raise the long-run steady-state and produce temporary 
growth, but it is not self- sustaining. On the other hand, a sequence of cumu­
lated changes (say, subsequent ‘revolutions’ which shift repeatedly the term a 
in the learning function) will cause the disappearance of the stationary equi­
librium.
Under some additional assumptions we prove that in the take-off stage, 
along the equilibrium path, capital grows at a faster rate than consumption, 
with the difference shrinking as accumulation proceeds. Technically, this guar­
antees the existence of (at least) a competitive equilibrium for all initial con­
ditions.
Finally, we characterise different types of ‘transitional’ trajectories. We 
show that, given the state of scientific knowledge, it is possible to find economies
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in which, for any initial state with low capital, alternative sets of agents’ con­
sistent beliefs drive the economy to either a sustained growth or a long-run 
stationary path. On the other hand, there exist economies that, if the capital 
stock is below some threshold level, are uniquely destined to be locked into a 
trap condition.
The first issue is to analyze under what conditions stationary (steady-state) 
solutions exist. An immediate implication of equation (13) gives the following 
preliminary result:
L em m a 1 Let C(Kt)  =  {Ct E R + \ Kt =  0, given Kt}. For any Kt, C (K t) 
is a univalued, continuous and monotonically increasing function of Kt.
Proof. Follows immediately from (14), since y (A (K t)K t) is non-negative, 
continuous and increasing with K t. □
We now identify the conditions under which an economy exhibits zero- 
growth. Define the function r (K t ) = A (K t)y '(A(Kt)K t), where r  is the interest 
rate in the laissez-faire economy.
P roposition  1 (a) I f r (K t) > 6, VKt, then the system of differential equations 
(13)-(14) has no fixed point, i.e. no steady-state solution exists. I f  a solution 
exists, it must be characterised by Ct >  0, K t > 0 and Ct < C (K t), Vf.
(b) I f 3 K t such that r (K t) < 6, then there will exist at least two steady-state 
solutions.
Proof (a) That C* >  0 follows directly from (13). Assume
that, for some t , K t < 0 .  Then the condition K t > 0 will be vi­
olated in finite time. To show this, differentiate (14) obtaining: 
Kt = [A(Kt) + A \K t)K t]y '(A (K t)K t)k t - C t <  0, as K t <  0, Ct >  0, 
[At +  A'Ktjy' > 0. Thus K t will reach zero in finite time.
(b) By the assumptions (1), (7) and (16) it follows that limKt^o r (K t) =  oo 
and lim/c^oo r (K t) = 0  > S. Since A (K t) and y(A (K t)K t) are continuous, 
then r (K t) is continuous. We can then apply the Intermediate Value Theorem
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and conclude that r (K t) = 8 for at least two values of K t. Let us call these 
values K* and K**; by (13), we know that Ct — 0 at K* and K**. But, by 
Lemma 1, there exist C* =  C(K*) and C** =  C (K **), such that K t =  0. Then 
(C*, K*) and (C**, K**) are fixed points of the dynamic system (see fig. 1). □ 
FIG. 1 HERE
Part (a) establishes that, if the marginal productivity of capital always 
exceeds 8, then no ‘trap ’ will exist. If the reward to capital does not fall too 
much in the first stage of the accumulation process, then the economy is of the 
Jones and Manuelli-type. Part (b) establishes that, when a steady-state exists, 
it cannot be the only one (in generic economies). The behaviour of the function 
r (K t) in this second case is represented in Fig.l. The particular way in which 
the externalities affect the marginal productivity of capital in equilibrium (A t, 
increasing with K t , multiplies t/J, decreasing with K t) causes the alternation of 
decreasing and increasing returns to capital alone. There is a range of values 
of K t (precisely K t E [K*, K**]) in which consumption is decreasing, whereas 
outside that range it is everywhere increasing, since the competitive interest 
rate rt exceeds the social discount rate. Notice that r (K t) in Fig.l decreases 
monotonically to zero in the traditional neoclassical model (Cass, 1965) as well 
as it decreases monotonically in the model of Jones and Manuelli (1990), where 
it is however bounded from below by $ . In standard A k -type endogenous 
growth models, finally, it is a horizontal line and the dynamic system does 
not exhibit any fixed point (steady-state). In our model, if the function r (K t) 
takes on the value 8 in correspondence of one value of K t , clearly it must do so 
in correspondence of at least another value of Kt. Notice that there exist non­
generic knife-edge economies, for which r (K t) = 8 turns out to be a tangency 
solution and there is only one interior steady-state. This is a ‘bifurcation’ that 
separates economies which exhibit traps from those for which self-sustained 
growth is warranted for any initial condition. In the rest of the discussion we 
will ignore knife-edge cases and we will limit attention to ‘structurally stable’ 
economies to which linearisation techniques can be employed for the purpose
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of local stability analysis.
The stability properties of the steady-state solutions are dealt with by the 
next proposition. None of the fixed points of the dynamic system turns out to 
be stable, the dimension of the unstable manifold associated with each of them 
being either one or two. ‘Odd’ steady-state solutions - namely the first, third 
and so on starting from the fixed point with the lowest level of capital stock - 
are shown to be saddlepath stable (Cass-Koopmans type) and are interpreted 
as asymptotes of growth paths for economies that are in a trap region. ‘Even’ 
steady-states are fully unstable.
P ro p o s itio n  2 Consider a generic economy, described by the system of dif­
ferential equations (13)-(14), whose fixed points are all hyperbolic. Then, this 
economy is characterised by an even number of steady-state solutions. The di­
mension of the unstable manifold associated with each fixed point is either one 
or two, according to an alternate pattern. The unstable manifold associated 
with the fixed point with the lowest K  has dimension one.
Proof. Since all fixed points are hyperbolic, we can apply the Theorem of 
Hartman and Grobman and linearise of the vector field about each steady- 
state. Let (C , K ) be a fixed point. Then:
1■G1
i
o
i - 1
Z [A 'y '+ {A + A 'K  
(A 'K  +  A)y'
Ct - C _  
K t -  K (17)
where all functions and derivatives are calculated at (C, K).  The trace 
of the Jacobian is always positive. If r '(K )  =  A'y' +  (A 'K  -f A )A yn < 0, 
then the Jacobian has a negative determinant the dimension of the un­
stable manifold associated with the fixed point is one (saddle-point). If 
r '(K )  =  A'y' +  (A 'K  +  A)Ay"  >  0, then the determinant is positive, implying 
that the dimension of the unstable manifold associated with the fixed point is 
two. In this case, the fixed point is either a source if the eigenvalues of the 
linearised system are complex and conjugate, or a node, otherwise7. If the
7The occurrence of complex eigenvalues is associated, ceteris paribus, with low values of
<r.
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first-order linearisation is not decisive, one can consider higher-order lineari­
sations.
Using (7), compute MmKt-+or(Kt) =  oo, and lim ^-n* r (K t) = $  > 6. De­
fine K* as the lowest and K** as the highest steady-state level of capital. Then, 
by the Intermediate Value Theorem it is clear that r '(K  *) < 0 and r'(K**) > 0. 
So, K* is a saddle-point, whereas K** is a fully unstable fixed point. The ar­
gument can be easily extended to cases in which there n steady-states proving 
that the second fixed point is fully unstable, whereas the n — I st fixed-point is 
a saddle-point, that the third fixed point is a saddle-point, whereas the n — 2nd 
is a fully unstable and so on.
That the equilibria are even in number is proved by contradiction. Suppose 
that they are odd in number. Then, by the previous argument, r'(K**) <  0. 
Furthermore, r(Kt) < 6, VKt > K**, contradicting assumption (16). So, the 
number of equilibria must be even. □
Fig. 2 represents the phase diagram of an economy with two steady-states, 
(<7*, I<*) and (<7**, K**). Notice that Ct < 0 for I<t E [K*, #**], whereas Ct >  0 
for all K t outside this interval. The locus K t =  0 represents the aggregate pro­
duction function which includes the external effects. There is positive (nega­
tive) capital accumulation when the value of consumption is greater (smaller) 
than the level of production. The non-convex region exhibited by the schedule 
K t =  0 is not in contradiction with the assumed concavity of the production 
function at the firm level. Furthermore, the production function becomes ap­
proximately linear for high values of K t. The saddle-point nature of ((7*, K*) 
is evident from the diagram, whereas the purely geometric analysis is not 
sufficient to establish the repulsive nature of (C**, K**). W ithout loss of gen­
erality, we will limit attention in the rest of the chapter to systems which, like 
that represented in Fig. 2, exhibit only two fixed points. This allows us to 
refer unambiguously to ((7*, K*) and (C**, K **) as the saddle-point and the 
source/node, respectively.
FIG. 2 HERE
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Until now only the existence and the nature of steady-states have been dis­
cussed. The following Proposition characterises the equilibrium trajectories. 
The first part, establishes that a plan converging to a steady-state equilibrium, 
as in the traditional Cass-Koopmans model, is a competitive equilibrium. The 
second part establishes the existence (under some conditions) and the unique­
ness of an equilibrium trajectory with perpetual growth of K t and Ct. This 
equilibrium trajectory converges to an ‘asymptotic’ balanced growth condi­
tion characterized by the equal constant growth rate of K t and Ct and is the 
unique trajectory of the dynamic system with perpetual growth which satisfies 
the transversality condition. The solution identifies the long-run consumption 
to capital ratio, and the constant long-run saving rate.
P ro p o s itio n  3 (a) A plan {C t,K t}t>o represented by points belonging to the 
stable manifold of a saddle point is a competitive equilibrium.
(b) I f  either a  >  1 or <$ < y— then for some z  6 R+ and any K q > z  
there exists a competitive equilibrium, or a plan {C t,K t}t>o which satisfies 
(13), (14)> (15) and the boundary conditions. This plan is characterised by 
the following asymptotic conditions:
lim ^  = l i m ^  = ^ (18)
t-oo Ct *->«> K t a v 7
£  =  » ( < r - l )  +  g (19)
*-°° K t a
Furthermore, this plan is unique.
(c) There exists no trajectory such that lim^oo ^  > limt_oo >  0. Tra­
jectories along which lim^oo =  0 are not competitive equilibria.
P roof (a) Since the plan follows an orbit of the vector field, the necessary 
conditions are obviously satisfied. The transversality condition is also satisfied, 
since limt_oo e~8iK tCT° =  lim^oo e~5tK*C*~a =  0.
(b) First, it has to be proved that such a candidate satisfies the Euler 
equations. Define g as the common asymptotic growth rate of capital and
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consumption. Then, from the assumptions about the asymptotic behaviour of 
the technology:
9  =
9  =  
from which:
lim =  lim
t —► OO ( j  f t —t-oo
t-*oo K t t-+ oo K t   ^ ►oo K t
$(<r — 1) +  £
lim =  t^oo K t
The parameter restrictions stated in the proposition ensure
(20)
(21)
(22)
that
lim^oo j£- > 0. Next, it must be shown that this candidate path satisfies 
the transversality condition. First, observe that:
lim Cx =  lim C0e{°sAT)dT =  lim I V 1 (23)
t —fOO t —► oo t—*oo
where T =  limT-+ooC£~a eh * dr is a constant8 gc(T) =  r(Kr)~6 js the
consumption growth rate at time r . We have used the fact that along the
equilibrium trajectory gc(T) tends to the constant g. Finally, rewrite (15) as:
T lim =  0lim =1-OO Ct t—*oo (24)$(<7 — 1) +  8
since <jr(l — cr) — S =  < 0 by the assumptions of the proposition.
Imposing the asymptotic boundary condition and solving backwards iden­
tifies a set of initial states K q  such that there exists a plan {C t, Kt}t>o which 
converges to the asymptotic condition. However, we have to show that such a 
plan is unique, or that given K q  there exists only one Cq such that the path 
through (Co, A'o) satisfies the asymptotic terminal condition. In order to prove 
this, we show that trajectories through two arbitrarily close points in the re­
gion where K t > K** and Ct < C (K t) diverge one from another as t grows (see
8There is a technical issue here about the convergence of the integral. In particular, 
some difficulties may arise if the integral diverges to plus infinity (in which case we should 
solve a limit of the type zero times infinity to check whether the transversality condition 
is satisfied). Though we cannot exclude this possibility for general technologies, we limit 
attention, without great loss of generality, to technologies and learning functions such that 
T is constant and this simple proof is ufficient.
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Fig. 3). More precisely, fix Ko and call Co the consumption level which iden­
tifies the trajectory converging to the balanced growth solution. Then, choose 
two alternative consumption levels Cq and C q ,  such that Cq >  C Q >  C q,  
and indicate the three trajectories identified by each point with corresponding 
superindices. From (13) and (14), we have:
C ' > t o  > k'Q < k o  < K'£. (25)
Then, the trajectories diverge one from each other. Since the divergence occurs 
at each t >  0, then there will be only one critical trajectory which converges 
to the asymptotic condition
(c) The first part of the statement stems from the fact that
limt_*oo > limt_oo > 0 implies unbounded growth of violating feasibil­
ity, since the productivity of capital is bounded. The second part is proved by
checking that a path along which jf- —> 0 as t —> oo violates the transversality 
condition. To show this, observe that in this case we would have lim^oo =  $  
and lim^oo and the transversality condition is violated, since:
lira C r 'K te ~ 6‘ = Ae(~a±^ +<l- 6')t =  A >  0, (26)
£—►00
where A =  Cq^K q limT-^oo * ^~r K^r ~^T^ dT. To show that A >  0 is
equivalent to show that the integral of its expression does not diverge to minus 
infinity. This is necessarily true, since:
(i) - — r(K T) > 0,V r, from the concavity of y(.);
(ii) - limr-^oo fo <  0 0 ■ This is proved by observing that:
1
* dr = ^ e f o T *?-*+*Kr)*r (27)
where v(K T) is an (uninteresting) function of K such that lim /r^oo v(K T) =  0. 
Since, by assumption, — $  < 0, then one can choose a large enough z  such 
that — $  +  v ( K t ) < 0,V r >  z .  Then, rewrite:
lim [ T -jr-dr =  f  + lim P  % -dr  = 
t - kx>Jo K t Jo Kx T-*ooJz K t
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This shows that A > 0 and the trajectory is not an equilibrium. □
FIG. 3 HERE
This proposition requires comment. First, since $  > 8, by assumption (16), 
Proposition 3-b restricts the range of feasibility for values of $ , when a  <  1, 
to the open interval ]£, y ~ [. The intuition is that if 6 and/or a  are too small, 
agents postpone consumption too much and no solution to the programme 
exists.
Second, there is a class of candidate trap trajectories that we have ignored, 
i.e. closed orbits. It is possible, in fact, to find conditions under which the 
occurrence of closed orbits is impossible. Bendixson’s criterion (Guckenheimer 
and Holmes, 1983, p.44, Theorem 1.8.2) ensures that if there is no sign change 
for the trace of the Jacobian evaluated at all points of a two-dimensional flow, 
then there exists no closed orbit. The expression of the trace as a function of 
K  is given by:
T r(K ,)  = A (K ,)y '(A (K t)K t) -  S +  +  A ’{I<t)Kt]y'(A{I<i)I<ty  (28)
(T
The second term is always positive, whereas the first term is zero at all fixed 
points, and is positive in the region of the plane in which Ct > 0, including in 
particular all points such that K t < K* and all points at which Kt > K**. So, 
for Bendixson’s criterion to be satisfied - which, remember, provides only suffi­
cient conditions for the non-existence of closed orbits - it remains to be checked 
that [(1 +  <r)A(Kt) +  a K tA \ K t)]y \A (K t)K t) > 6 , VI<t G ]Km, K**[.Though 
this condition is certainly violated for arbitrarily small values of cr, it is evi­
dent that rather mild restrictions on the admissible parameters (particularly, 
a lower bound on cr dependent on the technological specification) would ensure 
that it is satisfied. For this reason, we will ignore the issue in the rest of the 
chapter.
Third, and most important, the main limitation of the proposition is that it 
does not ensure that an equilibrium with sustained growth exists for arbitrary
initial states of the system. In fact it only establishes existence for large enough 
t f o ’s. If we can show that an equilibrium with perpetual growth necessarily 
exists for all initial states K q > K **, however, this is sufficient to ensure that 
at least one equilibrium (either long-run stationary or with sustained growth) 
exists for any initial state of the system. It is in fact easy to establish (the 
proof is omitted) that for all states K t belonging to the region of the plane 
such that 0 <  K t < K** there exists at least one point belonging to the stable 
manifold of the saddle-point (C *, K *), namely an equilibrium saving decision. 
The next proposition provides these conditions. Define the variable </>t = 
and its long-run equilibrium value as <f>* = —te.~J)+s Also, let g be defined, 
as before, as the asymptotic growth rate along the equilibrium growth path. 
Using these definitions, rearrange (13)-(14) to obtain:
& =  4>t j ( 6  -  <P) +  I  A (K t)y'(A(Kt)K t) -  a ^ A i ^ K t) _  $ ( i  _  a ) \
(29)
Kt = Kt { g +  y{A{I^ Kt) -  $  (30)
where we notice that <^f =  The unique equilibrium trajec­
tory converges here to the conditions {Kt =  g K t , </>t =  0}, with <f>t =  and 
A (K t)y'(A(Kt)Kt) = =  it js clear then that our problem is equiv­
alent to establishing that for any Ko > K** there exists a strictly positive 
plan {<t>t,K t} t>0 which satisfies these asymptotic conditions. Before going 
through the formal analysis of the general case, we study geometrically the 
simplest case, consistent with Fig.l and Fig.2, in which the competitive in­
terest rate (r(K t) =  A (K t)y \A (K t)K t))  is monotonically increasing with K t 
when K t > K** and the output-to-capital ratio (y{A{^)Kt)) js decreasing with 
K t in the same range. In this case, the term in square bracket in (29) turns 
out to be an increasing function of K t and the term in square bracket in (30) 
turns out to be a decreasing function of K t. Accordingly, in the phase diagram 
in Fig.4 both the isoclines <j>t =  0 and K t =  0 exhibit a negative slope. It is 
clear from the figure that the unique equilibrium orbit with sustained growth
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is characterized by an always declining <f>t for all K t > K**. Notice, in par­
ticular, that the equilibrium orbit cannot enter the region of the plane where 
<j> < <j>* since no orbit which has points in that region tends asymptotically to 
<j>*. Since the equilibrium value of <j>t is bounded from below by <j>* >  0, then 
an equilibrium always exists9.
FIG. 4 HERE
The main fact that allows us to provide conditions for existence is stated 
by the following lemma.
L e m m a 2 Let </>eq(K t) be the (unique) value taken on by <j)t along the equilib­
rium trajectory in the region of the plane where K  > K** and K  > 0. Define 
£(Kt) =  +  i  -  Then: <f>*q(I<t) > m fKt>K.. ( (K t) for
all
K t > K * \
Proof. By reductio ad absurdum. Define =  log(^t). Then, using the 
definition of </>*, rewrite equation (29) as:
( t = e<‘ -  Z(K.) (31)
where sign((t) =  sign Assume that, contradicting the Lemma,
e^r =  <^e?(K t ) <  infKt>K** ((K t)  f°r some K t - This implies that < 0 
for all t > T  (to see this, observe that since ( t < 0, then
Cr+Ar < (t  < infKt>K** ((K t).  Hence C t+ A t < 0, and so on). Now, notice 
that lim/ct—oo ( (K t) =  (j>*. So, in f/^ # * . ( (K t) < </>*. But, then, <j>eq(K T) < <f>* 
and <  0 , V t > T .  This implies that lim *-^ </>eq(K t) < which is a con­
tradiction, since we know that lim^oo </>eq(K t) = </>*. O 
Then, we can establish what follows.
P roposition  4 a) I f  infKt>K** ((K t)  >  0, then there exists <j)etq(K t) >  0, 
V K q > K ** , t >  0, i.e. there exists an equilibrium with sustained 
growth for any Ko > K**.
9This case is coherent with point (c) of the following Proposition.
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b) A sufficient condition for (a) to hold is that cr >  1.
e) I f ? ( K t ) <  0 f o r  all  K t > K**, then, in the region o f  the p lane  where 
K  > K** a n d  K  > 0, <f>eq < 0 a nd  (a) necessar i ly  ho lds .
P roof. Part (a) follows immediately from the previous Lemma. In fact, 
<f>egq(Kt) >  infjrt>K** Z{Kt) >  0, namely for all K t > K** there exists a choice 
of consumption which belongs to an equilibrium plan.
To prove part (b), observe (using the definition of £(Kt)) that (a) is always 
satisfied if, for all K t, (T > 1 and cr > - —. The right hand-side term of the 
latter inequality is the elasticity of output to capital in efficiency units when 
A t is treated as parametric, and is smaller than one since y(A tK t) is concave 
when external effects are ignored. So, existence is guaranteed when a > 1.
Part (c) is proved by reductio ad absurdum. Using the definitions intro­
duced in the proof to the previous lemma, time-differentiate expression (31) 
to obtain:
= (3 2 )
Assume that at some t f f9 >  0, in contradiction with point (c). Then, since 
K tg > 0, C,tq > 0. Since the vector field is continuous and twice differentiable, 
then limt-Kx, £teq cannot be zero, contradicting the fact that the trajectory is 
an equilibrium. That an equilibrium exists for any K t > K** follows from the 
fact that </>eq(K t) ></>*> 0. □
As a corollary to the Proposition, we provide an additional result which 
applies to technological parametrizations like (8).
C o ro lla ry  1 Assume that y (A (K t)Kt) = D A (K t) +  [A(Kt)Kf[e, where 0 < 
0 < 1. Define the elasticity of the learning function as X(Kt) =
Assume that A(K t) for  all Kt >  K** and that 6 <  <r. Then, a compet­
itive equilibrium exists for any initial conditions. If, in addition, a < 1, then 
j>etq < 0 for K t > K**.
P ro o f. When cr >  1 an equilibrium always exists by Proposition 4-6. 
Consider now the case in which cr <  1. Under the specified technology, (29)
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becomes:
C, =  D A (K t)— -  +  A W K * - 1 ■—  +  e<‘ -  f ,  (33)(7 <T
which, when time-differentiated, gives (after rearrangement):
C< =  \ ^ - D A ! ( K t) +  [9(1 +  \ ( K t)) -  l]A (ff«)% (' _2)} K , + (34)
Assume, in contradiction with the corollary, that > 0. Then, since 
At < (teq >  0 and limt_>ooCteg cannot be zero. The rest of the proof is
identical to the proof of Proposition 4-c. □
To summarise, in competitive models with aggregate non-convexities and 
externalities, contrarily to the results of standard concave programmes, the ex­
istence of an equilibrium (possibly, non-unique) is not guaranteed for arbitrary 
initial conditions. However, Proposition 4 shows that in our model existence 
is guaranteed for all initial states when cr >  1, or, otherwise, when some tech­
nological restrictions hold. Corollary 1, additionally, shows that the range of 
values of cr for which existence is guaranteed is wider when the technology is 
parametrised according to (8), without the need of fully specifying the learning 
function. The existence issue does not seem, in conclusion, particularly severe, 
since only highly non-standard technologies and preferences would not satisfy 
part (a) of the proposition. We will see in the Corollary to Proposition 5 that 
an alternative criterion to ensure existence may be found. Finally, the propo­
sition and its corollary establish that there is a class of economies in which the 
consumption to capital ratio unambiguously falls in the stage when ‘growth 
becomes the normal condition’ of an economy.
We will now consider economies such that an equilibrium exists for all Ko 
and extend the analysis to the region of the plane where K  < K**. The 
question which we address is where the equilibrium trajectory ‘comes from’ 
before entering the region indicated as (V) in Fig.2. In more precise terms, 
we search for the a-lim it of the equilibrium orbit with growth. To this aim, 
observe that generic orbits of the vector field defined by (13) and (14) which
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have points in the semiplane W  =  {(C, K )  s.t. 0 < K  < K**} belong to either 
the basin of repulsion of the origin or to the basin of repulsion of the fixed point 
(C**, K**)10. The non-generic exception is represented by the one-dimensional 
unstable manifold of the fixed point (C*,K*), whose a-lim it is the saddle- 
point. The geometric inspection suggests that if the equilibrium trajectory is 
bounded from above by the unstable manifold throughout the semiplane W ,  
then it must belong to the basin of repulsion of the origin (notice in fact that 
(C **, K**) is bounded from below by the unstable manifold, and trajectories 
never cross), whereas if it is bounded from below by the unstable manifold 
it must belong to the basin of repulsion of (C**, K**) Furthermore, in some 
knife-edge economies the equilibrium trajectory may coincide with the unstable 
manifold of the saddle-point (C*, K *). These points are stated more formally 
by the next Proposition. We will discuss later why discriminating between 
economies according to the a-lim it behaviour of the equilibrium orbit has 
im portant consequences in terms of the economic interpretation of the model.
P roposition  5 Assume that Bendixson’s criterion is satisfied throughout the 
vector field - cfr. eq. (28). Also, assume that the conditions of Proposition 4-a 
are satisfied. Define (C ^ ^ K f9) as the equilibrium orbit with sustained growth, 
and (C f , KY) as the unstable manifold associated with the fixed point (C*, K*), 
with ( K q  > K*). Then, one of the following cases will occur:
(i) limt_oo f v  =  0; l i n w ^  C?» =  C** , l i m , ^  K ?  =  AT**;
(ii) limt_oo K Y  =  0; lim ^-oo C(eg =  K fq = 0;
(Hi) ( C f , I<Y) = (CT, Kl") V t; l in w o c  C ?  = C ' , K ?  =  K ';
Proof. First, consider the asymptotic (u;-limit) behaviour of the orbit 
(Cf7, K ^ ) '  Since the Bendixon’s criterion rules out closed orbits, this trajectory
10The the basin of repulsion of z is defined as the set of points x with x(t) —* z as t —► —oo
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cannot be homoclinic (i.e., a closed orbit connecting the saddle-point with 
itself). Nor can it spiral ‘inwards’ towards since this would imply,
given the repulsive nature of this fixed point, that there exists a limit cycle 
which surrounds Then, (Cf7, KY)  may either grow for ever as t
grows or hit at some finite t one of the axes. If it hits the vertical axis we are 
in case (ii). If it hits the horizontal axis we are in case (i). If it grows for ever, 
it is either one of the infinite trajectories along which capital grows faster than 
consumption for large t (cfr. Proposition 3) or the unique trajectory which 
converge to the balanced growth condition11. The former case is consistent 
with (»)< whereas the latter, non-generic case is consistent with (Hi).
Second, observe that the unstable manifold associated with the saddle-point 
splits the plane into two regions, corresponding to the basin of repulsion of the 
origin and the basin of repulsion of the fixed point (C**, respectively.
To prove (i), observe that the equilibrium trajectory cannot be bounded 
from above by the orbit (Cj7,/f^7), since this trajectory does not satisfy - in 
case (i) - the transversality condition and, for this reason, bounds from above 
only trajectories which do not satisfy the transversality condition (cfr. Fig.3). 
Since trajectories never cross, the equilibrium trajectory must be bounded 
from below by (C^, K ^) .  On the other hand, all points {((7, K u ) | C > C u } 
belong to the basin of repulsion of the unstable fixed point (C**, K**). So, the 
equilibrium orbit has the a-lim it in ((7**, K**) (see Fig.5a).
To prove case (ii)y observe that the basin of repulsion of is in
this case a bounded set whose boundaries are the unstable manifold (Cj7, K ^ )  
and a subset of the vertical axis (see Fig.5b). Since the equilibrium trajectory 
with sustained growth is not contained in a bounded region, then its a-lim it 
cannot be So, it must be the origin. The knife-edge case (Hi) is
11Refer to Fig.2. The unstable manifolds, originating from the saddle-point, enter first 
the region III.  Then, unless it hits the horizontal axis, it enters the region V . If it enters 
V,  it either remains there for ever (sustained growth), or it enters the region VI.  If this 
latter case occurs, it necessarily crosses subsequently the regions I V  and II,  and ends up 
hitting the vertical axis in finite time. It is impossible that it enters for a second time I II  
coming from IV,  because this would imply the existence of a limit cycle.
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self-explanatory. □
If the unstable manifold does not hit the boundaries, point (i) can be proved 
under milder assumptions.
Corollary 2 I f  lim^oo cy =  oo and
lim*_oo j^r = 0, then limt__oo C^q — C** , l i m t _ > _ o o  K fq — K**. Furthermore, 
for all K q  > K**, there exists an equilibrium plan {Cf9, K lq}t>0 > 0.
Proof. The prove of the first part is analogous to that of Proposition 
5. However, the fact that (C ^ , K ^ )  > 0, V G ]0, oo[ guarantees the exis­
tence of a competitive equilibrium with sustained growth for all (Kt > K**), 
since the equilibrium trajectory is bounded from below by (Cj7, K J7), without 
the need of assuming that Proposition 4 hold assumptions. □
The different cases are described by the following figures. The shadowed 
areas emphasise the basin of repulsion of (C**, K**) in each case. Also, we have 
indicated with S  the saddle-path equilibrium, with T  the equilibrium with 
sustained growth and with U the unstable manifold associated with the fixed 
point (C * ,K *). In Fig.5a, corresponding to case (i), the trajectory U grows 
for ever, but violates the transversality condition (geometrically, it becomes 
‘horizontal’ for large K).  The equilibrium trajectory T  lies entirely above it 
and ‘comes from’ the point (C **, K**). Notice that, as stated by the Corollary, 
the existence of an equilibrium trajectory for any initial state is guaranteed 
in this case. In Fig.5b, we have the case (ii). Notice that all trajectories 
originating from (C **, K**) revert to negative growth and hit the vertical axis 
in finite time. Fig.5c, finally, represents the knife-edge case.
FIG. 5a, FIG. 5b and FIG. 5c HERE
The difference between the two main cases (ignoring the knife-edge case) 
has some interesting economic implications. When case (i) occurs, we have a 
theory of development thresholds. More precisely, there is a set of initial con­
ditions 0 < K q  < K lt such that the only equilibrium generated by self-fulfilling 
expectations is the long-run stationary one. When case (ii) occurs, instead, we
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have a theory of multiple self-fulfilling prophecies. Krugman (1991) stressed 
how the presence of external economies introduces the possibility of mean­
ingful multiple equilibria in development models. ‘When there are external 
economies, it will often happen that the return to committing resources to 
some activity is higher, the greater the resources committed’ (p. 651). In our 
model, for all states such that 0 < K t < K ut there are alternative sets of ra­
tional expectations, generating different current saving rates, which drive the 
economy to either take off into sustained growth or long-run stationarity. If ex­
pectations of high aggregate investments and productivity growth prevail, all 
agents find it optimal to choose high savings, since accumulation gets a higher 
reward. In the opposite case, if low investments are expected, people find it 
optimal to choose high consumption today. This is a case of strategic com­
plementarity in individual savings decisions (Cooper and John, 1988). There 
are no minimum thresholds, here: an arbitrarily small economy has always 
the chance of taking off along a sustained growth path. To our knowledge, 
this is the first model which allows for multiple Nash equilibria for a contin­
uum of low levels of the state variable with one equilibrium being long-run 
stationary and the other equilibrium being characterised by sustained growth. 
On the other hand, the multiple equilibria issue may arise also in case (i), if 
the equilibrium trajectory cycles about the fixed point (C**, K**), as in Fig.5a 
when K t £ [K1*, K ut). Notice that the multiplicity of equilibria exhibited by 
our model differs from the equilibrium indeterminacy of the type discussed 
by Benhabib and Farmer (1991), since for any value of the state variable we 
always have a finite number of saving choices which are equilibrium consistent.
4 A  num erical sim ulation.
In this section we provide the results of some numerical simulations for a 
parametrised version of the model which generate the dynamics described by 
the Figg.5a — b — c . Together with confirming the analytical findings, they
49
allow us to analyse the sensitivity of the results to some parameter changes. 
The main findings are that (i) the range of multiple equilibria tends to decrease 
with cr (the inverse of the elasticity of substitution in consumption) and (ii) 
dynamics of the Fig.56-type seem to be more likely, ceteris paribus, when 
the economy is ‘close’ to the bifurcation at which the steady-state equilibria 
disappear (i.e. when min/e r(K )  is not much smaller than the time discount 
rate). Furthermore, we can study the time evolution of the growth rates of the 
variables of the model and check whether they capture some typical feature of 
the data. Particular, like mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, cross­
country empirical evidence shows that growth patterns are typically hump­
shaped, with medium-size developing countries exhibiting higher growth rates 
than both poor and mature economies. This evidence is not rationalised, to 
our knowledge, by any existing theory, including AK-type endogenous growth 
models. The reason for believing that our model is a good candidate to cope 
with this dilemma is that it relies on two sources of growth, accumulation of 
capital and technical change, whose relative contribution to growth changes 
with the stage of development. If the learning effects are stronger in the take­
off period, it is possible that a country experiences the highest growth rates 
during this stage.
Assume the particular learning function (3) and production function (8). 
The system (13)-(14) becomes then:
C, = I  f ---------  D + Z/SJCf-1! -  4 — (35)
h + [t -1] e ' , K i 1 J J"
K t =   f  — 5-------- DK, +  z \  f  K t 1 - C ,  (36)
1 +  [ *  -  i] «-•*• U  +  [ £  -  1] « - •*  J
We will hold fixed all parameters with the exception of Z  and a. The 
parameters are assigned the following values: a =  0.075, A q =  0.015, q =  
0.01, D =  1,/? =  0.2, £ =  0.0512. The effect of an increase in Z  is to shift
12The choice of these numbers is somewhat arbitrary. We believe that the model is
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upward the marginal productivity of capital (cfr. Fig.l) and to make the 
technology more concave. The effect of an increase of cr is to make the con­
sumption growth rate less responsive to changes in the interest rate. Notice 
that cr does not affect the steady-state values, but affects the long-run growth 
rate, whereas Z  affects the steady-state values, but does not affect the long-run 
growth rate. In particular, we can identify the bifurcating economy for which 
8 =  min/ct r (K t) (tangency solution in Fig.l) as parametrised by a critical 
value of Z. Then, we consider economies parametrised by values of Z  below 
the critical one, which are those which exhibit underdevelopment traps. We 
will consider three different values of cr (0.5, 1 and 2) and we will identify the 
ranges of Z ’s for which each of the type of equilibria described by Figs.5a-b- 
c, respectively, arise. Notice that the asymptotic growth rate is 1.25% when 
or =  2, 2.5% when cr =  1 and 5% when cr =  0.5.
The methodology adopted to obtain numerical solutions for the equilibrium 
trajectories is the following. First, find the two fixed points of the system of 
differential equations (35)-(36). Then, choose two points arbitrarily close to 
the saddle-point (one geometrically above and one below it) as predetermined 
conditions and ask the computer to solve the system of differential equations 
backwards and forward. The backward solution identifies, by close approxima­
tion, the stable manifold (equilibrium), whereas the forward solution identifies 
the unstable manifold associated with the saddle-point. Notice that a trajec­
tory which is very close to the saddle-point at time t =  T  was necessarily even 
closer to the equilibrium saddle-orbit at time t =  T —j  (for positive j )  since all 
trajectories tend to diverge from the stable manifold as t grows. On the other 
hand the same trajectory will be very close to the unstable manifold at time 
t = T  + j ,  in the region in which consumption is decreasing, since all trajecto­
ries are ‘attracted’ by the unstable manifold in such region. The (approximate) 
solution for the equilibrium trajectory with self-sustained growth is found by
presently too stylised for a substantive calibration exercise, which we leave to further re­
search. We have assumed a standard 5% time discount rate, and a learning effect which 
increases up to five times the productivity of the reproducible factor.
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choosing as a predetermined condition a point very distant from the origin that 
satisfies the asymptotic condition (19) and solving the system of differential 
equations backwards so as to trace the whole equilibrium orbit from its a-limit 
up to the chosen point. By the same argument used for the saddle-orbits, the 
backward solution gives a good approximation to the true equilibrium orbit, 
since we have shown that all orbits ‘diverge’ from the equilibrium trajectory 
as t grows in the region to the right of the last steady-state. The choice of the 
predetermined condition may be corrected by checking whether the forward 
solution originating from it, remains linear as K  grows; if this is not the case 
we rectify the original predetermined state of the system by fine adjustments 
until we reach a satisfactory approximation13.
The bifurcation which separates economies with traps from economies with­
out is identified by Z =  149.5 and is independent of <7 . The following table 
summarises the results.
FIG.5a FIG.5b FIG.5c
<7 =  0.5
< 7 = 1  
<7 =  2
0 <  Z  <  53.49 
0 <  Z  < 112.06 
0 <  Z < 149.5
53.49 <  Z < 149.5 
112.06 < Z <  149.5 
never
Z =  53.49 
Z =  112.06 
never
In the case with low intertemporal substitution in consumption (<7 =  2) the 
economy follows a behaviour of the type described by Fig.5a for any Z, namely, 
the equilibrium orbit is always bounded from below by the unstable manifold. 
In cases with <7 =  1 and <r =  0.5, however, economies with relatively large Z 
behave like in Fig.5b, namely exhibit multiple equilibria for any low level of the 
state variable. Fig.5a-type behaviour keeps occurring for low values of Z, when 
the two steady-state are relatively far one from each other. We also observe 
that cycles about the unstable fixed point are increasingly pronounced the 
larger the elasticity of substitution in consumption chosen. Also, Fig.5b-type 
behaviour tends to become predominant when the intertemporal elasticity of
13The predetermined conditions used for the different simulations are:
( K t  =  10,000, Ct  — 260) for the case with <7 =  0.5, ( K t  =  10,000, Ct  =  538) for the case 
with <7=1,  (K t  =  10,000, Ct  =  670) for the case with <7 =  2. In all cases ^  is decreasing 
along the equilibrium trajectory.
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substitution in consumption is high. The intuitive reason is that when people 
are more willing to substitute present for future consumption, a trajectory 
with very low consumption at low stages of development is more likely to be 
viable in equilibrium. As a consequence not only do thrifty economies exhibit 
higher long-run growth rates (like in standard endogenous growth model) but 
also they face sooner the opportunity to get out of a stationary state.
The following figures report the result of three simulations with logarith­
mic preferences (<r =  1), showing the different cases. In all figures only the 
equilibrium trajectories (S, the stable manifold of the saddle-point and T, the 
equilibrium trajectory with sustained growth), plus the unstable manifold, f/, 
are represented. Fig.6a is obtained by taking D =  105. It shows that the equi­
librium trajectory is bounded from above by the unstable manifold. Notice 
the pronounced cycle described by the equilibrium trajectory, which causes 
the occurrence of multiple equilibria for all K% 6 (44,132). Fig.6b is obtained 
by taking D =  120. Though this is not evident from the scale of the figure, 
solving forward from a point belonging to the unstable manifold shows that 
the trajectory reverts to negative growth at K t =  1450 and Ct =  210 and is 
not an equilibrium. Fig.6c, finally, shows the knife-edge case obtained from 
taking D =  112.06265.
FIG. 6a, FIG.6b and FIG. 6c HERE.
We now examine the issue of the time evolution of the growth rates along 
the equilibrium path with sustained growth. We use the same parametrisations 
just considered (dropping the knife-edge case) together with two cases in which 
there is a higher elasticity of substitution (cr =  0.5). In each figure, the upper 
pictures offer a comparison of the growth rates of capital (thinner continuous 
line), income (thicker continuous line) and consumption (dashed line), the 
time being graphed on the horizontal axis. Notice that the final points in the 
graphs are such that the different variable grow approximately at the common 
asymptotic rate. The second picture shows the evolution of the growth rate of 
output at different log-income levels.
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We summarise here the parameter specifications chosen:
<7 Z Equilibrium type
Fig. l 1 100 Fig. 5a
Fig. 8 1 120 Fig. 5b
Fig.9 0.5 40 Fig. 5a
Fig. 10 0.5 120 Fig. 5b
FIG. 7, FIG. 8, FIG. 9 and FIG. 10 HERE
Consider Figures 7 and 9 first, corresponding to Fig. 5a-type equilibria. 
It is evident, in both cases, the existence of fluctuations before the final take­
off. The take-off stage is characterised by investments booming long before 
consumption also starts growing. It is evident that agents ‘smooth’ consump­
tion, coherently with the rational expectations nature of the model. The sharp 
increase of the rate of capital accumulation during the take-off stage can be 
interpreted as the counterpart of consumption smoothness. During this crit­
ical period, the marginal productivity of capital is extraordinarily high and 
output tends to grow fast. However, agents anticipate that in the long-run 
productivity will settle down at a lower level and do not increase consump­
tion too much, so as to grant themselves higher sustained consumption in the 
future. Notice that in both cases the growth rate of capital peaks at above 
10% about sixteen periods after that output growth has started being posi­
tive. Though the quantitative features of the simulations results should not 
be overemphasised, it seems clear that this specification of the model predicts 
that the growth rate of output remains for some prolonged period significantly 
above its long-run value (2.5% for the case of Fig. 7 and 5% for the case of 
Fig.9). The hump-shaped relation between GDP levels and growth rates is 
even more evident in the Fig. 5b-type equilibria represented in Figures 8 and 
10. The most remarkable difference with respect to the previous figures is that 
capital here is always increasing over time. Notice, finally, that in all cases the 
growth rate of consumption is bounded from above by that of capital.
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5 Econom ic im plications and conclusions
In what measure has the model succeeded in providing an analytical inter­
pretation to Rostow’s stylised fact? First, the model captures the idea that 
activating growth is more difficult than keeping it going. Second, it is coherent 
with the fact that once-off shocks may have long lasting effects, namely a single 
stimulus gives rise to a ‘sustained and self-reinforcing’ response to it. Third, it 
suggests that small structural differences between countries that in a station­
ary world only cause (possibly marginal) differences in levels may give rise to 
large consequences if some exogenous change enables better positioned coun­
tries to take-off, leaving the others in the stationary state. Finally, it accounts 
for the possibility that countries which are exactly identical from the viewpoint 
of economic structure are driven by different expectations (one might perhaps 
relate them to cultural or institutional differences) to alternative destinies of 
take-off or stagnation. The first three points seem to match Rostow’s analysis, 
whereas the fourth introduces a degree of flexibility which avoids an excess of 
historical determinism.
Let us clarify these points, with reference to some historical experiences 
documented by Rostow (1978). The first episode of take-off into sustained 
growth is Great Britain during the First Industrial Revolution. Rostow dates 
the British take-off at the last two decades of the eighteenth century. Accord­
ing to his data, the yearly growth rate of industrial production, which had 
been about 1% between 1700 and 1783, became 3.4% between 1783 and 1802, 
remaining high throughout all the Nineteenth century. The stimulus which 
created the take-off opportunity was given, according to Rostow, by a wave 
of major technical improvements which affected the cotton textile manufac­
ture, iron manufacture with coke as fuel, and the efficiency of steam engine, 
plus technical progress in agricultural which perm itted urbanisation, and an 
environment of expanding international commerce (Rostow, 1978, p.373). The 
capacity of countries to absorb these innovations was not uniform, and de­
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pended on the degree of industrial development which each country had in­
herited from earlier experience. Consider two other countries, Sweden and 
France, whose response to the new technological opportunities was fairly mod­
erate compared to Great Britain, and not such as to be identified as ‘turning 
points’. Sweden in the eighteen century did not enjoy a comparable economic, 
commercial and political power to that of Great Britain. After the Battle of 
Poltava in 1709, it had lost the leadership role exerted in the latter part of 
the seventeenth century, and though it had maintained a vigorous mercantile 
economy, it had a weaker industrial base than Britain. The case of France 
looks different. Under Colbert’s government France had undertaken a remark­
able process of industrial and commercial development between 1665 and 1685 
which, though temporarily arrested by a period of war, was resumed between 
1715 and 1783. The standard explanations to the absence of take-off in France 
proposed by economic historians (e.g. the oppressive role of the monarchy in 
France as opposed to the liberal attitudes emerging in Britain after the second 
english revolution) do not attribute a major role to differences in the economic 
structure. An analogous case can be made for Netherlands.
Consider” our model. Suppose that before the occurrence of the shock 
Britain and France were structurally identical, whereas Sweden was lagging 
behind (say, the total factor productivity parameter Z  was lower in Sweden 
than in the other two countries). Fig.l 1 (the analogue of Fig.l) represents 
the situation before and after the ‘stimulus’. Imagine that all countries had 
reached the ex-shock long-run equilibrium in the mid-eighteenth century. This 
means that the capital level in France and Great Britain was at the level K ^ 9*, 
whereas that of Sweden was at the level Kq. As the figure shows, we assume 
that no country, before the shock, had the possibility to achieve self-sustained 
growth. We assume that the shock was large enough to make all the economies 
‘bifurcate’, namely a second steady-state and an equilibrium trajectory with 
sustained growth appear. Also, the lower steady-state capital level shifts to 
the right (/C^U/^6), /{’*’(*)). The post-shock marginal productivity schedules
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are drawn as dashed lines. Consider now our interpretation of the take-off 
hypothesis. We imagine that Fig.5a represent the post-shock phase diagram 
for Sweden. Given its initial condition (Kq), Sweden only faces an equilibrium 
path which converges to a higher steady-state level. Though an equilibrium 
trajectory with perpetual growth now exists, the Swedish ‘capital’ was below 
the threshold level which would make take-off an equilibrium. So, Sweden 
simply converges to a new steady-state14. On the other hand, according to 
our hypothesis, Britain and France can be represented by the same phase dia­
gram and initial condition ( K ^ 9b). Since the two steady-states are closer than 
in the case of Sweden (a consequence of the higher value of Z), we interpret 
Fig.5b as representing the structural condition of these two country after the 
shock. France and Great Britain were facing the same opportunities, but for 
reasons that are left out of our analysis, they ended up selecting different equi­
libria. France was driven to the new steady-state represented by K* (higher 
than the Swedish one) moving along the trajectory S'15. Britain, on the other 
hand, selected the trajectory T  characterised by a higher accumulation rate 
and went through that great irreversible change represented by the Industrial 
Revolution which marks the beginning of the stage in which growth became 
the normal condition for the British economy.
FIG. 11 HERE
The historical accuracy of the Rostovian example just considered is de­
batable. A detailed consideration of the issue goes beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Critics of the take-off hypothesis have noted that there is not clear-cut 
evidence from the data that a substantial wedge opened up between the British 
and the French investment rate after 1783, as our theory (together with that of
14Systematic data for Sweden are only available since 1810 for iron production and 1860 
for per capita GDP. Looking at iron production (Rostow, p.412), one observes a moderate 
constant growth rate of 1% per year between 1810-1855, followed by a sharp increase in the 
following two decades, at which Rostow dates the Swedish take-off.
15The hypothesis that France reached a higher steady- state is not contradicted by a rough 
analysis of the existing data. Rostow (1978) remarks that ‘in the decade after 1783, both 
nations (England and France) progressed, Britain more rapidly; but the gap widened during 
the war years and down to the beginning of the French take-off in the 1830’s’ (p.395).
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Prof. Rostow) would predict. On the other hand, there are other examples of 
countries which, after having been structurally similar for some period of their 
history, seem to have then taken divergent paths at some stage. The example 
of Korea and Philippines, drawn from Lucas (1993), has been discussed in the 
introduction to this Thesis. Argentina and Australia, whose economies was 
pretty similar at the beginning of this century but followed rather divergent 
paths since the late 30’s, provide another example.
Our model also provides an explanation to the fact that countries seem to 
have taken off in bunches during some critical periods. According to the model, 
new growth opportunities (what we called ‘scientific revolutions’) come up at 
discrete time intervals and give the chance to better positioned countries to 
activate sustained growth, whereas worse positioned countries benefit, at most, 
from level effects. Rostow argues that it was between 1830-1850 when France, 
Belgium, the United States and Germany underwent the great transformation 
and activated a sustained growth process (Sweden followed with some delay). 
The same happened to Japan, Russia, Canada, Italy and Australia between 
in the last two decades of the century. Large Latin American countries like 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico started their take-off stage in the 1930’s and 40’s. 
Finally, the late 50’s and the 60’s have been the years of take-off for many Asian 
countries like South Korea, China, Taiwan, Thailandia and, perhaps more 
recently, Malaysia and Indonesia. But as noted in the Introduction, many 
countries seem to be still locked into underdevelopment traps, particularly 
the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries, some small Latin American 
countries, and few Asian countries (Burma, Bangla Desh, Nepal among the 
others).
From a normative viewpoint, the model provides the rationale for active 
government development policies, though the highly stylised nature of the 
model suggests caution in identifying the exact nature of these policies. When 
a country is in a Fig.5a-type situation, government intervention could force the 
pace of accumulation, by imposing on the economy an allocation mechanism
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different from the market. A planned system may impose some higher rate of 
investment than the decentralized economy would deliver, driving the country 
out of the ‘trap ’. This may be thought as the way followed by some socialist 
countries, such as China or the Soviet Russia, though the problems and the 
inefficiencies created by these systems are well-known.
A more market-oriented strategy could rely, instead, on a set of incen­
tives (e.g. capital subsidisation) and other forms of intervention that rule out 
the bad equilibrium, by correcting the externality and increasing the private 
productivity to the accumulation in the reproducible factor. Furthermore, one 
could extend the model to allow for the possibility for the government to affect 
the generation of externalities (by assuming A = A ( K t,fi), where ft is a vector 
of policy variables). This may be the case with public investment in education 
or infrastructure. This strategy implies a certain degree of state intervention, 
but is compatible with a market regime and does not imply the administra­
tive costs of a planned economy. Korea seems to be a classic example of this 
strategy (see Chenery, Syrquin and Robinson, 1986). Finally, some countries 
may need just a therapy to enhance economic confidence of consumers and 
investors, without the necessity of major structural changes.
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CHAPTER 2
Endogenous Growth and Intermediation 
in an ‘Archipelago’ Economy
This chapter investigates the relationship between growth and intermedia­
tion, emphasising the impact of market imperfections on the process of eco­
nomic development. Traditional growth models assume that market activity 
is frictionless and costless. However, modern economies devote a large amount 
of resources to activities that are not directly productive. Diverse specialised 
institutions like financial intermediaries, estate agencies, job placement agen­
cies, wholesalers, transport companies and so on take part in a process through 
which the economic system transfers resources (including physical and human 
capital) from the place where they are accumulated to the place where they 
are most productive. The degree of efficiency achieved by this ‘intermediation 
sector’ affects the productivity of investments and this, according to modern 
growth theory, gives rise to growth effects.
The low development of intermediation and trade activity may then be an 
explanation to the poor growth performances of a number of less developed 
countries. Recent models in this vein emphasise the role of fixed costs to 
opening new markets (particularly financial markets),and include Greenwood 
and Jovanovic (1990), Saint-Paul (1992), Greenwood and Smith (1993) and 
Blackburn and Hung (1993). This chapter examines a related, but somewhat 
different issue. ‘Thick m arket’ externalities originating in market imperfections 
in the trade sector cause the cost of intermediation to be higher in poor than 
in rich countries. This induces firms to choose techniques intensive in internal 
rather than in traded resources, and reduces the efficiency of accumulation. 
We show that economies that would attain self-sustained growth under the 
first-best allocation might get locked into a stationary equilibrium under a
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laissez-faire regime if the initial endowment of capital is below some threshold 
level. Multiple dynamic equilibria may exist, since the investment demands of 
final producers are ‘strategically complementary’ to each other in the presence 
of imperfect intermediation markets (Cooper and John, 1988; Murphy, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989; Benhabib and Farmer, 1991).
The idea of introducing market imperfections in endogenous growth models 
is not new. Some papers which studied the relation between growth and both 
horizontal (Romer, 1990; Helpman and Grossman, 1991) and vertical (Aghion 
and Howitt, 1992) innovation assumed an imperfectly competitive sector for 
the production of intermediate goods. However, these models typically intro­
duce assumptions which guarantee constant markups in the non-competitive 
sector. Accordingly, growth is sustained by the increasing productivity war­
ranted by the introduction of new differentiated (horizontal innovation) or 
higher quality (vertical innovation) inputs, but it is never affected by changes 
in the degree of market imperfections (i.e. the markup) which remains in fact 
constant. In our model, on the other hand, the price charged by the mo- 
nopolistically competitive intermediation sector decreases with the size of the 
economy and tends asymptotically to the marginal cost. This implies that 
wedge between the reward to savings and the marginal productivity of capital 
which is opened by the existence of a costly intermediation activity is higher in 
the small than in the large economy, providing an offsetting effects to the fall 
of the marginal productivity of capital throughout the accumulation process 
due to the convexity of technology. A similar mechanism in which changes 
in the aggregate productivity are caused by endogenously falling markups has 
been independently shown in an exogenous growth framework by Gali (1993a).
1 T he Archipelago econom y
Consider an economy consisting of a number of islands. Each island is endowed 
with the same number of trees. Each tree yields a specific fruit and each
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island grows only one kind of tree. Each tree bears fruits in some amount 
which increases less than proportionally with the quantity of fertiliser applied 
to it in the previous period. The fruits that are not consumed can be used 
to produce fertiliser. Different types of fertilisers made with different fruits, 
however, are only imperfect substitutes. The inhabitants of each island own 
shares of the respective forest and their income consists of dividends on such 
shares plus a reward to foregone consumption depending on the interest rate. 
As consumers, they share identical tastes and endowments and are indifferent 
between consuming different types of fruit. Each island has the same number 
of inhabitants.
Fertiliser is non-storable. The fertiliser purchased by firms at time t is paid 
to the sellers after the completion of the following harvest, at time t +  1. Now 
consider a representative island in the archipelago. When a local firm employs 
a unit of home-produced fertiliser, it pays directly to the savers a reward per 
unit of foregone consumption equal to the marginal contribution to production 
of the fertiliser (since firms are owned by consumers, we can imagine that part 
of the fruits are retained by the firm to make fertiliser). Consumers may alter­
natively give the fruits which they do not consume to outsider intermediaries 
which pay, in the following period, a yield which must equal, in equilibrium, 
the return paid by local firms. The business of a middleman consists of tak­
ing fruits from savers in each island and delivering them at time t to investing 
firms located in other islands, receiving from producers a revenue at time £-f 1, 
part of which is used to pay the original owners of the fertiliser. The cost of 
transferring fertilisers without intermediation from one island to another is 
assumed to be prohibitive for single producers, so firms wishing to employ 
external fertiliser have to pay the services of the middlemen. The existence of 
intermediation costs raises a wedge between the effective price paid by firms 
and the reward perceived by savers for fertiliser-capital. Householders’ gross 
unit reward for savings will be denoted as r, whereas producers’ effective cost 
will be a weighted average between 7*, the price of home fertiliser, and (r +  p),
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the price of foreign fertiliser, p being the unit fee charged by intermediaries.
Since different fruits are perfect substitutes in consumption, we can treat 
them as a unique final good, y, whose production requires a non-reproducible 
factor, z  (trees), and a reproducible factor, k (fertiliser). This is a composite 
good, consisting of variable proportions of different types of fertilisers. We 
assume the following technology, identical across islands:
A l-P ro d u c tio n  function : y = y(k,z); k =  a  =
where y(k, z) is linearly homogeneous and strictly concave. k{ are units of 
foregone consumption of each type of products, m being the number of islands.1 
Since in this section we do not deal with dynamic issues, time subscripts are 
ignored.
Firms behave competitively in both factor and product markets. We solve 
the profit maximisation problem in two stages, by first minimising the cost of 
fertilisers for given k and then choosing the optimal K  Define kh as the units 
of home fertiliser and kf  as the units of a composite good consisting of equal 
proportions of each fertiliser produced in external islands. By symmetry the 
demand for fertilisers produced in any island, other than that where the firm is 
located, is simply —f j . Also define q as the relative price of foreign fertilisers 
to home fertilisers, q =  The problem is then:
P I :  m in ^ ,^  r(kh +  qkj), s.t. k =  k%k}~a,
whose solution is:
kh =  a i q ^ k ,  k ,  = (1 -  a ) $ q - ak, $  =  ( ^ ^ ) °  (1 ~  (1)
Given the symmetric Cobb-Douglas nature of the aggregator function for 
k , each firm spends a constant uniform amount on each type of fertiliser. The
1The technology >11 is somewhat restrictive, especially by implying that every input is an 
essential factor. Our results are however independent of this specification, which we maintain 
throughout this section for analytical convenience. Section II discusses a case in which there 
exists an alternative technology which uses only internal capital, and intermediation is not 
strictly necessary to production.
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elasticity of the demand for external capital with respect to the relative price 
q is constant and equal to a. We can also derive the unit ‘effective cost’ of 
composite capital, p*, defined as the minimised capital costs (i.e. the solution 
to P I) per unit of k:
P k - r
aQq1 ak + q ( l  — a ) $ q  ak
k =  (2)
Equation (2) shows that the effective price of capital responds with a con­
stant elasticity (1 — a) to changes in the intermediation costs. In equilibrium, 
firms invest until the point at which the marginal productivity of capital, 
yi(k,  2 ), equals pk, taking r  and q as parametric.
Specialised companies provide inter-island shipment services. To avoid 
complications concerning the location of companies, we assume that each inter­
mediary necessarily makes a complete tour of the archipelago at each period, 
regardless of where its headquarters are situated. The provision of services 
is subject to the payment of a fixed cost F  plus a cost which is proportional 
to the amount of fertiliser traded. For reasons of notational convenience, we 
define the marginal cost as (A — 1). All costs are in terms of units of capi­
tal (fertiliser of any type is used as ‘fuel’). The total cost function that each 
intermediary faces is then:
A 2-C ost fu n c tio n  of in te rm ed ia rie s  TC(x)  =  r [ F +  (A — 1)®],
where x  represents the number of units of output (services) supplied by a repre­
sentative intermediary firm. We assume that intermediaries act in a Cournot- 
Nash fashion in an imperfectly competitive market, taking their competitors’ 
outputs (x) as given.2 The total demand for services in the archipelago is
2We assume, for simplicity, that individual shipment companies neglect the effects of 
their decision on the average price pk and, through this, on the aggregate demand of K.  
Cournot competition is not essential for our argument. The main results, for instance, carry 
over to a regime of Bertrand competition cum fixed costs (monopoly). W hat is essential is 
that prices are linear (e.g., we rule out two-part tariffs). Middlemen are price-takers in the 
collection of resources (they take r  as parametric), since savings have an alternative use in 
local firms.
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given by X  =  K f  =  m kf  (capital letters denote aggregate variables at the 
archipelago level), whose price-elasticity with respect to q is, as we saw, a. 
Each shipping company, then, faces a constant individual demand elasticity 
equal to na , where n is the number of companies that are active, and max­
imises the following profit function:
P2: max{x}p(X)a: — r(A — \)x  — r f  =  r[q(X)x — ax — F],
where X  =  x  +  (n — l)af and p ( X ), q(X)  denote inverse demand functions. 
The condition for profit maximisation for each shipment company is given, as 
usual, by equalising the marginal revenue to marginal cost, or by the following 
mark-up rule:
( l - — ) q  = A.  (3)V a n j
We assume free entry in the intermediation market. This implies that every 
shipment company breaks even:
(q — A)x  =  F. (4)
The last condition for the industry equilibrium is that the market clears:
nx  =  K f  = [(1 -  a)$ ] Kq~a. (5)
Equations (3), (4) and (5) provide a solution for the endogenous variables 
n, x  and q, given K  and the technological parameters. We focus here on the 
solution for q, leaving to the reader the derivation of the results for the other 
variables (in particular, it turns out that both x  and n grow unboundedly as 
the market size grows, and n tends to 1/a  for arbitrarily small K).  We obtain:
r(<?) S  =  0(1 ~Fa)* K  ' 9 6 ]A’ ° ° l ’ r ' (<?) <  ° ’ r " (9) >  °- (6)
The following proposition summarises the key results.
P roposition  1 Consider the solution q = q(K) implicitly defined by (6). 
Then: (i) q \ K )  < 0, q"(K) < 0; (ii) \\mK-+oo q(K)  =  A,  limK-+oq(K) =  oo; 
(Hi) q(I<) j  K  o, for some constant J.3
3We say that f (x )  ~  (is equivalent to) g(x), x —► x if limar_tx{/(ar)/5f(ar)} =  1.
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P ro o f. Parts (i) and (ii) follow immediately from (6) by the applica­
tion of the implicit function theorem. Part (Hi) follows from observing that 
<7a_1 ~  T(q) =  q qq an(j from (ii)m □
Remember that q(K)  is the relative price of external to internal capital 
faced by firms. Then , point (%) of the proposition implies that as K  grows 
final producers find it relatively cheaper to buy other islands’ fertiliser and 
have an incentive to improve productive efficiency by adopting a technology 
more intensive in external capital. Point (ii) shows that the degree of market 
imperfection vanishes in the ‘large’ economy. Notice that q =  A  <=> p =  
r(A — 1). On the other hand, it establishes that in the ‘small’ economy the 
intermediation costs become arbitrarily large. Point (Hi), finally, shows that 
q(K)  behaves like the function when K  is small. The relevance of
this technical result will become apparent in the next section.
We assume that the final sector of each island consists of a continuum of 
identical atomistic firms on the real interval [0,1]. Firms’ atomistic behaviour 
implies that they neglect the effects of their decisions on aggregate variables, 
particularly on the total demand for intermediation services and, through this, 
on the unit cost of services paid by each of them. So, the equilibrium invest­
ment for the individual firm is given by the choice of k which satisfies the 
condition: Pk(r ,q(K))  =  z), where K  is taken as parametric. Given the
symmetric nature of the archipelago and the constant returns to scale of the 
technology, we can use this equilibrium condition together with (2) to obtain 
an expression for r  as a function of aggregate variables only,
=  <7 >
which is identical to (2) apart from that here q is the function q =  q(K)  
characterised by Proposition 1. K,  until here treated as exogenous, is in fact 
the state variable of the dynamic model. Condition (7) shows that the re­
ward to savings is in general a non-monotonic function of K ,  unlike in convex 
one-sector growth models in which it typically decreases with the total accu­
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mulation. Since the economy is subject to higher costs to the intermediation 
process at a lower than at a higher stage of development, this provides a coun­
tervailing effect to the decreasing returns to investments induced by the final 
sector technology. If intermediation costs are relatively large, we can expect 
that the productivity of investments, ceteris paribus, be higher in large than 
in small economies. This will be a central issue in the next section.
For future reference, we also write the expression for the absolute price 
per unit of shipment, p, as an implicit function of K.  Since, by definition, 
p(K) = r(K)(q(K)  — 1), then
p(K) = y1(K ,Z ) 0 , p'(K)  <  0, (8)
V ( K )
where we note that the term in square brackets is increasing with q and de­
creasing with K.
The laissez-faire economy suffers from two sources of inefficiency. The first 
is the existence of a non-competitive sector. The second is a demand or ‘thick 
market’ externality. Each firm, when investing, adds to the total demand of 
intermediation services and causes a fall in the wedge between the price of 
internal and external capital. In a second-best world, firms internalise such 
external effects and coordinate their demands. This means that they invest 
until the point where t/i(fc, z) — Pk(K) +  p'k( K ) K , whose second term on the 
right hand side is negative. Then, (7) is replaced by
r ’b( K )  =  —   f  -----— —  > r(k,  K).  (9)
v '  q ( I <y -a +  (1 -  a)q(I<)-aq ' ( K) K  v J w
For any K , the reward to saving is higher in a world of second best than 
in a laissez-faire economy with atomistic behaviour. In a world of first-best, 
finally, trade services are offered at their marginal cost and the interest rate is
r f b [ K )  =  y ^ z ) *  > r , i { K )  > r{K)< (10)
which is monotonically decreasing with capital, as in standard neoclassical 
growth models.
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2 D ynam ic general equilibrium
We focus on economies whose growth is self-sustained in the absence of inter­
mediation costs. This is obtained by assuming, following Jones and Manuelli
(1990), that the marginal productivity of capital, uniformly decreasing with Kt, 
is bounded away from a sufficiently large positive lower bound. For simplicity, 
we limit attention to a well-known class of production functions which exhibits 
this feature, namely CES functions with elasticity of substitution greater than 
one. We assume that:
A 3-Jones-M anuelli yt =  y(kt- \ , z )  =  [(Bkt- i ) p +  zp]p,
where: 0 <  p < 1 , yi(kt- i , z )  =  [(Bkt- i ) p -I- z p] ~ ^ B pkpZ l ,
limfct_1_>00 2/i(fct_ i,z ) =  B  , lim*t_1_>0yi(fc*-i,z) =  oo.
A representative householder maximises a standard utility function, taking 
the paths of dividends on shares and rates of reward on savings as given. 
Formally:
o° c1 ~a
P 3  max (/(c i,c2,...) =    s 't ’
t=l,...,oo} 1 — (T
Ct + h  < +  dtz, (11)
with kt > 0, ko given. Here, kt~i denotes the fertiliser accumulated at t  — 1 
and used in the production of the fruits which are gathered and distributed 
at t ; dt is the dividend per-tree; rt is the interest perceived at time t per unit 
of savings made at time t — 1; (0 <  /? < 1) is the time discount rate. The
solution to this standard programme is given by:
d  = c t-i,  (12)
together with (11) - with equality - and the transversality condition. The 
laissez-faire general equilibrium solution is found by substituting the equilib­
rium values of rt and dt into (11) and (12), and using the symmetric equilibrium
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pconditions K t = m  kt , Ct = m  ct and Z  = m  z. The equilibrium value of rt is 
given by (7). Instead of computing directly the expression for dt , we use the 
fact that the net product is entirely distributed to consumers, so the aggregate 
budget constraint implies that rtKt - 1 +  dtZ  =  Z) — p(Kt- i ) K f ( K t - i ) ,
where p(K t- i ) K f ( K t- i )  is the total revenue of the intermediation sector, K f  
being the total amount of ‘external’ fertiliser used in the archipelago. Since 
intermediaries break even, this revenue is equal to the total cost of the in­
termediation process, or the amount of output socially dissipated in moving 
fertiliser between islands. It is convenient to use (8) to reformulate this cost 
as follows:
p i K ^ K j i K t - r )  = U ( K t- U Z ) ^ ‘K ' ^ ~ l )  =  w (K t. , ) K t. x (13)
where w'(Kt- i)  <  0. By substituting (13) into (11) and rearranging, we express 
the equilibrium conditions in terms of an autonomous system of first-order 
difference equations plus the initial and the transversality conditions:
r  _ (q yi(Kt-u Z)$Y
-  V* )  c , ~u  (14)
x i
K t =  y (K t. u Z)  -  w (K t^ ) K , - x  -  f/S J  (15)
K 0 = K„, lim frC'-’ Kt = 0 ,  C\ >  0, K, > 0.t—*oo
Consider the asymptotic behaviour of the system, in correspondence of ar­
bitrarily large values of the state variable K.  By Assumption (A3), Proposition 
1 and (13) we have:
h  ■  ( ' £ ) * •  "«»
Ct ( n
„ l im  ^
K t _ i —►oo O ,
- ( p - T T - V  lim (17)V A l ~a J Kt—\—*oo K t- i  v 'Kt—i—*oo K t-1 A
It has been proved in the first chapter that in (possibly non-convex) models 
with bounded asymptotic productivity there exists at most one equilibrium
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path with self-sustained growth. This path converges to a balanced growth 
condition according to which consumption, income and capital grow at a com­
mon rate. Here, we only provide the conditions for the existence of this path, 
referring to the first chapter for the argument of the proof of uniqueness. Let 
g be defined as the asymptotic growth rate.
P ro p o s itio n  2  A self-sustained growth path converging to a balanced growth 
path is characterised by the following conditions:
(i)9=my^ - 1 (”)
Such path exists i f  and only if:
< • > ■ < ( £ ) ■ " < ( ! ) ■ < » * > ( £ ) "  <-»
P ro o f  (ske tch ), (i) and (ii) are found as the solution to (14), (15), 
after imposing the asymptotic balanced growth condition lim^oo ( c ^ )  =  
lim4_oo (7^ 7 ) =  1 +  <7. The condition (18)-a ensures that g > 0 and 
limt_oo ( £ ) >  0 along the asymptotic equilibrium path. The condition (18)-b 
ensures that the transversality condition lim^oo fPCt*Kt  =  0 be satisfied. □
We will limit attention to economies which satisfy (18). Paths with per­
petual growth are not the only candidate laissez-faire equilibria. If there exist 
saddlepaths converging to stationary points of the system (14)-(15), they nec­
essarily satisfy the transversality condition and are equilibria. An important 
feature of the model that ensures the existence of ‘traps’ of this kind is that, 
due to the intermediation costs, the accumulation is more productive in ‘very 
large’ than in ‘very small’ economies, and r(K)  is increasing with K  in some 
interval. We formally state and prove this property.
P ro p o s itio n  3 Consider r t+ 1 =  r (K t), K t G R+, as implicitly defined by 
(7), (6) and AS. Then: (i) lim/<'{_ 00 r (K t) =  0; (ii) 31 C R + such that 
r'{Kt) > 0 for K t E I; (Hi) r (K t) = 1//? for some K t G / .
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P ro o f. We know that limKt^ o r ( K t) =  limjft->o • To prove (i)
amounts to show that y i (K t, Z) is an infinity of lower order than q(KtY~a as 
K t —> 0. From A3: Y\mKt^ o y \ { K t, Z )  =  Z 1~PK?~1 = oo. From Proposition
1, point (Hi): lim/ft_o 9 (^ t)1_a =  J 1-a lim/ct^ 0 K ~ x =  oo. Then, it is evident 
that the denominator is an infinity of higher order than the numerator. As to 
(ii) and (Hi), notice that (18) and A3 imply that lim/c^oo r (Kt) =  >  j}-
Then, (ii) follows from (i) and the continuity of r (K t ). (Hi) follows from (i) 
and (ii), by the application of the intermediate value theorem. □
Proposition 3 and equation (14) ensure that when the initial capital stock 
is below some threshold level, consumption declines through time. A phase 
diagram shows informally the existence of a ‘bad’ equilibrium path. Fig. 1 
represents a case in which r (K t) is monotonically increasing and takes on the 
value r (K t) =  1//? for one value of K t only.
FIG. 1 HERE
The locus Ct =  Ct- 1  corresponds to the condition r (K t- i)  = 1/(3 - cfr. (14) 
- and necessarily exists by Proposition 3. When Kt- i  < K*, rt < 1/(3, since 
low productivity techniques are adopted, and consumption declines over time. 
The locus K t =  K t - 1  is derived from (15). The fixed point S  is completely 
unstable (linearisation of (14) and (15) in the neighbourhood of S  shows that 
both roots are larger than one in absolute value, when r'(K*) > 0 ) and is not 
an interesting equilibrium. On the other hand, there exists a saddle-path (T ) 
converging to the origin which is also a dynamic laissez-faire equilibrium for 
a non-trivial set of states of the system. The equilibrium path with sustained 
growth is indicated by T #. The uniqueness of the growing equilibrium is ensured 
by the fact (see ch. 1) that all paths which remain below T '  are characterised 
by perpetual growth, but violate the transversality condition (capital grows 
too fast, and the ratio ^  declines towards zero), whereas all paths which lie 
above it are destined to revert to negative growth. In the case represented in 
F ig.l, the path T'  has no points in the region of the space with K  < K^.  So 
K l may be interpreted as a development threshold. If a laissez-faire economy
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has an initial capital endowment inferior to the threshold level, it is condemned 
to stagnation and underdevelopment. The equilibrium interest rate, because 
of the high intermediation costs, is too low to warrant sustained accumulation; 
people consume more now than in the future and the economy converges to a 
zero-income equilibrium.
It seems desirable to abandon the straight jacket assumption that the fer­
tilisers of all islands are ‘essential’ factors in the production of each fruit (A l). 
Let us consider a case in which there exists an additional technology, less pro­
ductive, whose adoption makes trees fertile even if no external fertiliser at all 
is used. This is formalised by replacing A1 by the following technology:
A1 bis: yt = y(kt- U z), k =  max{0fcfc, }, a  =  T .
Clearly, the ‘autarkic’ technology will be adopted when shipment costs are 
prohibitive. A3 ensures now that consumption grows in an arbitrarily small 
economy when the marginal productivity of capital tends to infinity.4 If 0 is 
large enough, no threshold will be observed and we have the standard solution 
of an endogenous growth model. We consider instead the case in which 0 is rel­
atively small and the productivity of capital falls below the social discount rate 
for an interior set of states of the system, before that the technology with inter­
mediation becomes productive enough to warrant self-sustained growth. Fig. 
2 shows the behaviour of the function r(K).  Notice that the no-intermediation 
technology is more productive at low levels of K  and there is an interval in 
which neither of the technologies is productive enough to sustain a positive 
growth rate of consumption (r ( K ) < 1 //?).
FIG. 2 HERE
Fig. 3 represents the corresponding vector field. Observe that as far as 
Kt < K* consumption grows, due to the high productivity of capital warranted 
by the autarkic technology at low levels of accumulation. However, as the size 
of the economy grows, the productivity of capital declines to a level which is
4We ignore the formal issues introduced by the technological discontinuity, since they do 
not affect the qualitative analysis.
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not sufficient to sustain consumption growth. At some critical level between 
K* and K **, however, the size of the market becomes large enough to justify 
the development of the market for intermediation. For values of K t which are 
larger than such threshold, we observe that r '(Kt) > 0 (see Fig.2), namely the 
economy switches from a regime of decreasing to one of increasing returns. 
Eventually, as K t > K** the productivity of capital returns to a high enough 
level to sustain consumption growth.
As before, there are two equilibrium paths: T  and T', but there exist now 
two interior steady-states (a saddle-point and a fully unstable node, respec­
tively). The saddlepath T  is a ‘trap’ solution which converges to a stationary 
interior long-run equilibrium. Notice its resemblance to the solution of tradi­
tional neoclassical convex models, like in Cass (1965). T  can be thought as 
a no-intermediation equilibrium path, characteristic of an economy that will 
never create the opportunity for an intermediation market to be profitably 
open. T \  on the other hand, describes the unique self-sustained growth path 
with an active intermediation market converging to a balanced growth condi­
tion with constant saving rate.
Fig. 3 displays an interesting possibility of this model. If K 0 lies between 
K l and K jj, there are alternative sets of consistent beliefs which may drive 
the economy to either take-off into sustained growth or irreversible economic 
decline.5 In the language of Krugman (1991), for either very low or very high 
values of the state variable K t only ‘history’ matters, the future path of the 
economy being entirely determined by inherited conditions. However, there is 
a set of states of the system in which ‘expectations’ m atter, the destiny of the 
economy being open to multiple self-fulfilling prophecies.
FIG. 3 HERE
5This possibility is related to the occurrence of explosive cycles about the unstable fixed 
point. Simulations show that the lower a  the more pronounced, ceteris paribus, the cyclical 
pattern. Another theoretical possibility is that the a-limit of the equilibrium path with 
sustained growth be the origin rather than the fixed point S '. In this case the region with 
multiple equilibria is larger.
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Note, finally, that dynamics of the type described by Fig. 3 may also be 
generated by the system (14)-(15) (i.e., without the autarkic technology), since 
r (K)  is in general non-monotonic and can generate multiple interior steady- 
states.
Clearly, traps are less likely in second-best economies, since firms’ invest­
ment demand is higher and rsb(K) > r(K)  for all K.  In a first-best world, no 
trap exists. Since the ‘wedge’ is constant (q =  A), consumption grows in a 
smaller economy at a faster rate than in a large economy. If the intermediation 
costs are covered through lump sum payments which do not affect the incentive 
to accumulate, the growth rate will be bounded from below by the asymptotic 
rate and the economy will never get locked into a stationary equilibrium.
3 Conclusions
We have constructed a theoretical model with an imperfectly competitive 
transportation-type intermediation sector, which shows in what sense the cost 
of trading productive resources affects growth and can lead to stationary (pos­
sibly interior) underdevelopment equilibria. We have also shown that a model 
with convex technology in the final goods sector can produce strong non­
convergence results, with structurally identical economies moving either along 
a self-sustained growth path, or towards a long-run stationary trajectory. The 
policy implications are clear-cut, though the highly stylised nature of the model 
suggests caution. Countries should aim at reducing imperfections in the mar­
kets for inputs and services, either real or financial, which are complements of 
productive capital, so as to lower the opportunity-cost to accumulation. Fis­
cal policies or public investments that stimulate the process of accumulation 
(of both physical and human capital) are also welfare-improving, given the 
presence of a ‘thick market externality’.
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CHAPTER 3
Growth and Intermediation: 
an Empirical Analysis
This chapter investigates from an empirical perspective the relationship be­
tween growth and intermediation. In the previous chapter we emphasised the 
effects of market imperfections in the intermediation activity on the process of 
economic development, including the possible emergence of poverty traps. The 
most evident phenomenon in the contemporary world to which this analysis 
can be applied is financial intermediation.
The link between growth and financial development has attracted increas­
ing attention in the recent theoretical literature, though the empirical research 
is still limited. Among the first authors who ascribed a positive growth- 
inducing role to intermediating institutions, we can mention Gerschenkron 
(1962), Cameron (1967), Patrick (1967) and McKinnon (1973) who supported 
their argument with casual historical evidence. Goldsmith (1969) first a t­
tem pted to provide a rigorous empirical support to such conjecture. Using the 
value of all financial instruments outstanding divided by the value of national 
wealth as an indicator of the development of the intermediation system, Gold­
smith found some evidence that a progressive deepening of financial activity 
accompanies the process of growth and development. Taking homogeneous 
samples of countries, he found that this ratio increases over time in the pe­
riod 1880-1963 in both a group of developed and a group of underdeveloped 
countries considered separately. Furthermore he found that the index takes on 
lower values in underdeveloped than in developed countries (p.208). However, 
though both of these findings point in favour of the conjecture, Goldsmith 
himself recognised that evidence as ‘loose and irregular’ and the formal cross- 
sectional tests as essentially inconclusive (p.374-5).
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Atje and Jovanovic (1992) provide some renewed evidence of a positive asso­
ciation between financial development and growth. They run a cross-sectional 
regression in which the growth rate of GDP per capita is the dependent vari­
able and the ratio of the cumulative credit extended by banks plus the value 
of stock outstanding to GDP is included in the list of regressors, and find 
that remarkable cross-country differences in growth performances may be a t­
tributed to different degrees of financial development. The reliability of this 
result is however weakened by the lack of control in their regression for other 
potentially im portant determinants of growth like human capital, indices of 
political instability, etc.. Furthermore, they obtain less encouraging results in 
time-series analysis for a selected group of developed countries.
From a theoretical standpoint, financial intermediation introduces a sep­
aration between savers’ and investors’ decisions in aggregate growth models. 
We have seen in the previous chapter that in models with self-sustained growth 
and costly intermediation activity, the technology and market structure of the 
intermediation sector can alter the rate of capital accumulation and growth of 
the economy. In particular, intermediation costs affect both the propensity to 
saving of agents and the productivity of investments allowing for a more effi­
cient allocation of resources. Though our model is highly stylised and abstracts 
from many specific features of financial intermediation, we find it plausible to 
think of the financial sector as performing the economic activity of ‘transport­
ing’ resources from the places where they are saved and accumulated to that 
where they are invested and, possibly, get the highest return. This is close in 
spirit to the traditional analysis of Gurley and Shaw (1960), who motivated the 
existence of intermediaries on the grounds of transaction costs. Like has been 
recently emphasised by Hellwig (1991), this line of analysis sees intermediation 
as a kind of transportation activity. ” (J)ust as the transporter takes oranges 
from Spain and transforms them into oranges in Germany, so the intermedi­
ary takes bonds issued by firms and transforms them into demand deposits or 
savings deposits held by consumers” (p.42). The function of specialised mid­
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dlemen is that of overcoming the frictions from transaction costs, particularly 
when non-convexities in the transaction technologies occur.
The interpretation of intermediation in terms of ‘transportation activity’ 
is certainly restrictive. We believe, however, that possible extensions of the 
model designed to introduce explicitly the dimensions of risk and asymmet­
ric information would not alter the essence of the argument and the testable 
implications which are delivered by our simple parable.
There are other papers which provides a more specific description of the 
financial intermediation process, resulting in similar predictions to those gener­
ated by our model. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) construct a competitive 
model with heterogeneous agents which deals with growth, intermediation and 
income distribution issues. Intermediaries collect and analyze information, 
channelling resources to the place where they earn the highest social returns. 
Entry into the intermediation activity requires paying a lump-sum cost pro­
portional to the number of agents being intermediated. In exchange for a 
once-for-all payment (a sort of initial ‘subscription’ fee), each intermediary 
commits himself to paying the savers an agreed return on the capital invested. 
Intermediated savings turn out to be more efficiently allocated and to give a 
higher reward than those not intermediated. Agents with low-income, how­
ever, still find it optimal to choose the less efficient investment technology in 
order to avoid the payment of the lump-sum fee. As growth proceeds, also 
poorer people gradually switch to develop a link with the exchange network 
and foster an accelerating growth. In the long run, all savings are interme­
diated and efficiently allocated and the growth rate becomes constant at the 
maximum sustainable rate.
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) identify the growth enhancing role of finan­
cial intermediation in the encouragement which it provides to agents to switch 
their savings from lowly productive liquid assets to highly productive illiquid 
ones. Saint-Paul (1992) constructs a model in which the development of capi­
tal markets, by allowing the spreading of risk through financial diversification
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makes possible the choice of more specialized and risky techniques, charac­
terised by a higher degree of division of labour and productivity. Multiple 
equilibrium growth paths (one ’’financial” and another ‘nonfinancial’) are a 
possible outcome of his model.
In the archipelago model, like Greenwood and Jovanovic, we made the 
critical assumption that the provision of intermediation services is subject to 
some fixed costs. However, in our model these do not take the form of a 
once-for-all entry cost, but of a continuous flow of capital costs independent 
of the output of services produced viz a fixed cost of operation rather than 
entry. The main difference between our model and that of Greenwood and 
Jovanovic is that the latter is entirely competitive. This is made consistent 
with the existence of fixed costs by the assumption that the lump-sum cost 
(subscription) paid by the investors just covers the lump-sum cost suffered by 
the intermediary for establishing its activity. This guarantees Pareto-efficiency 
in their model. In our model, instead, we allow for market imperfections in 
the intermediation sector and the laissez-faire outcome is then suboptimal.
When interpreted as referred to financial intermediation activity, our para­
ble identifies the wedge between borrowing and lending interest rates as an 
im portant variable which can be used for empirical tests. This prediction 
is model-specific, since the existence of such wedge makes sense only in an 
imperfectly competitive framework. The crucial point of our theory is that 
the higher the price of intermediation services, the higher the effective cost of 
investment. Though firms can substitute external capital with own capital, 
there is an increasing cost in terms of productive efficiency in doing so, since 
the marginal rate of substitution across different types of capital is decreasing. 
The lower the intermediation costs, the less intensive in own capital and the 
more productive the technology chosen by firms. Since the productivity of 
reproducible assets is higher, so is the incentive to make new investments and 
the growth rate in the economy.
This chapter proposes some empirical tests related to the predictions of
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the model, based on cross-country data. According to the model the price of 
intermediation services should affect the growth performances of countries. To 
test this prediction, we first add the wedge between borrowing and lending 
interest rates to the list of regressors proposed by Barro (1990) and find that 
it has a highly significant coefficient with the expected (negative) sign, pro­
vided that countries subject to hyperinflation are excluded from the samples. 
Differences up to 2.75-3.5(depending on the sample considered) in the average 
yearly growth rate of GDP per-capita are explained by different interest rate 
wedges. The result is consistent with the findings of Atje and Jovanovic, who 
estimated quantitative effects slightly smaller but also significant. Further­
more, we find that the effects of intermediation costs are particularly strong 
for African countries.
1 Framework o f th e analysis
We reconsider here the existing results from the cross-country growth regres­
sion literature (Barro, 1991). The core prediction that we want to test is that 
per-capita growth rates1 should depend on the efficiency of the intermedia­
tion process, which should be reflected by the wedges between borrowing and 
lending interest rates.
Our analysis is based on a simplified version of the archipelago model. 
Consider the following Euler equations derived from an AK-type model in 
continuous time with intermediation costs, which can be taken as the simpli­
fied analogue of the model of chapter 2. Apart from the discrete vs. continuous 
time difference, in fact, the model is identical to the asymptotic version of that 
discussed in the previous chapter. First, we write down the equilibrium bal­
anced growth conditions, summarised by the following differential equations:
C t = #1 —a
*We assume throughout this and the following sections that the results of the theoretical 
model are normalized in per- capita terms
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k t = (2)
The first equation is the usual condition saying that consumption growth rate is 
equal to the elasticity of substitution times the difference between the marginal 
productivity of capital and the time discount rate, modified to account for in­
termediation costs (the notation is analogous to the previous chapter). The 
productivity of capital (ft) is reduced by an amount that depends on the 
size of intermediation charges. The second equation expresses the usual fea­
sibility condition. The term ‘a ’ will be assumed to be country-specific, and 
captures the effect of intermediation costs along the balanced growth trajec­
tory. Observe that, departing from the discussion of chapter 2, we treat here 
for simplicity intermediation costs as exogenous, determined by depending on 
institutional country-specific features, like policies towards the banking and 
financial sector and so on. Though this exogeneity assumption can be ques­
tioned, the nature of the problem is not different from that concerning other 
standard explanatory variables of cross-country growth regressions, like human 
capital or index of political instability which are likely to be two-way related 
to growth rates. From the Euler equation we can derive the following balanced 
growth conditions:
n  _  s  . . .
9 (Tal - a a  ^ ^
I  aa  -f a a -1 ft — S
Y  =  ------^ - (4)
where y  is the investment to GDP ratio. To obtain (4), we have used the
expressions (1), (2), the identity y  =  1 — y  =  1 — and the balanced
growth condition.
Throughout the empirical analysis, we will control in the growth regressions 
for a list of variables. First, we add the the ‘initial state’ of the system, namely 
the GDP per-capita at the initial year, which previous work has found to be 
highly significant. This variable is normally interpreted as capturing ‘conver­
gence effect’ towards the long-run path when a country has not yet reached
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such path. Second, we control for the set of explanatory variables identified 
by Barro’s work sis being significant in explaining cross-country growth rates.
Equation (3) predicts that growth rates should be negatively correlated 
with intermediation costs. On the other hand, equation (4) shows that the 
sign of the correlation between y  and a is ambiguous. The reason is the 
traditional conflict between substitution and income effect. On the one hand, 
lower intermediation costs make the rewards to saving higher and induce people 
to be more parsimonious. On the other hand, they increase the permanent 
income and, since current consumption is a normal good, induce agents to 
enjoy higher consumption in current time. Ceteris paribus, low values of or 
(high intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption), tend to make 
y  decreasing with a.
The previous analysis suggests another implication of the model. Regard­
less of whether intermediation costs decrease or enhance the savings rates, they 
affect positively growth rates when we control for savings rates. This descends 
from the fact that resources are better allocated in economies with lower inter­
mediation costs. In the archipelago parable, firms choose a technology which 
is relatively more intensive in external fertilizer and, thus, more efficient. This 
is shown explicit by using equations (2) and (4) to obtain:
=  k ± = i_ _ “
9 ~  i<t ~  y  n
Equation (5) confirms that growth depends negatively on intermediation costs 
after controlling for investment to GDP ratio.
2 Cross-country regressions reconsidered
The data set from which all but one of the variables are drawn is that con­
structed by Barro and Wolf and used by Barro (1991). Only 79 countries 
from that data set, however, enter our sample for diverse reasons. First, no 
data are available from the International Financial Statistics for the wedge be­
tween borrowing and lending interest rates for Algeria, Ethiopia, Madagascar,
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Sudan, Zaire, Hongkong, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Taiwan, Austria, Turkey, 
Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay. Second, some countries, 
particularly in South America, were affected throughout the 80s by extraordi­
nary fluctuations characterised by high inflation rates and violent adjustment 
policies. This makes unrealistic to take the interest rates of that decade as rep­
resentative of ‘structural’ conditions. In particular Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, plus Israel, have been ex­
cluded because they exhibit anomalous (negative in some cases negative, very 
high in others) or highly volatile wedges that clearly reflect the particular 
contingencies of the 80’s rather than long run stable conditions of the credit 
market.
For the reader’s convenience, we resume here the list of the variables drawn 
from Barro’s data set, referring to his work for further details. GR6085 
(GR7085) is the annual growth rate of per-capita GDP over the indicated 
period (e.g. GR6085 is the annual growth rate in the period 1960-85); GDP60 
(GDP70) is the log of per-capita GDP level in the referred year (all data are 
in Kravis Dollars); PRIM60 (PRIM70) and SEC60 (SEC70) are the of school- 
enrolment rates at the primary and secondary levels, and so proxy human 
capital; FERT60 (FERT70) is the fertility rate; GOV6085 (GOV7085) is the 
real government consumption expenditure to real GDP ratio (average for the 
indicated period); INV6085 (INV7085) is the average investment to GDP ra­
tio; REVOL is the number of revolutions and coups per year (1960-85), and is 
a measure of political instability; AFRICA is a dummy for African countries; 
JAMAICA is a dummy for this Caribbean country.
The new variable WEDGE (defined as the difference between the credit 
market and deposit rates) is instead obtained from the International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook, 1992. The main problem is that observations for a large 
enough number of countries are only available for recent years. So, we have 
constructed WEDGE by taking the average for reported observations from
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1981 to 1990 (when available) for each country2. This data constraint raises 
serious questions. In principle, it is always preferable to use begin-of-period 
data as explanatory variables of our regression, in order to weaken the issue of 
reciprocal causation between dependent and independent variables. Unfortu­
nately, this is not possible for the variable WEDGE. With some ‘suspension of 
disbelief’, we will treat our variable as an estimate of the wedge over a longer 
period3.
To start with, we test the significance of adding the variable WEDGE to 
linear Barro-type regressions whose dependent variable is the average yearly 
growth rate in the period 1960-85 (GR6085) and 1970-85 (GR7085), respec­
tively. The list of control variables include REVOL, PRIM60 (PRIM70), 
SEC60 (SEC70), GOV60 (GOV70), and FER60 (FERT70) defined earlier. 
The dummy variables AFRICA (sub- Saharan countries) and JAMAICA are 
also sometimes added. Particularly, Jamaica seems to be a constant ‘outlier’. 
In this set of regressions we do not add the investment to GDP ratio to the 
list of right hand-side variables and present the result of strictly reduced form 
regressions. This means that the measured effects on growth of the variables 
introduced can work either directly, namely by affecting the productivity of in­
vestments, or indirectly through their effects on the investments. The scope of 
this section is mainly to provide results directly comparable with the existence 
mainstream literature.
Several experiments were performed starting from a larger set of control 
variables drawn from Barro’s data set and then eliminating those with non­
significant coefficients through subsequent tests. We present the following 
results4:
2In cases with more than two missing observations, we have used also observations for 
1979 and 1980.
3The usual choice of taking averages over different annual observations has the scope 
of purging the data from short-run country-specific effects, though it is also questioned by 
some authors. (Quah, 1992).
4We are more agnostic than Barro about the role of the variable fertility, which he treats 
as endogenous, like in Becker et al. (1990). In such model, fertility is a choice variable of the 
agents, but it can alternatively be conceived, more traditionally, as an exogenous variables
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Table 1.
depvar: grl 960-85 depvar: grl970-85
ind.var. regrl regr2 regr3 ind.var. regr4
const. 0.026 0.012 0.024 const. 0.032
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
revol -0.055 -0.054 -0.053** revol -0.064
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
prim60 0.027
(0.005)
0.038
(0.005)
0.027
(0.005)
prim70 0.021
(0.005)
sec60 0.018 0.023 0.019 sec70 0.033
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
gov6085 -0.047
(0.023)
-0.051
(0.023)
gov7085 -0.090
(0.029)
gdp60 -0.014
(0.002)
-0.018
(0.003)
-0.013
(0.002)
gdp70 -0.017
(0.003)
africa —0.004**
(0.004)
-0.009
(0.0035)
africa
jamaica -0.033
(0.003)
-0.033
(0.003)
-0.032
(0.002)
jamaica -0.053
(0.003)
fert60 -0.005
(0.0014)
-0.006
(0.0012)
fert70 -0.007
(0.002)
wedge -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 wedge -0.0023
(0.00045) (0.00047) (0.00045) (0.0006)
R 2 0.71 0.64 0.71 R 2 0.62
adj-7?2 0.67 0.60 0.67 adj-.fi3 0.57
F 18.25 17.25 20.36 F 13.84
Dependent variable: per capita GDP growth rate. Number of observa­
tions: 78 (regrl, regr2, regr3); 79 (regr4). Standard Errors in brackets. 
x* =  significance level of the coefficient of x inferior to 0.95. x** =  
significance level of the coefficient of x inferior to 0.90. Method of 
estimate: OLS (standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity)
Regressions (1), (2) and (3) in Table 1 consider average growth rates in the
period 1960-85. We have also provided the results when the fertility index is
omitted in order to facilitate the comparison with Barro’s result. In this case
government consumption also becomes non-significant. Also we have omitted
the non-significant dummy for Africa. The coefficient of WEDGE is in all cases
reflecting cultural and religious attitudes of a population rather than a process of economic 
maximization
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negative, highly significant (more than 95 per cent significance level) and stable 
across experiments. The sign is in accordance with theoretical expectations, 
showing that a reduction in the wedge has positive effects on growth.
We have also repeated the regression for the period 1980-85 (not reported). 
In this case, the fit of the regression is smaller (R2 =  0.48) and some coefficients 
become non-significant. This is no surprise, since the average growth rates 
become highly sensitive to short-run fluctuations when the period considered 
is so short. Noticeably, however, the coefficient of WEDGE remains stable (its 
point estimate being -0.0025, s.e. 0.0009) and statistically significant.
The suspect can arise that the variable WEDGE captures in fact the effect 
of inflation rates on growth. If wedges are positively correlated with inflation 
rates and inflation rates are negatively correlated with growth rates, then we 
would have a case of spurious correlation. However, the introduction of average 
yearly inflation rates into the list of regressors does not affect the estimated 
parameters and turns out to be lowly significant. We have also controlled 
separately for inflation rates in the period 1980-90 (the period in which the 
variable WEDGE has been computed) and verified that the results are never 
significantly different.
We can draw some quantitative inferences about the extent to which cross­
country differences in growth rates can be attributed to differences in the costs 
of intermediation in a typical country. A one percent fall in the wedge between 
the borrowing and lending rates brings about a 0.1% percent increase in the
annual growth rate, raised to . O.Z3 percent when the restricted sample 
is considered. Since the variable WEDGE ranges between 0.0006 to 0.1587, 
differences in intermediation costs account for differences up to 2.75 percent 
(regressions 1,2,3) or 3.5 percent (regression 4) of the observed distribution 
of annual average growth rates across countries. In conclusion, the effect of 
intermediation costs on growth can be regarded as fairly large.
To check of the robustness of the results, we have tested the structural sta­
bility of the sample. Some interesting insight comes from splitting the sample
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into African and non-African countries. We report the results of regressions (1) 
and (4) only. The estimated coefficients of WEDGE is -0.0026 (s.e. 0.0011) in 
(1) and -0.0036(s.e. 0.0013) in (4) for African countries, and -0.0014 (s.e.0.0005) 
in (1) and -0.0020 (s.e. 0.0008) in (4) for the rest of the sample. This suggests 
that the effect of differences in intermediation costs are particularly remark­
able in the African continent. On the other hand, such differences are not 
statistically significant. An added shift dummy (WEDGE times AFRICA) is 
never statistically significant. The F-test of structural stability also fails to 
reject the null hypothesis.
A potential issue which has been considered is the measurement error in 
the variable WEDGE. To correct for the potential bias, we have run the same 
regressions by using the Instrumental Variable method, using a rank indicator 
as an instrument for WEDGE. This indicator classifies countries in five coun­
tries according to their wedge. Provided that the measurement error is not too 
serious, this variable should be uncorrelated with the error term, being so a 
valid instrument. The results (not reported) are almost unchanged, apart from 
the fact that the point estimate of WEDGE is slightly larger in absolute value 
(-0.0019 in regrl, -0.0025 in regr4, with the same standard errors as before).
After finding that the wedge between borrowing and lending rate has a 
positive explanatory power in growth regressions, we can test the prediction 
of the model (equation 5) that such effect remains positive when we introduce 
the saving rates into the list of regressors. The results obtained are reported 
in the following table.
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Table 2.
depvar: grl960-85 depvar: gr1970-85
ind.var. regrl ind.var. regr2
const. 0.018
(0.006)
const. 0.018
(0.008)
revol -0.047
(0.009)
revol -0.053
(0.012)
prim60 0.023
(0.005)
prim70 0.020
(0.005)
sec60 0.015*
(0.0078)
sec70 0.028
(0.01)
gov6085 -0.061
(0.022)
gov7085 -0.088
(0.031)
gdp60 -0.016
(0.002)
gdp70 -0.022
(0.003)
africa -0.006
(0.003)
africa -0.011**
(0.0044)
jamaica -0.032
(0.002)
jamaica -0.049
(0.003)
fert60 -0.004
(0.0014)
fert70 -0.004
(0.0017)
wedge -0.0016
(0.0004)
wedge -0.0020
(0.0005)
inv6085 0.07
(0.03)
inv7085 0.102
(0.033)
R 2 0.75 R? 0.70
adj-il2 0.71 adj -R2 0.65
F 20.04 F 15.28
Dependent variable: per capita GDP growth rate.
Number of observations: 78 (regrl); 79 (regr2).
Standard Errors in brackets, x* =  significance level 
of the coefficient of x inferior to 0.95. x ** =  signif­
icance level of the coefficient of x inferior to 0.90.
Method of estimate: OLS (standard errors corrected 
for heteroscedasticity)
There is clear evidence that in both periods the effect of WEDGE on growth 
works mainly through the productivity of capital, rather than through the 
saving rates. On the other hand, the coefficients of WEDGE are lower in 
absolute value than those in Table 1, showing that lower intermediation costs
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also affect growth through savings rates.
The highly stylised nature of the model suggests caution in interpreting 
these results. Though these simple regressions cannot be taken as a direct test 
of the model of the previous chapter, it seems remarkable that the prediction 
generated by the theory about the relation between economic development 
and cost of intermediation are clearly supported from our empirical analysis. 
This looks a robust result, the limitations of the methodology notwithstand­
ing. Many important issues have not been considered, like the existence of 
credit rationing, financial repression, segmentation of local markets, access to 
international financial markets etc.. Altogether, these issues make extremely 
problematic to assess the ‘efficiency’ of the intermediation process by simply 
lookin at the figures of borrowing and lending interest rates. Finally, the ‘trap 
issue’ has been ignored throughout this empirical analysis. Still, such figures 
seem to contain some interesting preliminary support to our theoretical work, 
and add to the findings of other authors in cross-country growth regressions.
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CHAPTER 4
Enforcement Constraints in a Model of Growth Driven 
by Human Capital Accumulation
A critical issue about theories of development thresholds and underdevelop­
ment traps is their robustness to an open economy environment. The explana­
tions proposed by the models of the first and second chapter are, respectively, 
that (a) accumulation is characterised by locally increasing returns, causing 
the low marginal productivity of capital at some low stages of development, 
and (6) increasing returns and market imperfections in some intermediate in­
put markets make these inputs highly expensive when the market size is small, 
causing the low ‘effective’ productivity of capital and accumulation rate. A 
natural objection (particularly to type (6) models) is that thresholds should 
vanish when the productive factors and resources, particularly capital, are al­
lowed to move freely across countries. A theory of underdevelopment traps 
should then explain not only what prevents the activation of an internal en­
gine of growth in a closed economy, but also why foreign investments do not 
flow into poor countries and rule out the trap equilibria. There is good deal of 
empirical evidence that the amount of foreign direct investments (fdi’s) which 
flows into poor stationary countries is pretty moderate.
Two explanations may be proposed to this puzzle. The first, already men­
tioned in the introduction, is that these economies lack some non-tradable 
productive resources, e.g skills embodied in labour force, network services, 
etc., which are complements of tradable factors in production. For this rea­
son, the productivity of fdi’s and the power of poor countries to attract them 
remains low. This argument could be used to defend the robustness of the 
models of the first two chapters. There is a second point, however, that might
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be also important, and is that the fdi’s inflow is low because property rights 
are perceived as unsafe by foreign investors. Political instability and incentive 
problems make them fear to loose the control over the resources invested, due to 
nationalisation, taxation etc.. The relationship between incentive constraints, 
financing opportunities and growth, already discussed by the ‘dept repudia­
tion’ literature (Atkeson, 1991), have been recently reconsidered within the 
general framework of a stochastic competitive equilibrium model with infinite 
horizon by Marcet and Marimon (1992). From an empirical viewpoint, Barro
(1991) finds that an index of political instability has a very strong predic­
tive power in cross-country growth regressions. Some more direct evidence 
which supports the hypothesis of a negative effect of enforcement constraints 
on growth with reference to some African countries is found by Giovannetti, 
Marcet and Marimon (1993).
This chapter considers the two issues (accumulation of non-tradable factors 
and property rights) jointly, and identifies a vicious circle in which enforcement 
problems reduce foreign investments, and this affects negatively the local peo­
ple’s propensity to invest in human capital. The slow growth (if any) of human 
capital feeds back into a low levels foreign investments. The main features of 
our model are the following:
a) the government of the host country can ‘expropriate’ the resources in­
vested by the foreigners and redistribute them among the local population. 
However, fdi’s have a component of specific knowledge that cannot be seized, 
and the host country cannot run the productive process combining the na­
tionalised and the local resources at the same level of efficiency as the in­
vestor would do. The productivity fall is biased against the local qualified 
labour; in particular, we make the (unnecessarily) extreme assumption that 
qualified labour becomes unproductive at all when non-seizable resources are 
withdrawn.
b) fdi’s are an essential factor for the development of a ‘modern’ sector. 
We assume a dual economy in which productivity growth takes place only in
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the sector which is fdi-intensive (the ‘modern’ sector). On aggregate, growth 
in per-capita term is entirely driven by the development of the modern sector;
c) the average and marginal productivity of fdi’s is increasing in the stock 
of human capital available in the host country. Foreign capital and human 
capital are assumed to be the only factors which enter a constant returns to 
scale production function of final goods in the modern sector;
d) the host country is populated by overlapping generations of two-period 
lived agents. They can save in two forms: either by investing in education 
when young and using their expertise in the modern sector when old, or by 
storing the resources earned in the first period when employed in the traditional 
sector. Accumulated knowledge can be transm itted from one generation to its 
offspring.
e) to accumulate human capital is costly to the indigenous inhabitants. 
The opportunity-cost is given by the time spent in education rather than in 
production during the youth. The aggregate investment in education in the 
host country is a non-decreasing function of the wage rate in the modern sector;
f )  the enforcement problem reduces the amount of foreign capital per ef­
ficiency unit of human capital which enters the country. This causes a lower 
wage in the modern sector than in a first-best world and affects negatively the 
accumulation of human capital and the growth rate of the economy.
The solution of the model is simple and unsurprising when agents are as­
sumed to be identical. Given the structure of preferences and technology, the 
economy will converge to either a stationary or a steady-growth solution de­
pending on whether the initial human capital endowment is above or below a 
critical level. The enforcement problem affects the threshold, and leads a set 
of economies that would converge to the good equilibrium in a first-best world 
to converge to the ‘bad’ equilibrium.
The model produces richer dynamics when agents are heterogeneous in 
their individual human capital endowments. The intergenerational transmis­
sion of human capital is assumed to take place partly inside each dynasty
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(family education), partly as a social process (school education). The stock of 
productive knowledge held by each agent is a function of the human capital 
of his parents, of the total human capital accumulated in the society when 
he is young and of his personal investment in education. People belonging 
to different dynasties choose, in general, different levels of investment in hu­
man capital. Furthermore, more educated people gain more from selling their 
labour services in the ‘modern’ sector. So, rich people are less inclined to ‘seize’ 
the foreign investments than poor, less educated people. The main ‘results’ 
are the following:
a) the extent to which the enforcement problem binds depends on the 
distribution of income. Particularly, it is more severe when the ‘median voter’ 
has low education compared with the average human capital. A very unequal 
distribution of human capital in which a majority of uneducated people live 
together with an elite of highly educated people is unfavourable to growth. A 
highly egalitarian distribution is not the most favourable situation, though;
b) growth increases inequality in the beginning, when the inflow of foreign 
investment induces people from better educated families to undertake high 
investment in education, whereas poor people find it optimal not to invest 
in education. At a later stage, however, growth is equalising, since people 
progressively switch into investing time in education and those dynasties which 
have less human capital than average benefit more from the process of social 
transmission of knowledge produces. The result is a ‘convergence’ of individual 
productivities to a uniform growing level. This evolution is coherent with the 
traditional Kuznet’s curve argument also captured by recent models about 
growth and distribution (Aghion and Bolton, 1992);
c) multiple equilibria are possible in the model, for a full-dimensional set of 
initial distributions of knowledge. In one type of equilibrium, the majority of 
local workers anticipate low wages in the modern sector and do not invest in 
education. These expectations are confirmed by the behaviour of the foreign 
investors who anticipate unfavourable political conditions and enter with a
110
low amount of foreign investments per efficiency unit of human capital. This 
implies low wages in the modern sector. In the other type of equilibrium the 
opposite happens: a high level of foreign investments flow into the country, and 
the majority of workers invest in education. The expectations which generate 
this behaviour are again self-fulfilling. It is possible for the initial selection 
of the equilibrium to have long-lasting consequences, namely to determine 
whether an economy is to converge to a long-run stationary equilibrium or 
to a self-sustained growth path. This is illustrated by a simple example by 
simulations.
The chapter is structured as follows. We first describe the basic model with 
identical agents and no enforcement constraints (section 1 ). Then, we intro­
duce the enforcement constraint and its relation to the political equilibrium 
(section 2). In the following two sections we generalize the model to the more 
interesting case in which workers are heterogeneous. Policy implications are 
discussed in section 5. An example is then presented to discuss the relation 
between short-run and long-run equilibria (section 6 ).
1 T he basic m odel
An economic system is populated by overlapping generations of two period- 
lived identical agents belonging to a continuum of dynasties. The successive 
generations have a constant size, whose measure is assumed to be unity. In the 
first period of their life agents choose to allocate their time between working 
in a ‘traditional’ household activity and receiving formal education (leisure 
is worthless). The goods produced by a young person can be stored for one 
period and consumed by the same agents when old. Alternatively, we can 
imagine that first-period savings can be invested in a non-productive asset, 
like foreign currency, which plays the role of a store of value. In the second 
period, agents sell their labour force in the modern sector. Here they earn a 
wage which is proportional to their productivity (h). This income, together
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with the savings of the previous period, is entirely consumed in the second 
period. For convenience, we assume that a young worker is entirely unskilled, 
and is worthless in the modern sector, as well as an old worker is unsuitable 
for working in the traditional sector.
Agents have standard intertemporally separable logarithmic preferences 
and do not care about their offspring. There is no uncertainty. A represen­
tative member of the generation which is young at time t solves the following 
programme:
max Vt = log ct +  f) log Ct+1 (1 )at,ut
s.t. Ct < w(l — s t)(l — ut)
Ct+1 <  s tRw( 1 -  ut) -I- w fl l ht+ 1 
ht+1 =  (<£ +  u\ b)ht 
0 < s t < l ;  0  <  ut <  1 .
where w is the wage rate in the traditional activity, 1 is the wage rate 
per efficiency unit in the modern sector, /3 (0 <  (3 < 1) is the time-discount 
factor, st is the saving rate out of the income earned in the first period, ut 
is the share of time spent in education, R  is the gross rate of return paid by 
the storage technology, 8 ( 0  <  8 <  1 ) is one minus the depreciation rate of 
the human capital inherited from the former generations without any personal 
investment. The parameter b is such that 0 <  b < 1 , meaning that there 
are non-increasing returns to the individual investment in education. The 
representative agent takes as given the stock of human capital of the previous 
generation, ht , and the wage rate in each activity.
The First Order Conditions (VUt < 0, V* <  0 ) of this problem can be 
expressed - after simple manipulations- as follows:
w™iht[ p ( l - b ) - u t ( l + l 3 ( l - b ) ) - 8 u bt] < st ubR (l -  ut)(l +  /?)u;] (2) 
w pR ub{\ — ut) — w ^ h ^ u t  +  8u\) < s t ubR(l — ut)(l +  /?)w] (3)
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where strict inequality in (2) and (3) implies, respectively, u t =  0 and s t =  0 
(slackness conditions). Notice that no corner solutions at which either ut = 1 
or s t = 1 (or both) can be a maximum, since this would imply consumption 
at time t to be zero and the utility to be minus infinity. So, the gradient of 
the value function evaluated in the optimum is always non-positive.
When b > 0 (strictly decreasing returns to the individual investment in 
human capital) and ht > 0, the optimum ut is always positive. This is evident 
from the fact that (2) never holds for ut =  0. Let us consider, first, strictly 
interior solutions. By using (2) and (3) to eliminate s f, we obtain:
ut =
(1 - 6)wM t+ 1
wR ht (4)
The second condition which needs to hold is that st > 0. From the inspec­
tion of (2 ), it results that this condition is satisfied if and only if:
(1 -  6)/9 -  [1 +  (1 -  b)P]u, > Su\ (5)
Call u* the value of ut for which (5) holds with equality (figure 1 ). Then
< u* =$> s t > 0. One can check that this condition is bothU* =  U,R
necessary and sufficient for the solution to be strictly interior.
FIGURE 1 here
It can also be verified that any corner solution at which st =  01 will be 
characterised by ut =  u*. This solution is independent of the state variable ht.
Finally, it is useful to obtain the limit behaviour of the policy function 
when ht —* 0. In this case, the logarithmic preferences generate the simple 
solution:
l im ^ o  st =  lim ht^ out =  0
The characterization of the equilibrium dynamics requires us to obtain the 
value of w f1. To this end, consider the technology of the productive sectors in
1 Agents cannot issue debts when young.
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the economy. In the ‘traditional’ activity only physical labour of young people 
is used, and there is no technical progress. Formally:
y j  = u>(l -  «i) (6)
having normalized the measure of the labour force to one, as already said. In 
the modern sector, output is produced by using human capital and imported 
resources. For analytical convenience, we assume that each vintage of fdi’s is 
productive for only one period. In the basic case described in this section, each 
m ature agent’s belonging to a particular generation is endowed with the same 
amount of human capital. The production function is assumed to be Cobb- 
Douglas, of the form:
(7)
Human capital is supplied inelastically by mature people. Foreign investors 
decide at time t — 1 the amount kt which is invested in the host country and 
which becomes productive at time t. They are assumed to act competitively, 
taking as given the opportunity-cost of resources given by the international 
one-period interest rate, r , and paying wages to workers at the value of their 
marginal productivity. This means that the level of foreign investment will be 
set at the following level2:
kt =
(1  -  a )
ht (9)
and the wage per efficiency unit paid to workers will be:
( i —°)wt =  a (10)
2One could assume, alternatively, that foreign investors’ decisions are taken according 
to a joint profit maximization principle. In this case, less fdi’s per efficiency unit of human 
capital would enter. Precisely, we would have:
*,= ( 1 - a )
21
ht (8)
The change is qualitatively unessential for our argument.
114
So, in a world with no enforcement problems the wage per efficiency unit 
paid in the modern sector is constant. Notice that in an economy characterised 
by a growing stock of human capital, this means that per-capita wages are 
growing over time.
Since we have established that wM is constant over time, the only state 
variable which determines the solution to (2) and (3) will be ht. In particular, 
we have the following cases:
ht =  0  =$■ ut =  0 ; s t =  ^
1 +  0  
_ , wRu*
1 <  (1  -  b)wM ^  Ut = =  *(**)
. ^ wRu*
kt *  (1 -  i)u,M =* «. =  « i - . = 0
The function u(ht) is defined in (4). Clearly, u'(ht) > 0. The behaviour 
of s(ht) can be derived by totally differentiating (2 ) (the details are in the 
appendix). This establishes that s'(ht) <  0 in all the relevant range.
We can now establish the main result for the basic case dealt with in this 
section:
P ro p o s itio n  1  Let the parameters be such that 6 +  u* > 1 . Define hthr =  
(llilfwM (1  — and 9t as the growth rate of human capital from t to t +  1 .
Then:
• i f  ho > hthr, then the equilibrium path will be such that: 
ut+1 Ut]St+1 <  s t; ht+1 >  ht
and will converge to a steady-growth path in which 
s =  0 ; tz =  u*',g =  (S +  u* — 1 ).
• if  ho < hthr, then the equilibrium path will be such that: 
ut+1 ^  Ut, 5<+i ^  su ht+i < ht
and will converge to a steady-state in which
5 = T+p’u = = °i 2/ = yT ‘
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• i f  ho =  hthT, then the equilibrium path will be stationary and such that, 
for all t:
_  f (l-b)wMh.thr] 6 . _  u;M/u[/?(l-6)-ut(l+/?(l-6))-fa*fl . i __ li/ir
U ~  [ tuR \ i ’ 11
PROOF - Since we know that u \h t)  >  0 and s'(ht) < 0, it is then sufficient to 
prove that ht > (<)hthr &  ht+1 > (<)ht m  order to ensure that the Proposition 
holds true. By substituting (4) into the human capital accumulation 
equation, we obtain:
ht+i — w R
ht. (11)
One can check that the term inside square brackets takes on the unit value 
when ht = hihr and is larger (smaller) than one when ht > (<)htkr. □
The following pictures give an intuitive representation of the dynamics 
described by the Proposition. When h0 > htkr, ht grows over time (figure 2), 
since 8 + u t > 1. Then, ut grows and s t falls over time (figure 3). The opposite 
occurs when ho < hthr (figure 4).
FIGURES 2, 3, 4 here
2 T he enforcem ent constraint.
In this section we allow for the possibility that the host country’s government 
seizes the foreign resources before the productive process is set. Given the 
Cobb-Douglas technology, a constant share of the production in the modern 
sector is appropriated by the foreign investors as a reward to the productive 
resources invested. The complement of this share represents the income earned 
by the inhabitants of the host country from the activity of the modern sector. 
This can be compared with the income which can be obtained by nationalising 
the foreign resources.
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An important assumption is that the country cannot nationalise the capi­
tal and manage the productive activity efficiently without the cooperation of 
foreign investors. We imagine, to motivate this assumption, that some non- 
seizable factor,like specific knowledge, managerial capabilities etc. be owned 
by foreign investors. The government can, however, seize the tangible assets 
and obtain an income which is assumed to be proportional to the amount of 
capital planted in the previous period. We will refer to this income as ‘scrap 
value of capital’ and indicate it by xf)kt3. We will structure the sequence of 
the relevant decisions as follows. At the beginning of period t foreign invest­
ments are planted in the host country; such vintage of investments becomes 
productive only at time t 4-1. Meanwhile, also at time £, the young workers 
who contemplate being employed in the modern sector in the following period 
decide the time to invest in education. At the beginning of time t + 1 elections 
are called and this generation, just become mature (the newborn do not have 
right to vote at this stage), chooses the government in a two-party system. Of 
the parties which run the competition, the party A, ‘liberal’, is credibly com­
m itted to enforce property rights over the entire mandate. The party B y to 
the opposite, is believed (regardless of its explicit programme) to nationalise 
the foreign capital and to redistribute in equal shares to the members of the 
voting generations of the income obtained. We will show that it is indifferent 
to assume, alternatively, that party B  is expected, when in power, to tax at 
full rate the profits of foreign capitalists.
3In our notation kt is the capital which is productive at time t. The formulation proposed 
in the text can be interpreted as if the country can do no better than to sell the machinery 
seized on the international market. Alternatively, one could assume that the country can 
still operate a certain number of efficiency units of foreign capital in the modern sector. 
However, in this case we should impose an additional assumption, namely that the relative 
contribution of the local factor to the production process be smaller when the foreigners are 
expropriated than when they are not. This makes the loss to the indigenous population from 
not running the process at full efficiency decreasing with the level of foreign investments, 
a fact which is essential, as it will become clear soon, in order to have interior solutions. 
Informally speaking, we want the productivity of the local factor to be strongly reduced by 
the withdrawal of the non-seizable component. The case which we consider is the extreme 
one in which the local factor looses its productivity entirely.
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We need to justify this political structure, in which apparently the two 
parties only cover the two radical options, whereas a continuum of tax rates 
on foreign investors’ income seem to be viable policies. First, we stress that 
governments remain in power for only one period, implying that no party may 
act strategically to build a reputation to the eyes of foreign investors.4. Con­
sider the case in which the government can decide to tax profits at the end 
of the production process. Then, a time-consistent strategy for the local gov­
ernment will be necessarily characterised by the full taxation of the corporate 
income belonging to the foreigners. The expectations about the behaviour of 
party B  simply come from this time-consistency issue. Notice that if party 
J3 ’s victory were anticipated, no foreign investment at all would be observed 
in equilibrium. How to justify then the existence of a party, the ‘liberals’, 
which supports property right enforcement and never deviates from its elec­
toral manifesto? One might argue that the leaders of this party obey some 
ideological convictions or have a moral commitment to the future generations 
(it will become clear soon why). More realistically, we can think that they re­
ceive financing and bribes from foreign investors. As marxist literature would 
say, party A’s leaders are ‘agents of the foreign capital’. Leaving aside ethical 
issues, it is possible that the current generation find it optimal to ‘tie his (and 
government’sjhands’ and choose to delegate political power
r«fcher
to party A  than to the ‘honest’ politicians of party B. To be concrete, let 
us review the complete scenario. Party B 's leaders are expected to operate 
under any circumstance in the interest of the electors. This sound, to the 
eyes of foreign investors, as the threat of facing ex-post taxation at the full 
rate. Party A’s propaganda hides the corrupted nature of its leaders under the 
banner of an ethical defense of the intangibility of private property rights. This 
sounds credible to foreign investors, on whose behalf these politicians in fact 
speak. Consider now the event of party J9’s electoral victory. The investors,
4The lack of consideration for reputational issues is certainly a major limitation of the 
model which is open to further research. However, we expect the technically issues that this 
would arise to be non-trivial.
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anticipating full taxation, put themselves ‘on strike’, leaving the country alone 
with the tangible assets which can be seized but withdrawing all the intangible 
assets which are necessary to carry on the productive activity (something like 
this happened in Allende’s Chile and in the Sandinist Nicaragua). If party A  
wins, instead, the modern sector will be active and no seizure will occur.
To summarize, it is unessential how radical the party J9’s manifesto is. The 
game is in fact structured in such a way that a party which is loyal to the in­
terests of the local electors will always tax foreign capital income at the full 
rate. The threats of taxation or nationalisation turn out to be observationally 
equivalent in our framework. It is instead essential that (i) governments re­
main in power for only one period and are linked to only one (non-altruistic) 
generation, (ii) there is a party which acts, ex-post, on behalf of the investors 
rather than the electors. This party may gain, ex-ante, the support of the 
majority of the country, because it represents the actual instruments through 
which credible precommitment may be taken by the indigenous population, 
and (in) some assumption is made about the way in which the benefit from 
the seizure-taxation is redistributed to the local agents. Though the actual 
form in which the redistribution takes place is unessential, we do not consider 
the potentially interesting, and certainly non-trivial, issue to endogenize the 
fiscal policy by allowing for a multi-party system in which any redistribution 
mechanism may be proposed by a party or a coalition.
Now, we compute what constraint the enforcement problem imposes on 
the foreign investors’ decisions, given that they need to act so as to induce the 
party A’s victory. This is easy to determine when the population is entirely 
homogeneous The party A  will win the elections held at time t if and only if:
il>kt < wMht — akl~aht (1 2 )
(13)
This condition can be rewritten as:
i
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We assume that, in the equilibrium, the foreign investors can coordinate 
their decisions and thus avoid creating the conditions for a victory for party B. 
This means that they will optimally restrict the inflow of investments in such 
way that (13) always holds. We will refer to (13) as the ‘enforcement constraint’ 
condition. Clearly, such a constraint is not binding (strict inequality) under 
certain parameter configurations. In these cases the results of the previous 
section carry over. We will focus, however, on those cases in which such 
constraint is binding, by assuming, throughout the rest of the chapter, that:
J  <  ^  (14)
When (14) holds, the wage rate in the modern sector is lower in the presence 
of incentive problems than under first-best Pareto efficiency. In particular, we 
have now:
wM =  a 1®-  (15)
This means that the threshold level hthr which guarantees convergence to a sus­
tained growth path is now larger than in the previous section (cfr. Proposition 
1).
3 H eterogeneous agents.
In this section we consider a population with heterogeneous levels of educa­
tion between agents of the same generation. To this end, we define a generic 
distribution function over human capital level, Ft(h) : R  —> [0,1], Ffth) >  0, 
where Ft(hc) is the proportion of old people whose human capital is inferior 
to hc at time t. We also define the density function ft(h)  =  dFf f l  •
Two main changes are introduced here with respect to section 2. The 
first, merely technical, is that we restrict the analysis to the case in which 
there are constant returns to scale to the individual investments in education. 
This means to restrict the parameter 6 in (1 ) to be zero. The second, more 
substantial, concerns the process of transmission of human capital between
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generations. We assume that knowledge is transferred between generations 
through both a family and a social channel. As before, individual investment 
in education increases the power of this process of transmission. We formalize 
this idea through the following transition equation:
h\+i = ($+u])(7h r + h\) (i6)
where i (i E 72, 0  <  i <  1 ) indexes dynasties, h*v =  f£° f t(hx)h\di is the average
human capital at time t, and 7  is an arbitrary constant which indicates the
importance of the social channel of transmission (e.g. public education) of
knowledge between generations.
The programme (1) can be now reformulated, with reference to the member 
of the dynasty i who is young at time as follows:
max V* =  logc*t +  /?log }+1 (17)
S.t. c\ < w(l — 5 j)(l — u\)
c‘t+1 < 5 j/?u;(l -  u\) +  wMh\+1
h \+ 1 = ( 6  + u \ ) ( l h t v + h \ )
0 < s \ <  1 ; 0  <  u\ < 1 .
where h\ and f t(h l) are given. The First Order Conditions can be expressed 
as:
 L_, /3 w M(h\+7 h * v ) - r s \ w  < n
1 _  u * P  r s \ w ( l - u \ ) + w M( 6 + u \ ) ( k \ + i h f v ) — V /
”  1 _  +  P r a \ w ( l - u \ ) + w “ ( 6 + l \ ) { h \ ^ h f v ) ~  0  ( 1 9 )
It is easy to verify that only corner solutions exist. For technical reasons
that will become clear soon, we assume that /? > S throughout the rest of the
work. The solution can be summarized as follows. Define the human capital 
‘endowment’ of a young agent at time t as h\ =  (ji\ -f • Then:
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• V {*,£} such that h\ < h* =
i * % Pw ~  hwMh\
=  ; S< =  (/? + r)w ( 0)
V { i , t}  such that h\ > fc* =
f i - S
l + S
; S) =  0 (21)
When the population is heterogeneous, it turns out that young agents com­
ing from poor, uneducated families have less incentive to invest in education 
than those coming from better educated families. We will refer to h*, the level 
of human capital endowment that makes workers indifferent between investing 
or not in education, as the ‘critical level of human capital’.
We now determine at which conditions an individual dynasty accumulates 
human capital at a positive or negative rate in the time interval between one 
generation and its offspring. Remember that part of the process of transmis­
sion of knowledge depends on institutional features of an economy, like the 
establishment of a system of compulsory primary education (cfr. the parame­
ter 7 ) and on the size of the aggregate human capital ( h fv ). As a result, the 
degree of inequality, if we control for differences in the individual investments 
in education, tends to decrease as the stock of knowledge grows over successive 
generations. Some relatively poor dynasties may accumulate human capital at 
a positive rate even when their members do not invest in education. To the 
opposite, some relatively rich dynasties may decumulate human capital even 
when their members do invest in education. The precise conditions are stated 
in the following Lemma.
L em m a 1  Define ht =  , and ht =  .
Then:
• Vj s.t. h{ < ht, h{+1 > h{
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• \/k s.t. h* > ht, ht+1 < h^
PROOF - Consider an agent from dynasty j  who is young at time t and 
chooses u3t =  0. From (16):
ht+i =  8 ( l  +  7^ fr) ht
then: hj+1 >  (<)hi S ( l +  7 ^ )  >  (<)1
from which the first part of the Lemma is established.
The second part is established similarly, using the condition (16) for an 
agent who chooses u = it*. □
To rule out uninteresting cases, we will impose parameter restrictions such 
that a society whose all members invest in education (tt{ =  u*, Vi) accumulates 
human capital, whereas a society in which no member invest in education 
(u\ — 0, Vi), decumulates human capital. This is guaranteed by the following 
assumption.
A ssum ption  1 i  >  ( 1 +  7 ) =  {$$:) J 
for some 0  G (0 , 1 )
One can check from (16) that this implies that the income of a homogeneous 
population (h\ =  h f v , Vi) which chooses ut =  u* grows over time, whereas 
the income of a homogeneous population which chooses ut — 0  falls over time. 
The role of the constant 0 will become clear soon. A corollary which follows 
from this assumption is that all agents who invest in education and belong to 
a less educated dynasty than average will add to the stock of human capital 
of their parents, whereas all agents who do not invest in education and be­
long to a more educated dynasty than average will remain below the level of 
education/productivity achieved by their parents.
In a world with heterogeneous population, the relation between short-run 
and long-run equilibrium is less straightforward than that given by Proposition
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1 in the second section. The state of the system is now defined by the entire 
distribution of human capital across dynasties, and, in general, we will observe 
at any moment some dynasties accumulating and some others decumulating 
human capital. The dynamics of average human capital is in general ambiguous 
unless the entire distribution of wealth is specified.
Still, we can construct some useful intuition. If the initial state of the sys­
tem (t =  0 ) is such that a richer part of the population invests in education 
whereas a poorer part does not, we observe the tendency for the density func­
tion to accumulate about two levels of human capital which evolve over time. 
Consider, for example, a case in which agents with an original endowment Hq 
(the ‘critical level of human capital’) ends up with more human capital than 
the parents if they invest in education and less human capital than the parents 
if they do not invest (figure 5). Then, dynasties with an initial human capi­
tal endowment just below h5 will decline over time in terms of their stock of 
knowledge. However, very poor dynasties (h30 < ho) will increase their human 
capital stock by the effect of the social channel of transmission. Dynasties with 
an initial human capital endowment just above will increase their human 
capital stock. Finally, very rich dynasties (hJ0 > ho) will experience negative 
accumulation.
FIGURE 5 here
Imagine that the resulting average human capital has grown from period 
zero to period one and keeps growing for the following periods. This causes 
a rightward shift over time of both h and h (figure 6 ). If the members of the 
‘poor’ dynasties (i.e. those originarily below the critical level Hq) kept choosing 
ut = 0  for all t and the rich dynasties kept choosing ut =  u* for all t , then 
the density function would converge to a two-spikes distribution such that the 
human capital and income of both groups grows at the same rate. The mass 
of the population, in other words, would concentrate at two growing points, 
‘close’ to ht and ht. This cannot be, however, the long-run outcome. At some
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point in time, there will be a generation whose all members (both ‘rich’ and 
‘poor’) will find it optimal to invest in education. Since that moment, the 
income of the poor dynasties will grow faster than that of the rich dynasties, 
and the economy will converge to a steady-growth equilibrium in which the 
differences across dynasties tend to vanish.
FIGURE 6  here
According to this sketchy picture, earlier stages of development appear 
characterised by growing inequality. Later stages of development, however, 
are characterised by decreasing inequality , since poor dynasties invest the 
same in education as rich ones but gain more from the process of social trans­
mission of knowledge. Nothing ensures, unfortunately, that this case is general, 
and one could construct other examples in which the average human capital 
always decreases over time or follows mixed patterns. It is possible, however, 
to identify a set of initial conditions which guarantees that the equilibrium dy­
namics necessarily converge to the ‘good’ long-run equilibrium. Let us define 
Ft(h) : R  —► [0,1] as a generic distribution function of the young popula­
tion over (inherited) human capital levels at time t. Consider the following 
Proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  2  I f  F0(hj =  h*) < 1 — 9 => > h f v V t > 1
and the economy converges to the long-run equilibrium with the maximum
growth rate, g = ( 8  +  u*)(l -f 7 ), where u' =  u*, Vi.
PROOF - Consider (16). By integrating on both sides, over i we get:
h f  =  ( 8  +  J f u i M k ‘ ) d i ) ( f h M h < ) d i  +  7 h t v )
= £(i+ 7) * r + «*(i -  F0(fc=/.*)) +«* h'°hf^ h')dl h ^ \
> <5(1 +  7 ) h iv  +  u*(l -  Fo(ftJ =  ft*))(l +  7 )ft£v
> 0(6 +  u*)(l +  7 )fto V >  fto
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where the first inequality follows from the fact that h?Avh — > (1  — Fo(h^ =no
h*)), since the richest x per cent of the population holds at least x  per cent of 
total wealth. The second inequality follows, instead, from the Assumption 1.
Since h f v  > h*v , then Fi(hj = h*) < F0(kj =  h*). The previous argument 
applies recursively for all t  > 1 , so hf+i > h f v ,V  t.
Also, h%  > h f v  =► A(+1 >  ht, V t. Then 3 T  such that h, > G, V t > T.
Since then, h{+1 > V j .  Then, 3 T  such that h{ > G, V j, V t > T. This
implies that uj =  u*, V i, V t > T. That g —»> (^ +  u*)(l + 7 ) as t —> 0 0  follows
from (16). □
4 H eterogeneous population and the enforce­
m ent constraint
When the population is heterogeneous, the relation between political equilib­
rium and foreign investments acquires new dimensions. Agents are no longer 
unanimous in their political attitude. The ‘rich’ will find their interests repre­
sented by the liberal attitude of the party A, whereas the ‘poor’ will lobby for 
nationalisation and redistribution, supporting the party B. The solution of the 
electoral competition will be determined by the will of a decisive individual, 
the ‘median voter’. As the intuition might suggest, if the median voter has 
a marginal preference for the party A over the party B , just more than half 
population, i.e. those who are at least as rich as him, will support the party A, 
and just less than half population, i.e. those who are less wealthy than him, 
will support the party B.
The characterisation of the political equilibrium is not trivial, though. The 
key issue is that agents take their decisions about education before the election, 
and these decisions affect their political choice. If a voter marginally prefers 
the party A  after having invested in education, for instance, he would have 
come up with a preference for party B had he chosen, ceteris paribus, not 
to invest in personal education in the previous period. As in the previous
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sections, no outcome in which the foreign capital is seized is an equilibrium. 
In the equilibrium, foreign capitalists are careful enough to restrain the inflow 
of investments below the level that would trigger a ‘bad’ political outcome. 
However, when the population is heterogeneous it is possible to have interesting 
multiple equilibria in which all agents take time-consistent decisions.
To fix ideas, we construct a particular example in a game-theoretical frame­
work, before moving to the general case. Consider a three-class society with an 
homogeneous politically decisive ‘middle class’ which has a positive measure 
in the total population. A representative middle class agent chooses, at time 
t , to invest (E ) or not to invest (N E ) a fixed amount of time in education 
depending on his expectations about the wages paid in the modern sector. 
The ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ class find it optimal, respectively, to invest and not 
to invest time in education, and their decisions can be treated as exogenous 
and ignored. This allows us to discuss the model in the form of a two-player 
game between the middle class and the foreign investors. The latter choose 
high (H ) or low (L ) investment in tradable resources on the basis of their 
expectations about the political equilibrium. If they choose H  (L), high (low) 
wages are paid in the modern sector in the second period5. W ith an opportune 
choice of the pay-offs6 it is the case that the middle class, if it chooses E  in 
the first period, always finds it optimal to support the party A  in the second 
stage and the property rights are safeguarded. But if it chooses N E  in the 
first period, it only supports the party A  in the second stage if L is chosen by 
foreign investors. Otherwise it supports the party B, since the potential gain 
from seizing the foreign resources is larger than the benefit from working in the 
modern sector when H occurs. Figure 7 gives the extensive form representation
5In fact, the wages are also affected by the investments in education, being decreasing 
with the social stock of human capital. In this example we will neglect this second effect, 
with the motivation that in the general case it is never entirely offsetting (namely the wages 
given H  and E  are always larger than the wages given L and N E )  when the measure of the 
middle class is less than that of the entire population.
6The numerical payoffs chosen are arbitrary, but are coherent with the assumptions of 
the model, as it will be shown more precisely in section 7.
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of the game. Notice that only the political decision of the local people is taken 
with perfect information about the opponent’s choice, whereas all investment 
decisions in the first stage are taken without knowledge of the behaviour of 
the other ‘player’. This motivates the dashed oval in the figure (according to 
usual conventions this means that the representative foreign investor ignores 
the first-stage choice of the middle class when he takes his decision).
FIGURE 7 here
It can be checked, by using backward induction, that this game has two sub­
game perfect Nash Equilibria, given by the sequences of actions ((E, H ) ,A )  
and ( (N E , L ),A ),  respectively. More precisely, the two equilibrium strategy 
pairs are:
• Foreign investors choose H; middle class agents choose E  in the first 
stage and vote for the party A  under any circumstance in the second 
stage;
• Foreign investors choose L ; middle class agents choose N E  in the first 
stage and vote for the party 5  conditional on H  (information set not 
reached at equilibrium) and for party A conditional on L (information 
set reached at equilibrium).
The first Nash Equilibrium dominates the second one in welfare terms.
Having built the intuition through the example, we move now to show that 
the case for multiple equilibria does not depend on the particular distribution 
of human capital assumed in this example. First, we discuss how the enforce­
ment constraint is modified by the heterogeneity of the population. Before 
taking their decisions, foreign investors speculate about the political equilib­
rium which will prevail in the following period, that is to say about the attitude 
of the median voter in the next election. By maintaining the assumption that 
if the capital is seized, the income obtained is equally distributed within the
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local population7 equation (1 2 ) becomes:
wMh™d > il>kt (2 2 )
When (22) holds, there is a majority in the country which supports the party 
A  and no seizure occurs. In an equilibrium, foreign investors choose a level of 
k such that (22) holds with equality. The wage rate per efficiency unit in the 
modern sector keeps being determined by the marginal productivity of human 
capital, meaning that wf* =  a  ^ Using this condition, we can rewrite
(2 2 ) - taking equality - as:
a  ( W )  h r i  =  (23)
It is clear from this expression that we no longer have a time-invariant ^ ratio 
like in (8 ), and that neither the wage in the modern sector, wM, nor the ‘critical 
level of human capital’, h,*, are now constant and time-invariant.
As the game-theoretical example suggested, we have two types of candidate 
equilibria. We will call equilibrium of type 1 an equilibrium in which the median 
voter chooses to invest in education, and equilibrium of type 2 one in which 
the median voter does not invest in education. In each type of equilibrium all 
agents adopt optimal, time-consistent rules. This implies, amongst the other 
things, that under no circumstance does the decisive agent vote for the party 
B  after investing in education at the previous period. Some people (i.e. the 
‘poor’) may be dissatisfied with the political equilibrium which prevails, but 
all agents are ‘realistic’ enough to take decisions which are optimal on the 
basis of the effective political outcome rather than on their political ‘desires’. 
In other words, the political equilibrium is always perfectly anticipated by all 
agents. Some non-decisive agents might choose to invest in education at time
7A  natural extension could be to allow party B to device a redistribution schedule which 
maximises its chances of winning the election. This would imply, informally speaking, to 
redistribute nothing to the richest, whose support would be very costly to achieve, little 
to the poorest, whose support is easily bought, and most of the resources seized to the 
‘marginal voters’. This policy would make tougher the electoral task for party A and more 
serious the effects of the incentive constraint on investments.
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t based on the (correct) expectations about the one period-ahead wage rate in 
the modern sector, and then, at time t -f 1, support the party £ ,  because the 
nationalisation would still make them better off. The event of a victory of the 
party B  would be welcome by such agents, though it would make them regret 
about the choice of youth. This inconsistency will never show up, anyway, 
since the political equilibrium is always in favour of the party A.
Let us define formally the two types of equilibria.
D efin ition  1 An equilibrium is characterised by the following conditions8;
( k  \ (1_a)
“ ( i g H  (24)
(1-or)
„  b » Y
■K
“ ( h t * )  K  ~  6 (25)
f  * 6h\f(h\) di + f j s  + u*)h\f(h\) di =  h?v (2 6 )
JO J
An equilibrium is said to be of type 1 iff:
u™d =  u* (27)
K  < hTed (28)
u?ed = 0 (29)
h* > h?ed (30)
The condition (25) is the familiar definition of ‘critical level’ of human 
capital endowment. Notice from (26) that hf+r is a decreasing function of hJ, 
since the higher h* the lower the proportion of people who invests in education 
at time t in equilibrium. In the characterisation of each type of equilibrium, 
the time-consistency requisites are expressed by (28) and (30), respectively. 
The former says that should the median voter invest in education, the ex-post
and is said to be of type 2 iff:
8We remind that h\ =  h\ +  y h f v  is the capital-endowment of an agent who is young at 
time t , apologizing with the reader for the proliferation of notation
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‘critical level of human capital’ determined by the equilibrium wage rate in 
the modern sector, cannot be higher than the endowment of the median voter, 
h™ed; otherwise, the median voter would regret about his choice of investing 
in education. The opposite must hold true should he not invest in education 
when young. Given the distribution of human capital across dynasties at time 
t , the equilibrium solution(s) is (are) found, by solving (24), (25) and (26) for 
the endogenous variables h*, hf+x and kt+i and checking whether either of the 
pairs of conditions (27)-(28) and (29)-(30), or both, hold.
The main results of this section are summarized by the following Propo­
sition. It establishes that, for any distribution of human capital endowment, 
there exists (at least) one equilibrium outcome determined by the choices of 
a generation of indigenous agents (investment in education and political elec­
tion) and foreign investors. It also establishes that multiple equilibria exist for
a non-trivial set of distributions of human capital.
P ro p o s itio n  3 Let H  be the space of continuous distribution functions over 
inherited human capital, F(h). Then for any F  € H there exists an equilibrium 
as characterised by Definition 1.
Let D(F,F*) =  | f£° F(h) — F*(h)dh \ be a metric on H . Let N(F**,e) be 
an e-neighbourhood of F**, i.e. N(F**, e) =  {F  E H \ D(F, F**) < e)}. Let 
A  C H  be the subset of distributions such that both a type 1 and a type 2 
equilibrium exist, and let A 0 be the interior of A. Then A is non-empty, and 
for any distribution F  £ A° there exists a 8 > 0 such that N (F ,6 )  C A°.
PROOF. Rewrite (26) as hf_^ =  h(h* ,ft(h)), where hi < 0. Then, rear­
range (24) and (25) to obtain:
kt+1 =  (3i)
/  \  —
*,+i = (S ) 1 <32)
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and, by eliminating kt+1 ".
( i )  * (?£) {S + < ‘^ =  W)a_IW , •)» (33)
which we rewrite as:
r ( s + u T ed) h r d =  c ( h ; , H h , ) ) , Ci (*;, /(&*)) < o  (34)
where T is a constant term. From (34) it is clear that in equilibrium, given
the state variables f ( h t) and h™ed:
(h; | =  « o  < (h; | u?'d =  o) (35)
Now, assume that a type 1 equilibrium does not exist. This implies that
(h* | u? ed = u*) > ti?ed
But then, from the inequality (35):
(h; | u™d =  0 ) >  h™d.
So, an equilibrium of type 2 exists.
Suppose, to the opposite, that a type 2  equilibrium does not exist. This implies:
{h* | u?ed =  0) < h?ed.
But then, again from (35):
(h* | ulI f  =  u*) <  (h ^ed | u™ed =  u*).
So, an equilibrium of type 1 exists. This completes the proof of the first part 
of the Proposition.
To prove the second part, observe, using (34), that, given ^ ed, it is always 
possible to choose a density function f ( h t) (and a corresponding distribution 
function F (h t)) having the given median such that:
(h* \ u™d =  u*) < h™d < (h* | u?ed = 0 ) (36)
where h* is the value of h* originating from the distribution F. So, A  is non­
empty. Also, the continuity of (34) ensures that for any function F  E N (F ,6 )
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and some S > 0 there exists a condition analogous to (36) which continues to 
be satisfied. □
Figure 8  gives an intuitive geometric argument. The locus (1 ) represents 
the positive association between kt+i and h* described by the enforcement 
condition (31), whereas the locus (2), negatively sloped, represents the con­
dition (32). Notice that u™erf shifts schedule (1), whereas it does not affect 
the schedule (2). When u™ed = u* (type 1 equilibrium), there are more for­
eign investments and higher wages in the modern sector (lower h*) than when 
umed _  q (type 2 equilibrium). In the case represented, multiple equilibria 
exist.
FIGURE 8  here
5 Transitional dynam ics and long-run equi­
librium .
The analysis of the transitional dynamics towards a long-run equilibrium is 
complicated here by the fact that h* is not time-invariant. So, we should keep 
track not only of the dynamic path of h f v  but also of that of h*. The conditions 
given by Proposition 2 are no longer sufficient to ensure that convergence to 
a ‘good’ long-run equilibrium occurs. It turns out that, in fact, sufficient 
conditions for the economy to converge to the high growth long-run equilibrium 
can still be found, but they are more restrictive and involve ‘distributional 
issues’.
It is convenient to write explicitly the relation between the ‘critical level 
of human capital’ at time t and the ratio between the median and the average 
human capital at time t +  1 which holds in equilibrium. By eliminating kt+i 
from (24) and (25), and rearranging, we obtain:
The following Lemmas establish important facts for proving the main re­
sult.
Lem m a 2 I f  in the equilibrium ti™ed =  u* (type 1 equilibrium), and h™ed < 
h f v , then h* < hjLj.
I f  in the equilibrium u™ed =  0 (type 2 equilibrium), and h™ed > h f v , then
h; > h;_x.
PROOF - First part. Under the assumptions of the first statement, the
im ed hAV
equation (16) implies that - ^ 3  > (£+ u * )(l+ 7 ), and that -jffi <  (£+u*)(l-|-7 ).
hAV hAV 1 *So, ^  which implies, by (37), h* < h*^.
Second part. Under the assumptions of the second statem ent, the equation
im ed  uAV lAV hAV
(16) implies that -£ £ 3  < 6 ( 1  -f 7 ), and that >  6 ( 1  +  7 ). So, - ^ 3  > - ^ 3 3 ,
111 n t  '*»+ i
which implies, by (37), h* > h*_x. □
D efin ition  2  Let G be defined as hJ1 evaluated at an equilibrium in which 
ht+i =  ^t+i • Then, from (24), (25) and (37):
Q  s
Sat <*
Lem m a 3 / /  a type 1 equilibrium occurs at time T  and hj!ed > hj>v , then 
h r+1 >  ^T+i- Hence, i f  only type 1 equilibria occur f o r t  > T,  and hj!ed >  h^v , 
then hf < G, V t > T  — 1.
I f  a type 2 equilibrium occurs at time T  and h™ed < h^v , then h™^ < 
h r+ 1 • Hence, i f  only type 2 equilibria occur for t > T , and h^ped < h j V, then 
k't > G , V t > T - l .
PROOF - For the first part, apply directly (16) and obtain:
hr+i ~ hr h  =  (<5 +  u ) ( h ’^ ‘d + ■yh^v ) -
) -
= Fr (h =  h ' ^ h ^  + 6(h?ed - h $ v ) + u* -  jT ° V f l h ' j d i ]
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<5(1 +  7 ) h f  -  u’ ^ h 'f(h ')d i +  (1 -  FT(h = h'T) ) ^ h f
AV , c/vmed iAV\  . * I imed
which is greater than zero if h™ed > h j V (notice that the integral is smaller 
than hjY).  This implies from (37) that h? < G. The rest of the statement 
follows from the recursive structure of the result.
For the second part, analogously:
h r + i - h r h  = S (hred + 7 * tV) “
a
oo A
_ h ' f ( t i ) d i  +  (1 -  FT(h  =  h'T )) 'fh $ v
=  6 ( K f ' d -  h * v ) -  u* ( j H  h ' f ( h ' ) d t  +  (1 -  FT (h =  h'T )) - th * v
which is smaller than zero if h j ed > h jY . Then, again, apply recursion. □
Figure 9 gives a visualisation of the facts involved in the Lemmas. When 
only type 1 equilibria occur for t > 0, we have two possible cases: either 
ho < G (h%ed > hoV) - like in the case represented in the figure and G 
bounds from above h* the dynamics of h* being in general ambiguous, or 
hg > G (h™ed < hgV), and h*t < 0, at least as far as h* > G. The opposite 
happens when only type 2 equilibria occur.
FIGURE 9 here
The following Proposition uses the Lemmas 2 and 3, and jointly gives con­
ditions for a sequence of type 1 equilibria to exist. The result is a generalisation 
of the Proposition 2.
P ro p o s itio n  4 Let Fq{K) be the distribution function over initial human cap­
ital endowments. I f  the initial conditions are such that:
• either (i) h™ed > h£v > and (ii) F0(h =  G) < 1 — 0
• or (i) hgV < h™ed, (ii)h0 > hg, and (iii) Fg(h =  hg) < 1  — 0
then there exists a path characterised by a sequence o f type 1 equilibria such 
that hf+x > h*v , V t >  1, which converges to the long-run equilibrium with the 
maximum growth rate, where u% =  u*, V i.
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PROOF - Consider the first set of conditions. The Lemma 3 ensures that 
G is an upper bound to h*, if a sequence of type 1 equilibria occurs for t >  0. 
The strategy of the proof is similar to that of the Proposition 2, with the upper 
bound G being treated similarly to the fixed h*. The condition (i) guarantees 
that a type 1 equilibrium exists9 in the first period: since h™ed > fiQV, then 
famed ^  _j_ > G >  h,Q. The condition (ii) guarantees that h^v > h,QV:
since G > then F0(h =  Iiq) < F0(h =  G) <  1 — 9.
Then, verify that the problem has a recursive structure and that (a) >
h t v , V t >  1, and (b) type 1 equilibria exist for alH > 1. To verify (a), observe
A A
that Fi(h = G) < Fo(h = G) < 1 — 0, since the offspring of all agents with a 
human capital endowment h30 > G certainly has h{ > G, whereas that of some 
agents with h30 < G may have h{ > G. This ensures that h^v > lifiv . The last 
inequality, together with (i) implies that (b) necessarily holds true for t =  1, 
so a type 1 equilibrium also exists at t =  1. The argument applies recursively 
for t > 1.
The rest of the proof is identical to that provided in the Proposition 2.
Consider the second set of conditions. In this case, the Lemma 2 ensures 
that, if a sequence of type 1 equilibria occurs, then h*+l < h^, V t >  0. The 
conditions (ii) and (iii) ensure that a type 1 equilibrium exists in the first 
period, and that h^v > h,Q v . The rest of the prove is based on the recursive 
structure of the problem and is analogous to that given for the first part. □
To give sufficient conditions for convergence to the ‘bad equilibrium’, in 
which no activity in the modern sector exists, is less straightforward. The 
technical difficulty lies in finding simple conditions which guarantee that the 
average human capital falls over time when a sequence of type 2 equilibria
9It is possible to find less restrictive conditions, but at the cost of going through a list of 
algebraically intriguing and uninteresting different cases. Notice that in this case it is not 
sufficient to impose h™ed > G  when t = 0, in order to ensure that it holds also true for 
t >  1, since there is no restriction which ensures that grows over time. In the second 
set of conditions this is instead sufficient, since h™ed <  h* v , where h *v  grows over time 
along the equilibrium path, and h™ed must grow, in a type 1 equilibrium, faster than the 
average human capital.
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arise. It is intuitive, however, that the occurrence of a type 2 equilibria at the 
initial time tends to be associated with the future decline of an economy.
6 Policy im plications.
Two main points are identified by the previous discussion. On the one hand 
high initial levels of human capital are a favourable condition to avoid the 
lock-in into a stationary equilibrium. The existence of thresholds in the ac­
cumulation of human capital had been already revealed by the study of the 
basic case with homogeneous population. On the other hand, the lower the 
human capital of the median voter compared with the average human capi­
tal, the higher the total amount of human capital that the society needs to 
be endowed with in order to sustain a type 1 equilibrium and to take-off into 
sustained growth. This point emerges as a non-obvious effect of the relation 
between political equilibrium, property right enforcement and profitability of 
individual investments in education.
To study this point more closely, consider some economies which are identi­
cal in all but the distribution of human capital. It is clear that a very unequal 
distribution is not a good pre-condition for growth. Take the extreme case 
in which more than half the population has no human capital at all, whereas 
high competence and skills are concentrated in the hands of a minority. In this 
case, there will be no development of the modern sector, because the political 
pressure for seizure and redistribution of the foreign resources would be over­
whelming should any positive amount of foreign investment enter the country. 
On the other hand, a perfectly egalitarian society in which all people have the 
same amount of human capital, though a more favourable environment, is not 
the best situation for activating the growth process. Imagine that the initial 
aggregate stock of human capital is too low for promoting sustained growth 
in an egalitarian society. Still, it is possible that a less egalitarian society, in 
which the same total human capital is concentrated in the hands of a majori-
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tarian group, can sustain a take off process. The reason is that in this society 
there is a firmer support for property rights enforcement from the dominant 
class which, by squeezing the interests of the ‘poor’, is consistent with a higher 
inflow of foreign investments, higher wages in the modern sector and a higher 
rate of human capital accumulation. The ‘ideal’ distribution10 of a given stock 
of knowledge would be to give (just more than) half the population all the 
human capital equally distributed among the members and the remnant (just 
less than) half population nothing at all.
We can try to relate this rather abstract discussion to more realistic sce­
narios, in order to draw meaningful policy implications. Assume that in a less 
developed country there exists an elite with a relatively high endowment of 
knowledge or capabilities and a large majority of uneducated unskilled people. 
Should the government use its budget for education for the elite to acquire 
higher human capital, say by paying grants for studying abroad? Or should 
it give priority, to the opposite, to plans for large-scale basic literation of the 
mass of uneducated people? According to the model, as far as pure growth 
objectives are concerned, neither policy is ideal. If the first policy is adopted, 
the few highly educated people are likely never to find good opportunities at 
home, because the political environment will remain unfavourable to foreign 
investments and modernization. Possibly, they will be induced to spend their 
competence abroad. If the second policy is adopted, the government budget 
may get too much ‘disperse’ to produce significant effects. The expenditure 
should target the formation of a substantial, majoritarian middle class, whose 
interests are coincident with those of foreign investments and modernization. 
The change in the social structure puts the basis for credible protection of prop­
erty rights, increase of salaries in the modern sector and large ‘spontaneous’ 
investments in human capital from the current and future generations.
The model is viable to a ‘right-wing’ interpretation as providing the ratio­
10Obviously, we mean ‘ideal’ for a social planner who aims at maximizing the growth rate 
of the economy, without any regard for equity or other welfare considerations.
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nale to a period of non-democratic rules, with the repression of the political 
rights of the lower classes at an early stage of development. Even more, it 
seems to suggest that a government controlled by agents of foreign capital is 
the most desirable thing for the growth perspectives of a less developed coun­
try, because it creates a powerful instrument of pre-commitment which favours 
foreign investments. To defend this argument from ethically-based criticism, 
one could argue that a non-democratic ‘oligarchic’ government would operate 
in fact on behalf not only of the alive wealthy groups (and foreigners), but also 
of the future generations whose welfare is affected by the accumulation of hu­
man capital and which would be damaged by the ‘selfishness’ of a democratic 
government. However, repressive policies are always subject to the uncertainty 
that political outbreaks occur, and are likely not to be the best option. An 
opposite political interpretation, more in tune with the views of the author, is 
that the model indicate to the ‘liberal party’ (A) the need of being sensitive 
to social issues and introducing in its electoral programme some redistributive 
policies. In particular, it would be advisable to tax at a highly progressive 
rate the incomes earned by the richest groups of the local population in the 
modern sector and rebate them lump-sum. Tax schedules can be designed in 
such a way that they hit the most wealthy groups, but not the middle class 
(i.e. the median voter), and they do not affect the amount of investments in 
education (the rich finds it optimal to invest in education even if his income 
is going to be taxed up to some extent). The perspective of income redistri­
bution enlarges on the other hand the share of supporters of property right 
enforcement at a given level of foreign investments, and makes more foreign 
investments enter the country in equilibrium. If we insist on the interpreta­
tion of the liberal party as an agency controlled by international investors, we 
could also argue that it might be optimal for them to accept (by introducing 
a populistic note in the electoral programme of party A) a certain degree of 
taxation, so as to enlarge the support to the defense of property rights and 
reduce the extent to which foreign investments need to be ‘rationed’ due to
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the enforcement problem.
7 Long-run equilibria and historical accidents. 
Pallas-land vs. Lotus-land.
We have shown that multiple equilibria are an intrinsic feature of our model. 
Should we believe that structurally identical countries which select different 
equilibria at some stage of their history are destined to converge to alternative 
long-run equilibria? In other words, do historical accidents have long-lasting 
consequences? We will show that according to our model two countries that 
have achieved altogether different levels of economic development may have 
had, at some past stage, identical conditions and opportunities. Models which 
contain this prediction have been discussed in the previous chapters (see also 
Krugman, 1991, and Matsuyama, 1991). The main difference of the model of 
this chapter is that it does not need any type of technological non-convexity. 
Rather, it is the intergenerational externality in the accumulation of human 
capital that plays a central role.
In this section, we specify the initial distribution of knowledge and we 
give an example of non-uniqueness of the long-run outcome for given initial 
conditions. We leave to future research a more detailed study of the issue and 
the derivation of more general analytical results.
Consider the three-class economy in whose framework we have discussed the 
game of a previous section. A fourth of the population belongs to the ‘poor’ 
class, a fourth to the ‘rich’ class, and half of the population belong to the 
middle class. Each class consists of identical individuals. Though special the 
case is, we believe that a large class of distributions (particularly, symmetric 
and lowly skewed) would generate similar dynamics.
At time t =  0, the old middle class agents are two times as productive, and 
the rich three times as productive as the poor. The productivity of the poor 
is normalised to one. The other parameters are chosen as follows:
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p  =  0.875, 8 = 0.5, w =  1.714, a  =  0.5, i/> =  0.25
It is easy to check that, with this parameter choice, the following relations 
hold:
u* =  0.25, • < !  =  $ £ ,  h; = 3 $ ,
t+1 nt+l
where the expression for the ‘critical level of human capital’ is easily derived 
from (37). The representative member of the middle class is, obviously, the 
median voter.
When the first generation, alive at time t = (0,1), is considered, there are 
two equilibria. In the type 1 equilibrium, the middle class and the rich invest 
in education, there is a high level of foreign investments, the wage rate per 
efficiency unit is =  1.06, and the critical level of human capital endowment 
is h,Q =  2.73 < h™ed =  3. This implies that it is optimal for both the rich and 
the middle class (not for the poor) to invest in education in the first stage. As 
a result, the average productivity grows from 2 at time t =  0 to 2.125 at time 
t = 1. In the type 2 equilibrium, instead, the middle class does not invest in 
education, and the equilibrium is characterised by less foreign investments, a 
lower wage rate per efficiency unit (w ^  =  0.86), and a critical level of human 
capital endowment of /ij =  3.5 > h =  3. So, in this case it is optimal to 
invest in education only for the rich (3.5 < 4), and the average productivity 
falls from 2 to 1.75.
If alternative sets of self-fulling expectations are viable in the first period, 
the future faced by the following generations is uniquely determined. Imagine 
that two countries, Pallas-land and Lotus-land11, shared identical conditions, 
like those just described, at the beginning of their history, but in Pallas-land the 
type 1 equilibrium occurred in the first period, whereas in Lotus-land the type 
2 equilibrium occurred. In the second period, the Palladiensis face a unique
11In Greek mythology, Pallas was the goddess of sciences. Lotus was a legendary plant 
inducing luxurious languor when eaten. In a well-known episode of the ‘Odyssey’, Ulysses 
and his mates land at the island of the Lotus-eaters, and risk loosing the recall of the 
fatherland Ithaca by eating the flower.
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type 1 equilibrium. One can check that neither a type 1 equilibrium in Lotus- 
land, nor a type 2 equilibrium for Pallas-land exist. Pallas-land is destined to 
the route of progress and development, Lotus-land to an inexorable decline.
Let us follows the path taken by these two economies (figures 10 and 11). 
In Pallas-land, the first years are characterised by an irresistible escalate of 
the middle class, with the productivity and income of both the poor and the 
rich growing only moderately (figure 10.a). At the sixth generation, the gap 
between the rich and the poor is almost unchanged (in fact it is slightly wider) 
with respect to the initial difference, whereas the middle class has almost 
caught-up with the rich group. Since then, the social redemption of the lower 
class starts. At the ninth generation, the gap between the richest and the 
poorest is less than half as much it used to be, and continues to fall in the 
following periods, as the figure shows. The figure 10.b shows why this happens. 
At the seventh generation, also the poor start investing in education and their 
income grows at the highest rate.
In Lotus-land, to the opposite, the society continuously forgets something 
of what their ancestors could do12. As far as the first couple of generations is 
concerned, rich people do invest in education, and their productivity declines 
more slowly than that of the other classes. However, since the third generation, 
all the inhabitants of Lotus-land give up devoting time to education and the 
decline is generalised (figures 11.a and ll.b )
FIGURES 10.a, 10b, 11.a, l l .b  here
12If one finds this possibility unrealistic, he can think that some type of knowledge gets in 
fact obsolete as time goes on, and can no longer be productively used together with foreign 
capital in a modern industrial sector.
8 A ppendix
We prove here that s'(/it) < 0 for interior solutions in the basic model. This 
fact is used in the proof to Proposition 1. First, substitute (4) into u\ in the 
left hand-side of (2) (taken with equality) and get:
M
u> t+ iht[P(l-b)-ut( l+ P ( l-b ) ) -6 u \]  =  st 
Then, rearrange to obtain:
(38)
_  /?(! -  b) -  u,[l +  ff(l -  ft)] -  S u f  . .
( l - 6 ) ( l - u « )  ' ( ’
By differentiating the last expression, it turns out that:
dst (1 - u t) (l +bSubt~l) + u t +  <foj
d ^ , ~  (1 - u , ) ( l + / ? ) ( l  - u , ) 2 <  ' ( }
Since from (4) it follows that u'(ht) > 0, then we have proved that in an 
interior solution s'iht) < 0.
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CHAPTER 5
Stochastic Trends and Macroeconomic Fluctuations: a 
Multicountry Analysis
This chapter is intended as a contribution to the debate opened by the 
seminal paper of Nelson and Plosser(1982) about the relative importance of 
permanent and transitory shocks in macroeconomic fluctuations. It is now 
well-known that GNP in most countries is characterised as a unit root process. 
The success of the idea that trends in output have a stochastic rather than 
deterministic nature has caused the breakdown of the traditional clear-cut 
distinction between business cycle and growth theory, the former being related 
to the study of fluctuations around a trend and the latter to the study of 
the persistent features of the economy. This debate has some implications 
on the recent developments in growth theory. If economic fluctuations are 
caused by repeated shocks which affect a self-sustained growth path (including 
policy shocks like distortionary taxation) the stochastic version of the AK-type 
endogenous growth model can in principle be used to characterise both the 
long-run and short-run behaviour of the economic system. This diminishes 
the role traditionally attributed to temporary disturbances (e.g. monetary 
shocks) as a source of fluctuations in the economy.
The first generation of papers which discussed the issue focused on univari­
ate methods of time-series analysis, which decompose the stochastic process 
of GNP into the effects of a permanent - typically random walk - and a sta­
tionary component. The objective of the analysis was to quantify the relative 
‘size’ of the random walk (Cochrane, 1988), by comparing the variance of the 
non-stationary component with the total variance exhibited by the time series. 
A seemingly different approach, though in fact equivalent in results, is to com­
pare the impact effect of a shock with its cumulated (long-run) effect over time, 
providing a measure of the degree of persistence in the economy (Campbell and
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Mankiw, 1986). The finding that movements in permanent components are a 
quantitatively important part of GNP fluctuations was taken by some authors 
as the evidence that ‘real (non-monetary) disturbances are likely to be a much 
more important source of fluctuations than monetary disturbances’ (Nelson 
and Plosser, 1982, p. 159).
Both the methodology and economic implications of this research have 
been later criticised by the influential paper of Blanchard and Quah (1989), 
who argued that the issue of identifying permanent and transitory components 
is not satisfactorily solved by restricting the permanent component to be ran­
dom walk. This is in fact a purely statistical criterion. If we aim at giving 
some economic interpretation to the different disturbances, however, there are 
no valid reasons to justify the apriori assumption that the permanent com­
ponents is a random walk rather than any more general unit root process. 
Blanchard and Quah (BQ) showed that the identification of the permanent vs. 
transitory components is possible within more a general class of decomposi­
tions - particularly, arbitrary orthogonal decompositions - by using additional 
information revealed by the behaviour of macroeconomic variables other than 
the GNP. This multivariate methodology has the advantage of delivering a 
‘structural’ interpretation of the residual based on the effects which they have 
- coherently with some identifying restrictions - on the endogenous variables of 
the model. For this reason, this methodology has become known as structural 
vector auto-regression (VAR) analysis (see Giannini, 1992 for an overview of 
methods). The crucial identifying assumptions used by BQ is that transitory 
shocks (e.g. monetary shocks) do not have permanent effects on GNP. Both 
types of disturbances, on the other hand, affect both GNP and unemployment 
in the short run. The shocks are also assumed to be orthogonal. This identifi­
cation scheme has been exploited by a number of authors with diverse station­
ary ‘auxiliary’ variables (Fachin, Gavosto and Pellegrini, 1992, for example, 
use an index of industrial capacity utilization). BQ found that large part of 
the variance of GNP can be still attributed to ‘demand’ shocks. The same
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result is obtained in a higher dimensional multivariate framework by King et 
al. (1991), who conclude that in VAR systems with nominal variables produc­
tivity shocks typically explain less than half of the business-cycle variability. 
It is temptative to interpret the results of this ‘second generation’ of papers 
as evidence in favour of traditional models which predict that demand shocks 
play a prominent role in explaining business cycle fluctuations. The equiva­
lence between temporary and demand disturbances is certainly controversial, 
though is coherent with the predictions of some models with a neo-keynesian 
flavour. BQ, for instance, explicitely relate their findings to a version of the 
model of Fischer (1977) in which the temporary disturbances are monetary 
shocks.
The recognition that the decomposition of GNP must take into account 
the existence of diverse sources of fluctuations in the economy is a remarkable 
progress. However, the bivariate analysis of BQ can still be inadequate if the 
economy is in fact subject to multiple independent permanent shocks. The 
importance of temporary or ‘demand’ disturbances may be incorrectly mea­
sured (possibly, overstated) due to misspecification. In this work, we explore 
the possibility that an important role is played by the propagation of the in­
ternational business cycle (see also Canova, 1993). More precisely, we assume 
that there exist both ‘technological’ permanent shocks with an idiosyncratic 
country-specific nature, and a worldwide stochastic trend which is shared by 
all countries in the sample. The cointegration properties of the time-series of 
GNP for the different countries are used to disentangle the effects of the differ­
ent stochastic trends. This relates our contribution to the work of Bernard and 
Durlauf (1992), who find that the cointegration analysis reject the hypothesis 
that the GNPs of a set of industrialized countries are driven by a common 
trend.
In the following section, we show that the multicountry version of BQ 
which includes a stationary ‘conjunctural’ variable for each country provides a 
‘block-identification’ scheme which separates the effects of what we call ‘sup­
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ply’ shocks with respect to ‘demand’ shocks. The identifying assumption is 
that supply shocks have permanent effects on output levels in at least some 
countries, whereas demand shocks have no permanent effect on output in any 
country. The long-run properties are then used to fully identify each perma­
nent shock. As far as the demand shocks are concerned, it is more difficult to 
find economically meaningful restrictions and we do not opt for any particular 
identifying assumptions. This is in fact not crucial for the scope of the present 
paper. VAR analysis permits, once the joint effects of these purely temporary 
(‘demand’) disturbances are identified, to check ‘how the world would have 
looked’ without these components.
1 Identification
We first derive the generalization of the Blanchard and Quah model to a mul­
ticountry framework. Let Y k(t) and Uk{t) denote the logarithm of per capita 
GNP and the level of the unemployment (or other conjunctural variable) in 
country k. Let X( t )  denote the 2ra-dimensional vector of stationary variables 
(AV, I/ ) ' , where n is the number countries, and e be the vector of 2n ‘struc­
tura l’ disturbances. As usual in the VAR literature, we assume that such 
disturbances are orthogonal and that X follows a stationary process given by:
X( t )  = Z%0A (j)e(t -  j ) ,  Var(e)  =  I  (1)
where the diagonal covariance matrix has been normalised to unity. Let us 
impose the BQ-type restrictions on the long-run matrix. In the multicountry 
case, this is not sufficient to achieve complete identification. However, we 
want to show that it allows us to ‘block-identify’ the system, so that the 
lack of individual identification of the transitory shocks does not affect the 
identification of the permanent disturbances. The long-run BQ restrictions 
can be represented as follows. Let A (l) =  Y^ JL0A (j)  be the m atrix of long-run 
effects. Then, A (l) can be written in the form of the following partitioned
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matrix:
■4(1) =  [ I "  ?  I (2)
/ i2 1  /122
where the zero block has dimension (nxn). This implies that the temporary 
disturbances have no effects on the level of Y in any country.
The estimation procedure goes in two steps. First, obtain the Wold moving 
average representation by estimating and inverting the VAR representation; 
then transform the Wold representation by imposing that the residual be or­
thogonal and that the impact matrix B (0) have a lower triangular structure 
(Cholesky factorization). Let the Cliolesky decomposition be represented as 
follows:
X (t)  = X?=0B ( j ) e ( t - j ) ,  Var(e) = I  B(0)B(0)' =  0  (3)
where f2 is the covariance matrix of the residuals in the Wold representation 
and B(0) is lower triangular. To obtain the Cholesky decomposition is rou­
tine in current econometric packages. The problem of identification amounts 
to reconstructing the structural representation (1) from (3). The following 
relationships must hold true:
A(0)e(t) = B(0)e(f), A (j) = B (j)A (0 ), / i ( l)  =  B(1M (0) (4)
where B (  1) is the long-run matrix according to the Cholesky decomposition, 
defined analogously to A (l). From A(0)A(0)' =  ft, it follows that:
A ( i)A ( \y  = B ( i ) n B ( iy  = Ci (5 )
where Cl can be estimated. Now, partition Cl as follows:
f i  =
Hu Cll2 
^ 1 2  ^ 2 2 (6)
where each block has dimension (nxn) and ftn  and ft22 are symmetric. Then 
(5) implies that:
Ah Aji =  f tn , (7)
■All =  ftl2 (8)
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The permanent residuals are (exactly) identified if and only if there exist 
unique matrices An and A 21 which can be recovered from the estimates of 
f in  and ft12. Since f in  is symmetric, a necessary condition for identification 
(cfr. equation (7)) is that at least n (n-l)/2  restrictions be imposed on A \\. If 
there are no singularities, (8) can then be used to find a unique solution for 
A21. In particular, this allows the estimation of all the ‘structural’ parameters 
corresponding to the first and second column of A (j)  for j  =  0 ,1 ,..., 0 0 , using 
(5), together with the first n disturbances. This generates an estimate of the 
effects of each of the permanent shocks on all the endogenous variables. It 
is clear from this argument that whether or not the temporary disturbances 
are individually identified does not m atter for the sake of the identification 
of the permanent disturbances. Nor does it m atter for decomposing the fore­
cast variance into the effects of permanent and temporary disturbances. Then, 
we need to impose a sufficient number of restrictions on the long-run effects 
of technological shocks on output. In the next section we will derive these 
restrictions from the long run properties of the output series.
2 A tw o-country case
As a simple example of the procedure illustrated, we will consider a two- 
country case, with the countries chosen being the US and UK. Departing from 
previous literature, we use a longer sample than that usually considered for 
decomposition purposes. This allows us to test the robustness of the decom­
position results to the addition of a number of historical episodes, such as the 
two world wars and the Great Depression, though at the cost of using yearly 
rather than quarterly data. We use the logarithm of GNP per capita for the 
US and of GDP per capita for the UK and the levels of the unemployment 
rate for these two countries in the period 1900-1992.
To start with, we consider the univariate properties of the time series. The 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with different lag structures and no trend
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(see Engle and Granger, 1991) confirms, as expected, that the output series 
are 1(1) processes. The results of the ADF tests for the unemployment series 
are more controversial. The data do not reject the null of the presence of a 
unit root at the 95% confidence level for either of the countries. However, in 
both cases there is some evidence of reversion to the mean, particularly for 
the US series where we only marginally fail to reject the non-stationarity null. 
The relevant coefficients for the ADF test with two lags and a constant exhibit 
a t-value of -2.81 for the US which is very close to the 5% critical value of 
-2.86. In the case of the UK unemployment rate the t-value found was -1.991. 
Since the evidence is not conclusive, we choose to maintain the hypothesis of 
stationarity of unemployment in the text, and to report the results of the same 
model with unemployment in first differences in the appendix. As we will see, 
the results are affected substantially by this choice 2.
Next, we test for cointegration between the two output level series. Dif­
ferent tests for cointegration are available. The most traditional for bivariate 
analysis (Engle and Granger test) consists of running first a cointegrating re­
gression with an intercept, and then an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the 
residuals of this regression. The evidence from this test is again not clear-cut. 
The ADF test with one lag on the cointegrating regression returns a t-value 
of the critical coefficient of -2.65, failing to reject the non-cointegration null 
hypothesis at both 5% and 10% levels (the critical value of the 5 per cent 
Engle-Granger test reported in MacKinnon, 1991 is -3.34). In conclusion, we 
do not reject the null of non-cointegration, though one might think that the
1This failure to reject the unit-root null in the UK case was noted by Bean, 1992. Some 
issues about the stationarity of unemployment are also mentioned by Blanchard and Quah. 
Notice, that they introduce a fitted-linear time-trend regression line in their analysis. This 
solution does not seem of great help with our data.
2Our prejudice in favour of unemployment being stationary comes from the fact that 
the theoretical interpretation of the model with unemployment in first differences is prob­
lematic. In particular, we have no clear explanation to why temporary disturbances should 
have a permanent effect on unemployment, but not on output. We notice, however, that 
models with ‘hysteresis’ effects like Blanchard and Summers (1986) predict precisely that 
unemployment should be non-stationary and affected in the long-run by both demand and 
supply disturbances.
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results are due to the low power of the test.
The cointegration analysis suggests that the matrix of the long-run elfects 
of the shocks (A n) is full rank. It leaves a degree of freedom, however, about 
the choice of the basis of such space. The choice of a basis which is economically 
interesting is used here as the device to identify the permanent disturbances. 
Unfortunately, any solution is subject to some degree of arbitrariness, as it is 
often the case in VAR analysis. We can consider three candidate solutions. 
The first is that growth in the two countries is driven by entirely idiosyn­
cratic shocks which have permanent effects only in the country where they 
have been generated. This implies to impose that the off-diagonal entries in 
the m atrix An be zero. This structure implies two zero restrictions in the 
long-run matrix, and is overidentified since perfect identification requires one 
restriction only. However, the overidentifying restriction implied by the model 
with purely idiosyncratic trends is massively rejected by the data, so we ig­
nore this case. Both of the other identification schemes which we consider 
assume the existence of a shared ‘world’ stochastic trend. The model which 
we will refer to as case a follows from the assumption that, together with a 
world technological trend which drives growth in both countries, there exists 
an idiosyncratic technological trend in one of the two countries (particularly, 
the UK). Though this asymmetry is somewhat unpalatable, it is rather conve­
nient from an analytical viewpoint since it implies that the long-run m atrix is 
lower triangular. The alternative model (case b) eliminates the asymmetry by 
assuming, alternatively, the existence of a ‘relative shock’ with a unit root that 
drives the difference (Y us — Y UK) between the output of the two countries. 
This assumption implies one restriction on the long-run matrix, which takes 
on the form:
a p  
7
An — (9)
Since both the identifying restrictions suggested are controversial, we present 
the results of both cases. Notice that this specification issue is mildened by the 
fact that the choice of the identifying restrictions within the block A n does
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not affect the results of the permanent vs. transitory decomposition, but only 
the attribution to each permanent disturbance of the total forecast variance 
explained by permanent components and determined by the Blanchard and 
Quah-type restrictions.
3 R esu lts.
The observation of the GNP series (see later, Fig. 2) reveals a higher degree 
of volatility in the first half of the century than in second half, with three 
main shocks in the forefront: the First World War, the Great Depression and 
the Second World War. It is also noticeable that the first thirty years of the 
century are characterised by a very low average growth rate in the UK. It 
seems interesting to check how the model fits the data in the presence of these 
large-size fluctuations that are left outside of the analysis which considers only 
post-war data.
First, we proceed to estimate the impact and long-run matrices. In or­
der to make estimation feasible, we impose a technical ‘fictitious’ identifying 
restriction with no economic interpretation, namely that A 22 is lower triangu­
lar. This makes A (l) itself lower triangular. When interpreting the results, 
however, we will be careful to avoid to disentangle the effects of of the two 
temporary disturbances, and we only assess their joint effects on each endoge­
nous variable. In all cases, we have estimated a three lags VAR system with a 
constant (deterministic trend in output). Changes in the lag structure do not 
affect the results significantly.
Table 1 summarizes the estimates of the impact and long-run matrix ob­
tained from the VARs using model a model b. Notice that only the first two 
columns of each m atrix bear a meaningful interpretation, according to our 
previous discussion. In the former cases, the disturbances labelled as ‘world 
technological shock’ has a significantly stronger impact on the US than on the 
UK economy. We also notice that the UK shock has a positive impact effect
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\on the US economy. In the latter case, instead, the impact effect of the world 
shock is almost identical, whereas the cumulated long-run effect is higher in 
the UK than in the US. The ‘relative shock’ has a negative impact effect on 
both countries, though stronger in the UK, whereas the long-run effect is posi­
tive for the US and negative for the UK. We can compare the short-run effects 
with the long-run effects of permanent disturbances, in order to measure their 
degree of persistence, similalrly to Campbell and Mankiw (1987). In both 
cases, the so-called ‘world shock’ exhibits a high degree of persistence with 
long run effects being more pronounced than the impact effects. In model a 
the global shock has a long-run effect which is twice as large as the short-run 
effect in the US and more than three times as large as the short-run effect in 
the UK. In model 6, a 0.8% GNP rise in both economies following a world 
shock has a long-run effect of 0.9% in the US and more than 1.3% in the UK.
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Table 1
MODEL a
Estimate of A(0) - Impact effects Estimate of A(1) - Long-run effects
0.00532 0.00620 -0.00813 0.01345 0.01063 0 0 0
0.00260 0.01044 -0.00839 -0.00288 0.00826 0.01194 0 0
0.48103 -1.10866 0.58480 -1.43004 4.21228 -4.20664 11.90462 0
0.58998 -0.31436 1.33584 -0.07751 6.17355 1.49854 12.31294 8.40371
MODEL b
Estimate o f A(0) - Impact effects Estimate of A ( l) - Long-run effects
0.00781 -0.00240 -0.00813 0.01345 0.00899 0.00568 0 0
0.00778 -0.00744 -0.00839 -0.00288 0.01336 -0.00568 0 0
-0.18562 1.19541 0.58481 -1.43000 1.31372 5.80597 11.90482 0
0.33081 0.58086 1.33586 -0.07751 6.01957 2.03048 12.31310 0.40348
Figure 1 represents the cumulated effects for each of the permanent shocks 
on output in the two countries. We observe some pronounced oscillatory be­
haviour of the impulse-response functions whose interpretation is puzzling. 
Since we use annual data, we find it reasonable to expect that the dynamic 
effects of a shock should die off after few periods (i.e., we expect to see the 
impulse-response function settling down about its long run value rather soon).
FIGURE 1 (Impulse response functions)
The next step represents the main point of our exercise. The objective is to 
estimate the weight attributed to each disturbance in explaining the variability 
of output by each model. To this aim, we decompose the forecast error variance 
at various horizons into the part due to each of the innovation processes. Before 
going through our results, we remind the reader the findings of Blanchard and 
Quah. They estimated that the percentage of variance due to demand shocks 
at a one (ten) year horizon, depending on alternative treatments of structural 
breaks and trend in unemployment, is 97.9% (39.3%), 78.9% (18.7%), 98.6% 
(50.4%) and 38.9% (5.2%). Though the evidence is not clear-cut in one of the 
case mentioned, they considered their results as supportive of models which
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predict an important role for demand disturbances in the short run. We want 
to check whether the same finding holds true in our two-country framework 
and with a different sample. The results are summarised in Table 2.
168
Table 2
MODEL a
(N.B.: decomposition without the period 1930-46 in parenthesis)
Decomposition of variance for US output
Years Std. Error World shock UK shock Demand
1 0.0177 (0.0116) 9.1 (46.3) 12.4 (1.9) 78.5 (51.8)
5 0.0215 (0.0145) 10.3 (42.0) 22.7 (3.3) 67.0 (54.7)
10 0.0225 (0.0146) 10.2 (42.1) 23.6 (3.4) 66.2 (54.5)
Decomposition o f variance for UK output
Years Std. Error World shock UK shock Demand
1 0.0139 (0.0118) 3.5 (51.5) 56.1 (35.2) 40.4 (13.3)
5 0.0157 (0.0140) 6.1 (46.0) 48.4 (26.9) 45.5 (27.1)
10 0.0162 (0.0141) 6.2 (46.0) 46.6 (26.9) 41.2 (27.1)
Decomposition o f variance for US unemployment
Years Std. Error World shock UK shock Demand
1 1.9615 (0.9376) 6.0 (0.1) 31.9 (22.0) 62.1 (77.9)
5 4.2700 (1.4355) 1.6 (9.0) 35.8 (24.0) 62.6 (67.0)
10 4.6380 (1.4963) 2.7 (9.2) 31.4 (24.4) 65.4 (66.4)
Decomposition of variance for UK unemployment
Years Std. Error World shock UK shock Demand
1 1.4958 (0.6871) 15.6 (3.0) 4.4 (8.3) 80.0 (88.7)
5 3.1237 (2.2680) 9.9 (14.7) 6.0 (22.6) 84.1 (62.7)
10 3.8489 (2.9287) 11.4 (13.6) 5.6 (24.9) 83.0 (61.5)
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MODEL b
Decomposition of variance for US output
Years Std. Error World shock Relative shock Demand
1 0.0177 19.5 2.0 78.5
5 0.0215 25.4 7.6 67.0
10 0.0225 10.2 23.6 66.2
Decomposition of variance for UK output
Years Std. Error World shock Relative shock Demand
1 0.0139 31.1 28.5 40.4
5 0.0157 30.0 24.5 45.5
10 0.0162 29.4 23.4 41.2
Decomposition of variance for US unemployment
Years Std. Error World shock Relative shock Demand
1 1.9615 0.9 37.0 62.1
5 4.2700 7.7 29.7 62.6
10 4.6380 7.5 26.6 65.4
Decomposition of variance for UK unemployment
Years Std. Error World shock Relative shock Demand
1 1.4958 4.9 15.1 80.0
5 3.1237 3.1 12.8 84.1
10 3.8489 8.5 8.5 83.0
Our estimates seem to confirm the prominent role of demand disturbances 
found by BQ, particularly for the US economy. Almost 79% of the one-year 
forecast variance is attributed to temporary disturbances. This figure falls to 
about 66% at the ten-years horizon (which we still find it a surprisingly high 
percentage). In model a, the only shock which is assumed to have a permanent 
effects on the US output explains just about 10% of the forecast error at 
different horizons. We should notice, however, that an important role in these 
results is played by the highly turbulent period 1930-1946. When this period is 
om itted from the sample, the decomposition outcome changes different. In this 
case (estimates within brackets in the table), the forecast variance explained by 
‘supply’ disturbances turns out to be substantially higher, as reported in the 
table. Still, more than half of the output variability is explained by temporary
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disturbances in the US. Model b estimates attribute a more important role to 
the world shock than model a in explaining output fluctuations, particularly 
in the US case.
Finally, we can check how our model would fit the output data in the 
absence of temporary disturbances3. This provides similar information to that 
rendered by the decomposition, but is intuitively appealing and allows us to 
visualize the role of the different shocks throughout the history of the two 
countries. Furthermore, it is directly comparable with the picture obtained by 
BQ for the common period in the sample. Our model, once a deterministic 
trend is allowed, can be given the following representation:
X t =  +  ft (10)
where capital letter terms are (4x4) matrices and lower case terms are (4x1) 
vectors, with the variable ordered in the conventional way. If we constrain the 
third and fourth term of each vector e*_5 to be zero, and simulate the dynamic 
path of the economy, we obtain the representation of how the world would 
have looked in the absence of temporary disturbances. The visualisation of 
the results of this exercise are reported in the upper part of Figure 2, together 
with the graph of actual GNP per capita. The lower part reports the difference 
between actual and simulated GNP per capita absent demand.
FIGURE 2
We find these results interesting. Consider the US, first. According to 
model a, supply disturbances are the main cause of both the boom and the 
recession which preceded and followed, respectively, the First World War. The 
drastic fall of output during the Great Depression is a consequence of both 
demand and supply disturbances, though demand disturbances come first and 
have a much more violent effect. The recovery experienced by the economy 
throughout the New Deal is also mainly due to demand effects. After a brief 
slowing down of growth caused by a demand slump, both demand and supply
3For this part of the analysis, the results of models a and 6 are, obviously, identical.
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move to cause the production boom during the Second World War, as well as 
the immediate post-war recession. The picture of the post-war period and the 
respective decomposition look pretty similar to that produced by Blanchard 
and Quah (cfr. Fig. 7, p. 664). Compared with their results, however, our 
stochastic trend is characterised by a higher variability, as the graph makes 
clear. Our estimates, accordingly, confer to demand shocks a quantitatively 
smaller role than those of BQ. The band of fluctuation of output due to demand 
effects is (—4.3%,+3%) according to our estimates, whereas Blanchard and 
Quah detect fluctuations between +6% and -9%. This is only in a part due 
to the inclusion of the effects of propagation of the business cycle, which in 
fact play a marginal role. Like BQ, we detect demand-determined recessions 
in 1954 and 1961. Demand policies keep the output at a higher level than 
warranted by its structural component throughout most of the 60s and 70s, 
with im portant episodes of demand-pulled booms in 1964 and 1972. The slump 
of 1969 is supply-driven according to our model, whereas it was demand-driven 
in BQ. The recessions of 1974-75 and 1979-80 are instead attributed to the 
effects of falling demand plus a slowing down in the structural component 
of growth. The most recent recession, starting in 1989, is characterised as 
a supply-determined episode, which has been offset in 1992 by a favourable 
demand shock.
Looking at the United Kingdom, the analysis identifies some remarkable 
favourable demand shocks in 1910, 1915, 1934-35, 1939-41, and adverse de­
mand shocks in 1908-09, 1918-19, 1921-23 and 1930-31. The contribution of 
demand to the Great Depression is smaller in the UK than in the US. After the 
immediate post-war recession, the analysis does not detect any sharp demand- 
pull fluctuations. The main fluctuations in the actual output level are also 
recorded by the series which is constructed absent demand, including the most 
recent slump episode. This is coherent with the finding of the decomposition 
analysis that fluctuations have a more important supply-determined compo­
nent in the US than in the UK. Notice that the 80’s are characterised by a
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switch of regime such that the actual output ceases to be above its ‘structural 
level’ and remains constantly below it.
4 Conclusions.
We have extended the BQ framework in terms of both sample length and 
number of countries and independent sources of fluctuations considered. If the 
hypothesis of stationarity of the unemployment rate series is maintained, the 
results are similar to those of Blanchard and Quah. The finding that tem ­
porary shocks play an important role in explaining short-run fluctuations is 
confirmed by our analysis. Furthermore, the decomposition of the post-war 
US business cycle into ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ effects renders a picture which 
is, at least qualitatively, consistent with that of Blanchard and Quah. On 
the other hand, the impulse-response function presents some counterintuitive 
features that undermine the reliability of the results. The importance of the 
‘world shock’ vs. idiosyncratic or relative trends in explaining fluctuations 
depends significantly on the assumptions chosen to identify each permanent 
components. As agenda for future research, we intend to test the structural 
stability of the sample, checking whether some significant changes occur when 
some large-size shocks (the Great Depression, the two wars) are better mod­
elled as once-for-all deterministic changes rather than as part of the stochastic 
process (see Perron, 1991, for a univariate analysis).
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5 A ppendix
In this appendix we report the estimates obtained by differentiating the un­
employment rate. We will refer to this case as model c. Table 3 corresponds 
to Table 1 (estimates of impact and long-run effects) whereas Table 4 corre­
sponds to Table 2 (decomposition). The most remarkable feature of this case is 
that the role of demand in explaining output fluctuations becomes very small 
(about 5-6 percent in both countries). We find these results hardly plausible.
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Table 3
MODEL c
Estimate of A(0) - Impact effects Estimate o f A(1) - Long-run effects
0.01799 -0.00516 0.00088 0.00211 0.02340 0 0 0
0.00956 0.00997 -0.00296 -0.00024 0.00418 0.01563 0 0
-1.58902 0.62256 0.96829 -0.58282 -2.24788 0.42304 0.85722 0
-0.96889 -0.19432 0.88319 0.81358 -0.77348 -0.56463 0.59841 0.81076
Table 4
MODEL c
Decomposition o f variance for US output
Years Std. Error World shock UK shock Demand
1 0.0188 91.0 7.5 1.5
5 0.0222 85.4 8.6 6.0
10 0.0225 85.4 8.5 6.1
Decomposition o f variance for UK output
Years Std. Error World shock UK shock Demand
1 0.0141 45.8 49.7 4.5
5 0.0161 48.7 46.1 5.2
10 0.0163 49.8 44.6 5.6
Decomposition o f variance for US unemployment
Years Std. Error World shock UK shock Demand
1 2.0469 60.3 9.3 30.4
5 2.4050 56.0 9.3 34.7
10 2.4329 55.9 9.3 34.6
Decomposition of variance for UK unemployment
Years Std. Error World shock UK shock Demand
1 1.5551 38.8 1.6 59.6
5 1.6961 38.9 6.6 54.5
10 1.7171 39.2 6.5 54.3
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